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0. Introduction 
Bookkeeping with my father
I sat that evening in the back of the auditorium where 
the first Senate session of the academic year was being 
held. The table on the stage was draped with a green 
tablecloth that reached the floor. Seated at the table were 
the patricians of the university, which is situated north 
of an almost dry riverbed. A microphone was connected 
to scratchy loudspeakers. The national flag and the 
university flag drooped side by side in their stands.
The meeting opened with a string quartet whose 
young members had been asked to perform a classical 
piece to reflect the aesthetic taste of the Senate members, 
devotees of culture at a prestigious university. The rector 
then welcomed the participants, wishing them a year of 
fruitful research, a year of striving for excellence, and 
a year of peace. He noted a number of new programs 
at the university, “all of which express our pursuit of 
excellence.” He went on to list the promotions, prizes and 
honors that members of the Senate had received during 
the summer months. Each honoree, when his name was 
mentioned, stood and made a slight bow, to the bored 
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applause of a few of the more enthusiastic members of 
the Senate. 
The Senate then discussed the appointment of members 
of a committee set up to examine ways of promoting 
excellence at the university. One by one, the candidates were 
introduced and their unique qualities cited. There was an 
occasional burst of erudite chuckling in the auditorium when 
one of the presenters strayed from his written recitation and 
inserted a witty remark in the chronicle of the candidate’s 
meritorious deeds. The restraint disappeared when it came 
to female candidates. The first to leave the meeting had 
already begun to sneak out. And since to reach the exit they 
had to cross in front of the stage, they had no choice but to 
render an apologetic nod toward the self-satisfied rector. 
Until that evening, I had never spoken before the Senate. 
During the meetings, I actually thought that I had a lot to 
say. I sometimes felt compelled to jot down an outline of 
profound, daring and provocative points I would raise in 
response to the outrageous statements, full of pathos, being 
voiced there. I would write these things on the back of an 
ATM receipt I found in my wallet, in handwriting that even 
I had trouble deciphering. But at the end of the meeting, I 
would toss the note in the trashcan outside the auditorium. 
And if for some reason the note remained in my pocket and 
I found it the next day, I would praise myself for being smart 
enough to refrain from publicly expressing the ridiculous 
things I had wanted so much to say just the day before. 
The next item on the agenda was not supposed to 
dampen the festive atmosphere of the opening session. 
The administration proposed upgrading the program 
of studies in accounting to a status previously reserved 
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only for main academic fields, and allowing the best 
students to receive a bachelor’s degree after studying 
only accounting. The head of the accounting department 
extolled the virtues of the new program, his description 
easily covering a whole page, embellished by numerous 
tributes to excellence: the excellence of the lecturers, the 
excellence of the students – past, present, and particularly, 
future. The rector thanked the speaker for his fascinating 
remarks, and almost routinely began to take a formal 
vote when, from the back of the auditorium, I raised my 
hand and asked for permission to speak. 
I approached the podium, with the pages of the 
speech I planned to deliver in my hand – three documents 
pertaining to the program and another small page, hiding 
between the folded pages. It was a photocopy of the 
diploma from a bookkeeping course offered at one of the 
evening classes of the Daughters of Zion in Bialystock. 
I had found the diploma in my father’s forbidden drawer, 
under the compartment of the starched sheets and above 
the compartment of the embroidered tablecloths, along 
with his immigration certificate, his officer ranks from 
the Civil Defense unit, and a booklet of unused coupons 
for water rations from 1948. 
My father was 21 when he received his only professional 
degree, bookkeeper. Four years earlier, he had immigrated 
to Palestine, but due to circumstances he was never willing 
to discuss, he returned to his parents’ home in Poland. 
In the photograph in the diploma, my father appears in a 
suit and tie, looking straight at the camera, a handsome 
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young man, shy, yet proud. The left half of the diploma is 
in Polish, the right half in Hebrew: 
My father had a strong, confident voice, masculine, 
but soothing. When, rarely, he would raise his voice, it 
would frighten those around him. At home, everything 
was conducted according to his wishes. At one time he 
must have been a real ladies’ man. One of my aunts was 
secretly in love with him and, while I was growing up, 
sealed brown envelopes would still arrive at our house 
from a female admirer, a Dr. H. D., who apparently felt 
lost without him. During elections, he was the chairman 
of a polling station committee as the representative of the 
Mapai (the ruling party in Israel until 1977). On Memorial 
Day for Israel’s fallen soldiers, for a few minutes he 
was part of the guard of honor made up of veterans 
of the Haganah (the pre-State paramilitary defense 
organization), which President Ben Zvi reviewed before 
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the siren was sounded at ten o’clock. I was proud of my 
father, but also a bit embarrassed that he was not one of 
the fathers capable of standing stiffly at attention for a 
complete hour, next to the memorial flame. 
With the establishment of the state, the word buchalteria 
was Hebraized to hanhalat heshbonot (bookkeeping), and my 
father became a government clerk. In time, he advanced, and 
almost made it to senior official. He was once photographed 
with the Minister of Transport at a ceremony inaugurating 
an airfield at the Dead Sea. On another occasion his name 
was cited in a news item in one of the daily newspapers. 
The article, which was cut out and kept in the bottom of 
the forbidden drawer, reported that one of the employees 
in his office had attacked him, and had been arrested and 
released on bail. No other details were provided. 
I discerned my father’s professional pride when 
I showed interest in the bookkeeping textbooks that 
rested in the bookcase, alongside the six volumes of the 
Mishnah (a codex of Jewish law), a Hebrew dictionary 
and a memorial booklet about the Jewish community 
of Bialystock. On the same shelves were summaries of 
lectures from the Economic History course that my father 
saved from his unsuccessful attempt to study economics 
at the university – the same texts the lecturer continued 
to read even when I arrived at the university. “A person 
needs a profession in life,” my father told me many times 
when I was about to complete my military service and 
register for university. And he tried to convince me to 
study accounting, or at least economics. 
When I was a boy, my father would take me on two buses 
to Mr. Gur Aryeh, the eternal secretary of the committee for 
“Workers Quarters B,” a small neighborhood with narrow 
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paths, flowers and a towering palm tree, located between 
the aristocratic Rehavia and Talbieh neighborhoods. 
Gur Aryeh’s neighbours included a famous lawyer whose 
books are still cited, the father of an army Chief of Staff, 
an accountant, and a piano teacher who gave lessons only 
between 4 pm and 7 pm. Mr. Gur Aryeh, or “the nudnik” 
(nagger) as we referred to him in our family (because he 
would phone frequently, and ask, slowly and clearly, as 
if he did not expect us to understand, “is your father at 
home?”) would open the door for us at five o’clock sharp. 
First, he would offer me a piece of bittersweet chocolate 
from a yellow box he kept in a drawer. Then he would sit 
me down in an armchair, and I would gaze at a drawing 
of David’s Tower that hung on the wall, while my father 
discussed with him what to do about lost receipts. On the 
way back, between one bus and the next, we would stop at 
King George Street and my father would buy me a piece 
of peanut cake that had a whole peanut stuck in the center. 
Once a year we would ride to Mr. Gur Aryeh to pick 
up “the material.” Then my father would sit during the 
evenings and do the bookkeeping for the committee. My 
father had wide ledgers with colored lines, lots of columns, 
and thirty rows corresponding to thirty apartments and 
tenants. From there, the numbers spilled over into two 
columns that had to balance before we could travel again 
to Mr. Gur Aryeh to return “the material” and receive the 
check that my father would endorse and pass on the next 
day to the grocer to cover part of the tab in his notebook.
When a new regulation was issued requiring that high 
government officers must be university graduates, my 
father was consigned to early retirement and became a 
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teacher of bookkeeping in evening classes. The classes 
ran from 6:30 pm to 10 pm, with a break for burekas and 
Turkish coffee. He made his name as the author of the 
Exercise Primer in Bookkeeping Part 1. My father typed 
this slim book on a typewriter with a black ribbon that 
would get stuck whenever it was necessary to reverse 
direction. As a child, I used this typewriter to produce 
my street newspaper – a newspaper I founded, wrote, 
edited, and read, though not even a single edition was 
ever published. The bookkeeping primer bore my father’s 
patronymic nom de plume, Ben Israel Meir, a reference to 
his father, a man who died with “Shema Yisrael” [the 
Jewish deathbed declaration of faith] on his lips and who 
left a slim booklet of polemical articles about the virtues 
of observing the Sabbath and the sins of our fellow Jews 
who went astray with communism, as well as sketches 
of figures from the halls of Torah study. Copies of the 
booklet will remain untouched in the National Library in 
Jerusalem and in a library in New York until the end of 
days, or until their pages disintegrate.
The exercises in my father’s primer encompassed 
the entire theoretical world of Reuven, Shimon and 
Levy, the partners in “Furniture, Inc.,” including 
movable property and cash, debtors and creditors, 
and a lot of doubtful debts. The transactions to be 
recorded were the sale on credit of six chairs to Mr. X 
and the payment of wages to the carpenter, Mr. Y. At 
the end of the exercise, the student had to deduct the 
annual depreciation on the company’s typewriter and, 
if he did not make a mistake, he would find that the 
business had a small loss. To this day I do not know 
8 Economic Fables
how the loss was covered. There was also a sample test 
at the end of the primer, with questions such as: “What 
is goodwill?” “What is the role of bookkeeping in a 
business?” and “Describe the duties of an accountant.” 
The publisher was Moskowitz Book Publishers, Bat 
Yam. Moskowitz had a machine for duplicating 
stencils and some dealings with a bookbinder from 
Holon. My father orchestrated the marketing; every 
so often he would phone Moskowitz and ask him to 
send thirty copies via Egged Parcels for the evening 
course of the Workers Council in Hadera. The booklet 
had sequels: Exercise Primer in Bookkeeping Part 2 
and Exercise Primer in Bookkeeping Part 3. I was filled 
with pride when I found my father’s booklets at the 
university book store, among the books for students 
in the Accounting Department. When my father died, 
the books also disappeared from the evening courses 
of the workers’ councils.
My father never spoke to me of his passion for 
women, or of his ambition to be a senior official, or even 
of his fears. I do not remember him ever saying “I love,” 
“I want” or “I am afraid.” But one night I saw my father as 
I had never seen him before.
The room was cluttered with household items: a bed, 
a bookcase and a radio that no longer worked, a dusty, 
empty fruit bowl, and lots of newspapers tossed on the 
floor alongside a pair of tattered slippers. On the dining 
room table, which also served as a work desk, there 
were plates with leftover food, left there since lunch. 
My mother was sprawled on the bed as always, 
surrounded by the stale stuffiness of unaired 
bedding. The broken wood shutters were closed and 
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half-hidden by curtains that were once white lace and 
had since been refashioned by a decade of Jerusalem 
dust. My father sat in a brown dressing gown that 
was just about held closed with a threadbare cord. He 
sat with his back to the window, facing the bed where 
my mother was lying. I sat facing the window with 
my back to the bed.
My father made another attempt to balance the 
accounts of the committee of the Workers Quarters 
B neighborhood. The nudnik had already called five 
times to ask for “the material.” My father would read 
a list of numbers to me and I would add them with the 
proficiency of a young student of mathematics. I was 
21 years old. I was so bored. The totals swung between a 
deficit and a surplus and did not balance. I was impatient. 
I felt suffocated. I wanted to flee. My father said we 
had to start over again from the beginning. And again 
the numbers moved around in the shadows cast by the 
chandelier (two of its three bulbs were burnt out), and 
again he dictated the numbers and I added them up. And 
then my father clutched his balding head and said that 
if he did not manage to balance the numbers, he would 
have to kill himself. 
With a tone of seriousness befitting the occasion, 
I began my address to the members of the Senate with 
the following words: “I would like to express my strong 
objection to the plan to establish a program that focuses 
only on accounting.” And I immediately continued: “Before 
explaining the reasons for my opposition, I would like to 
declare that I have a personal connection to the accounting 
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profession. My late father’s only training was in buchalteria. 
In my childhood, without a computer, I would spend many 
hours helping him to balance the books, adding debits 
and credits, and he would occasionally explain to me the 
rationale of the discipline he so wanted me to study.” 
I then proceeded in a serious, business-like tone: 
Those who are admitted to the new program will 
undoubtedly be the cream of our youth. When they 
graduate, they will find work in the top accounting 
firms and will become part of Israel’s elite, whose 
cultural make-up we are shaping, whether we like 
it or not. What will the members of this elite be like? 
They will be remarkably similar to, almost clones of, 
the images its critics portray. We are speaking of a 
talented and ambitious group of students who, at age 
21, know what they are looking for in life. We will give 
them an entry ticket to the elite, extensive knowledge 
of accounting, and nothing else that this university 
could and should contribute to their education. Some 
might assert the cliché that accounting is an academic 
subject, but with all due respect to this new pillar of 
the scientific experience, I wonder how anyone can 
compare accounting to mathematics and biology and 
philosophy and linguistics. These are the subjects that 
we should be encouraging the outstanding students to 
study, rather than the elective course on “Accounting 
for Residents Committees”. 
At this point, the head of the Accounting Department 
interrupted me and shouted: “You don’t know what you’re 
talking about!” I hurried to conclude my remarks: “I ask 
each of you to use your independent judgment and answer 
the question of whether our curricula have true academic 
excellence as their objective, or whether our rhetoric is 
more Pravda than Pravda, and to vote accordingly.”
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I returned to my seat at the back of the hall and quickly 
buried my face in my father’s buchalteria degree. No one 
looked at me except for one humanities professor who 
passed me a note saying that she disagreed with some 
of the things I said. Another professor, his hair parted 
on the side, wearing a sporty suit and black tie, rose to 
the podium and, speaking fluently, said that he was very 
surprised by my remarks. “We are not talking about 
buchalteria here,” he explained, his face expressing distaste 
as he said the word, and went on to more or less say that 
I did not understand the difference between buchalteria 
and accounting: “Anyone can serve as a bookkeeper, but 
an accountant must have a BA degree. Accounting is an 
academic profession in every way, with international 
conferences and scientific journals…” 
Then a vote was held and the program was approved 
by a large majority. A few people were actually influenced 
by my remarks and voted against it. Others only abstained, 
but no one bothered to count them. 
During the following days, I was unable to forgive the 
head of the Accounting Department who had interrupted 
my remarks. I easily discovered that his comments were 
actually riddled with inaccuracies. I sent him and the 
rector a steady trickle of e-mail messages with evidence 
demonstrating that the approval of the program was 
based on erroneous information that he had presented. 
The embarrassed rector referred the program to some 
sort of committee and I said no more. 
The image of my father that accompanies me now is his 
picture on the certificate from the Daughters of Zion: young, 
handsome, serious, shy and proud. I would run into that 
head of department on campus and was curious to ask him 
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who his father was, but I did not dare to ask as I was afraid 
I would discover that he also had “a father”. I do not know 
what happened to that program in the committee. Perhaps 
it was buried there. Perhaps it will reemerge and be 
unanimously approved by the Senate. Or, perhaps it was 
approved there long ago. I am no longer interested in it. All 
I really wanted was to complete the one balance sheet that 
my father and I did not manage to balance at the formica 
table in the middle of the room opposite the window, next 
to my mother’s bed. After all, I just wanted to transfer one 
father from the liabilities side to the assets side.
Economics and me
This is how I usually begin lectures on economics and 
social issues:
I would like to start with what I believe every academic 
should do when appearing in public, especially when 
speaking about political and controversial issues – to 
clarify the extent to which he is incorporating his 
professional knowledge in his remarks, whether he 
is expressing views with the authority supported by 
academic findings, and what part of his comments 
are nothing more than his personal thoughts and 
opinions. And so, I would like to declare unequivocally, 
without hesitation and even with a bit of pride, that 
my words here have absolutely nothing to do with my 
academic knowledge. Everything I say here is personal, 
based upon the entire range of my life experience, 
which also includes the fact that professionally I 
engage in economic theory. However, to the best of 
my understanding, economic theory has nothing to 
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say about the heart of the issue under discussion here. 
I am not sure that I know what an option is; I am not 
attempting to predict the rate of inflation tomorrow 
nor the productivity index in manufacturing the day 
after tomorrow. Of course, I am aware of the fact that 
you have invited me here to speak because I am a 
professor of economics who is supposed to know all 
this, and my ignorance definitely embarrasses me. So 
you ask why I have come here? Because as an economic 
theorist, I would like to state that economic theory 
is exploited in discussions about current economic 
issues, and I don’t like it…, to put it mildly.
This statement is not just a pretense to exempt myself from 
a commitment to “scientific” criteria, and it is not intended 
simply to project an image that distinguishes me from other 
economists, or to boost my self-image. This introduction 
reflects what I truly believe. Nonetheless, it is clear to me 
that my remarks are received with skepticism. I myself 
would make fun of a professor of economics who begins 
a lecture by declaring that his remarks have nothing to do 
with economics, and speaks with an expression on his face 
that reflects his feeling of superiority over his colleagues and 
whose lecture could be seen as “spitting in the well from 
which he drinks.” I am sure no one would invite me to speak 
about the government’s economic policy if I were a professor 
of astronomy or an historian of the Middle Ages. Moreover, it 
is clear to me that my reservations do not prevent my listeners 
from continuing to treat me as a professor of economics 
(at most, an unusual one) and not just as a concerned citizen. 
And I suspect that despite my warning, there are those who 
regard my remarks as if they are spoken by someone with an 
authority whose existence I deny. 
14 Economic Fables
In this book too I make no claim to objectivity. I am 
not about to reveal to the reader some truth that I have 
discovered. On the contrary, everything I say here, even 
in an academic context (and I intentionally use the word 
“academic” since I do not think that the word “scientific” 
is appropriate for economics), is completely subjective, 
controversial and therefore perhaps describes me no less 
than it describes economic theory.
At the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, where 
I studied, I had the opportunity to listen to many 
distinguished professors. Two of them in particular 
contributed to the fact that I found myself engaging 
in economic theory. One is unknown in the world of 
economics, someone who is not slated to become an 
advisor to a Minister of Finance, and who has not even 
written articles on mathematical economics; he is the 
mathematical logician Saharon Shelah. When my friends 
and I emerged from the lecture halls on Mount Scopus 
and Givat Ram, our notebooks would be filled with the 
definitions and proofs we had gleaned meticulously from 
the blackboards that Shelah had filled and overfilled in 
courses on set theory and mathematical logic. When we 
understood what we had copied, we were astonished by 
its wholeness, level of conceptualization and logic. We 
encountered a strict and uncompromising insistence on 
norms of simplicity and precision. We were introduced 
to and learned to appreciate the beauty of a model, a 
statement and a proof. But the abstract mathematical 
concepts we learned in these courses (as in other courses 
in the Mathematics Department), actually appealed to 
us because of the interest it awakened in us in the world 
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around us. We somehow felt intuitively that the formal 
concepts we were learning were directly relevant to real 
life. In our discussions over coffee in the cafeteria, we 
searched for the meaning of the mathematical statements 
not only as links between mathematical concepts, but also 
as statements about what intrigued us so much as young 
students: the interaction between people. 
During my third year of study, I met the second teacher 
who is responsible for my academic pursuit, Menachem Yaari. 
As part of my work on a seminar paper, Yaari referred me to 
a wonderful book by Amartya Sen called Collective Choice and 
Social Welfare. This book has a very unusual structure. Each 
chapter has a parallel chapter with the same number but 
with an asterisk. In the chapter without an asterisk, a textual 
discussion is conducted about the various axioms of social 
choice theory, while in the chapter with the asterisk the textual 
discussion becomes a chain of precise definitions, arguments 
and proofs. When I read this book, I realized two things: First, 
that economics is interesting – a real revelation for me. And 
second, that the connection between our everyday world and 
the world of mathematical symbols is far deeper than I had 
thought previously during our coffee-bar debates. Before 
reading the book, I was like a child gazing at leaves, hills and 
shadows and imagining heroic figures in them, and feeling 
afraid of what I could see. After reading Sen’s book, I realized 
that what we did in the cafeteria was actually an innocent foray 
into the core of economic theory. This is because economic 
theory is concerned precisely with the abstract concepts 
related to the interaction between people (the chapters without 
an asterisk). And the working tools of economic theory are 
mathematical models (the chapters with an asterisk).
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Economic fables
Economic theory formulates thoughts via what we call 
“models.” The word model sounds more scientific than 
the word fable or tale, but I think we are talking about the 
same thing. 
The author of a tale seeks to impart a lesson about life 
to his readers. He does this by creating a story that hovers 
between fantasy and reality. It is possible to dismiss any 
tale on the grounds that it is unrealistic, or that it is too 
simplistic. But this is also its advantage. The fact that it 
hovers between fantasy and reality means that it can be 
free from irrelevant details and unnecessary diversions. 
This freedom can enable us to broaden our outlook, 
make us aware of a repressed emotion and help us learn 
a lesson from the story. We will take the tale’s message 
with us when we return from the world of fantasy to the 
real world, and apply it judiciously when we encounter 
situations similar to those portrayed in the tale.
In economic theory, as in Harry Potter, the Emperor’s 
New Clothes or the tales of King Solomon, we amuse 
ourselves in imaginary worlds. Economic theory spins 
tales and calls them models. An economic model is also 
somewhere between fantasy and reality. Models can 
be denounced for being simplistic and unrealistic, but 
modeling is essential because it is the only method we 
have of clarifying concepts, evaluating assumptions, 
verifying conclusions and acquiring insights that will 
serve us when we return from the model to real life. 
In modern economics, the tales are expressed formally: 
words are represented by letters. Economic concepts are 
housed within mathematical structures. 
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A typical tale looks like this:
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And an economic model looks like this:
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The use of formal language has its advantages. 
Formal language imposes self-discipline on the 
storyteller. A teller of economic tales who uses formal 
language is obliged to spell out his assumptions 
precisely. When he uses expressions like “thus” or 
“therefore” or “it follows that…,” he is exposed to 
objective criticism: the conclusion he draws from the 
assumptions must be formulated as a mathematical 
statement which must be accompanied by a proof.
A description of an economic model is like the 
introduction in a tale, presenting the heroes, their 
interests and the setting in which they operate. An array 
of rules by which the model is “allowed” to develop from 
its beginning to its end is called a solution concept.
Many solution concepts can be applied to the same 
model. We examine a solution concept according to the 
reasonableness of the assumptions it expresses, and we 
prefer solution concepts that can be applied to a large 
set of models. Formal language encourages the narrator 
to honor the requirement that the conclusion of the 
economic tale must be derived from the assumptions he 
formulated in describing the model and from the solution 
concept to which he is committed. 
However, formal language also has its disadvantages. 
It creates the illusion of being scientific. Those 
unfamiliar with formal models tend to regard them as 
representing “absolute truth,” though they are nothing 
more than tales. In addition, formal models narrow the 
target audience to those who were immersed in them. 
From my teaching experience I have learned that even 
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the best economics students with the highest affinity for 
the subject have difficulty with the language of formal 
models, perhaps due to their persistent confusion 
between the formal model and its interpretation, and 
between the mathematical concepts and the words that 
accompany them. Moreover, when it comes to questions 
of economic policy, the model’s formal mantle enables 
economists to create the false impression that their 
pronouncements are scientific and authoritative, and 
to conceal from the layman the assumptions the model 
uses. The barrier between the secret formal language 
and ordinary human speech almost completely prevents 
anyone who is not a member of the economic fraternity 
from criticizing “professional” economic claims.
Hotelling’s tale of the main street
Harold Hotelling’s model of the main street is a simple 
model that is considered to be among the more successful 
ones in economic theory. Two newsvendors compete 
for the custom of their city’s newspaper readers located 
along the city’s main street. Each vendor seeks to have the 
maximum number of customers buy the newspaper at his 
stand. In a simple version of the model, the freedom of 
action of each vendor is limited to choosing the location 
of his stand. The price of the newspaper is set by the 
publisher, so the vendors cannot compete against each 
other by lowering prices. Nor can they use violence to 
secure or enlarge their market share, and they do not have 
the legal right to appeal to the courts with claims such 
as “for generations, the whole street has been mine” or 
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“it is only fair that I will control half of the street.” As my 
teacher Menachem Yaari once noted, the economic agents 
in our models have desires but no rights. 
At dawn, each vendor sets up his stand somewhere 
along the street. At lunchtime, each newspaper reader 
takes a break from his other pursuits and realizes that 
he cannot get through the day without reading the 
newspaper. The reader sees where the two newsvendors 
are located, and sets out to buy a newspaper from the 
closest one. (If the two stands are equidistant from the 
reader, the chances of the reader buying the newspaper 
at either stand are equal.) The diagram below illustrates 
the distribution of customers between the two vendors. 
The vertical line marks the center point between their 
locations. Everyone situated to the left of the vertical 
line buys from vendor 1, and everyone to the right of 
this line buys from vendor 2. 
That was the introduction to the tale: we have described 
the characters participating in the situation and specified 
each one’s range of choice and objectives. The conclusion 
of the tale is a description of the choices made by the two 
vendors. In other words, the two unknowns in the model 
are the locations of the two newsvendors.
We noted earlier that the principles by which the 
tale’s conclusion is tested – that is, the solution of the 
two unknowns – can be found in the solution concept. 
The conventional solution concept for situations 
like the above is called a Nash equilibrium. This is 
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discussed at length in Chapter 2. Here, I describe it in 
the context of Hotelling’s model. The Nash equilibrium 
in this model must be a pair of locations, one location 
for each of the two vendors. In order to award this pair 
the title of “Nash equilibrium,” the location of each 
vendor must be the best one for him given the location 
of the other one. 
First, let us examine the situation in which both 
vendors are located in the center, the median point in 
the street with an equal number of buyers on each side. 
When one vendor is located in the center, the other will 
have less than half of the market share if he does not set 
up his stand in the center too. And if he does set up in the 
center, he will get half of the market share. Therefore, it 
is best for each one to set up his newsstand in the center 
when the other is located there. Consequently, a Nash 
equilibrium is achieved when both vendors set up their 
stands in the center. 
Any other pair of locations is not a Nash equilibrium. 
If the two vendors set up in different spots, each can 
increase his market share if he moves closer to the other. 
Both setting up at the same location different from the 
centre point is also not an equilibrium: each one, by 
shifting toward the center, can increase his market share 
(and get more than half of the total, assuming that the 
other does not move.
We are thus left with a single equilibrium: the two vendors 
set up in the center. This situation, a single-equilibrium 
model, is ideal from the perspective of the narrator of the 
economic tale because the result of the equilibrium can then 
be regarded as the inevitable conclusion of the tale. 
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By the way, in this model, the competition leads to an 
outcome that is not ideal from the buyers’ standpoint. If 
one of the vendors sets up at a location other than the 
center, none of the buyers will suffer and some will 
benefit, i.e., those who are now closer to the nearest one. 
Hotelling’s model has been applied to many 
situations. For example, instead of a main street of a city, 
economists apply the model to a situation in which two 
cola manufacturers must choose the sugar content in 
the product (and they cannot offer a range of products). 
The conclusion drawn from the model in this case is that 
both manufacturers should produce an identical product. 
Political scientists interpret each location point on the 
main street as a political position in a one-dimensional 
space (political right versus left, for example). Each 
candidate positions himself on the political map, aspiring 
to receive the maximum number of votes. Each citizen is 
situated somewhere in the political space and chooses 
the candidate closest to his own political views. Everyone 
agrees on the political geography and on the concept 
of distance in the political space. The model’s single 
equilibrium is interpreted in this case as follows: if there 
are two parties operating in the political space, and if 
the subject of dispute is primarily one-dimensional, the 
platforms of the two parties will be identical, in the center 
of the political spectrum. Only a cynic would say that this 
conclusion matches the political reality in the real world. 
Even in the United States, the two political parties are far 
from identical. But Hotelling’s model sheds light on the 
logic behind the efforts of the two parties, Democratic 
and Republican, to capture the center. 
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The tale of the three tailors
Imagine an island with six hundred residents, all dressed 
in identical clothes that require mending every month. 
Three tailors work at mending the clothes. For as long as 
anyone can remember, the residents of the island have 
been divided equally between the three tailors. Once 
a month, each resident goes to the same tailor whose 
services his father had used. Tradition, or decree, has 
set the price of the monthly repair at $5. Assume that 
the tailors have only minimal, negligible expenses. Each 
of the tailors would like to have as many customers as 
possible. However, even with great effort, none of them 
can do more than three hundred repairs a month. The 
residents feel that there is “hidden unemployment” in 
the tailoring sector. The tailors are often seen reading a 
newspaper, or dozing. It seems that two tailors would be 
enough and that it would be better if one of the tailors 
were to quit tailoring and find himself another job. In the 
language of economists, the situation is inefficient. 
Let us say that all the tailors have various other 
employment options that influence their decision about 
whether to remain in the tailoring profession or to quit. 
Tailor A can expect to earn $900 a month in another 
profession, while Tailor B can expect to earn $600. Tailor C 
has limited alternative employment options and can earn 
only $300 outside the tailoring field. Each of the tailors will 
choose to abandon his sewing needles if his income from 
tailoring falls below his alternative income (“opportunity 
cost”). Currently, when the price of mending a piece of 
clothing is $5, it is not worthwhile for any of the tailors 
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to leave this line of business because each tailor has two 
hundred customers and a monthly income of $1,000. 
One day, the idea of the free market reaches the island. 
The traditions are shattered and the decrees canceled, and 
each tailor can decide on the price he charges for repairs. 
Each resident compares prices and turns to the tailor who 
offers his services at the lowest price. If more than one 
tailor offers the lowest price, the residents of the island 
will divide their custom equally between them. Each tailor 
attends a short course in modern business management 
and internalizes his role in the new economic regime: 
he must become familiar with the market and maximize 
his profits. What will happen on the island in the new 
situation?
The continuation of the Tale of the Three Tailors 
must provide answers to the following questions: 
Which tailors will remain in this occupation? What 
will be the terms of commerce between the tailors and 
their customers? As is customary in economics in this 
type of context, we will use a solution concept called 
competitive equilibrium. The concept of equilibrium 
imposes the following requirements for the rest of the 
story: (1) All customers will pay the same price for the 
repair of his clothes. (2) Each tailor knows the price of 
the service and compares the income he believes he can 
make in this work and his potential income outside this 
field. If the income in the other profession is higher, the 
tailor will leave the tailoring business. If the income 
outside of this field is lower, he will remain a tailor. 
(3) The number of customers the remaining tailors are 
interested in serving (supply) is equal to the number 
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of islanders interested in this service (demand). Now, 
all six hundred islanders are interested in the service 
at any price. Since the tailors have no expenses, each 
one is interested in serving three hundred customers 
(the greatest number of repairs he is capable of doing 
a month). Thus, this condition demands that precisely 
two tailors remain in this business. 
The logic underlying the concept of competitive 
equilibrium is that if the price of tailoring services is 
so high that the supply of tailoring services exceeds 
the demand, then the price will decline until one of 
the tailors closes his business. And if the price is low and 
the demand for tailoring services is greater than what the 
tailors are able to supply, the price will rise until another 
tailor returns to this sector. 
We will now see that there is competitive equilibrium 
when the price of a repair is $2.50 (or any other price 
between $2 and $3), and only tailors B and C remain in 
this business sector. Each of the tailors (B and C) will have 
three hundred customers and each has an income of $750, 
which is more than either could receive in his alternative 
employment. Tailor A, meanwhile, earns $900 outside 
of the tailoring business. If he returns to this sector, he 
would earn $750 at most, less than what he is earning in 
another occupation.
In every competitive equilibrium, the price of the 
tailoring service will be lower than the price that prevailed 
in the old regime: If the price of the service were $5 (or 
higher), the tailor who quit the profession would figure 
that he could earn more as a tailor than he does in his 
new line of work. Only the two tailors whose alternative 
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employment options are less profitable will remain in 
the tailoring sector; and the total output of the residents 
of the island will grow. An “invisible hand” generates 
the competitive equilibrium price and mobilizes the 
self-interest of the tailors and the islanders to correct the 
inefficiency created by the traditions and decrees that 
were recently canceled. 
How does the market arrive at the competitive 
equilibrium price? The usual explanation offered in 
Introduction to Economics classes goes like this: The price of 
mending clothing prior to the cancellation of traditions and 
decrees was $5. After canceling the traditions and decrees, a 
price war erupts. One of the tailors who was “re-educated” 
concludes that it would be better for him to lower the price to 
$4.90 and thus create a situation in which all of the islanders 
would seek his services. Before long, the other tailors take 
note and also lower prices. And thus the price drops lower 
and lower until a certain stage when one of the tailors offers 
the service at a price less than $4.50. At this point, the tailor 
with the best employment alternative closes his tailoring 
business and engages in a different profession, and the 
island remains with only two active tailors.
Several assumptions in this story are not obvious. First, 
is it indeed so clear that the tailors will lower their prices 
after the cancellation of the traditions and decrees? We 
expect them to act only in pursuit of their own personal 
interests. But if a tailor is concerned only with his own 
earnings, it would actually be better for him not to 
lower the prices because he understands that any profit 
he would gain from increasing his clientele would be 
temporary and insignificant compared to the large loss he 
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would incur in the future when the other tailors respond 
to this move and also lower their prices. The tailor would 
not need to speak with his colleagues in order to refrain 
from lowering prices. (Explicit collaboration between the 
tailors might be prohibited on the island under anti-
trust legislation.) Stated simply, no tailor would want to 
start a price war.
Second, let’s assume that the tailors are not so wise 
and fall into the trap the competitive atmosphere lays for 
them. Is it clear that the consumers will indeed choose 
the least expensive tailor? Until now, they have used the 
services of the same tailor their father and grandfather 
used. Now they need to compare prices frequently. If the 
price differentials between the tailors are not large, some 
customers will decide that the price savings are not worth 
the bother involved in comparing prices. Thus, a tailor 
may actually raise his price a little, relying on the fact 
that most of the customers will not bother to find another 
tailor offering the service at a lower price. If customers do 
not compare prices, the market might stabilize at a higher 
price than the competitive equilibrium price. 
Finally, let us assume that all of the residents of the 
island regard the search for the least expensive tailor as 
a real national mission, an act that will serve the society 
as economists demand, and let us assume that the tailors 
are not so smart, and that price competition rages and 
leads to a drastic drop in prices, and that one of the 
tailors abandons the profession and finds alternative 
employment (and does not become jobless on the streets 
of the island), and that it enlarges the national pie. Then 
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we come to the question: is this story as happy as it 
sounds? 
The change generated by the competitive economic 
regime on the island did indeed lead to growth in the 
“national pie.” However, the improvement also led to 
a change in the distribution of income. The situation is 
worse for the tailors and better for their customers. Is 
the income distribution better now? Are the tailors now 
receiving fairer compensation for their work? Is the price 
for mending clothes now more reasonable? There are 
no objective answers to these questions. Economics has 
no way of choosing between the new situation and the 
previous situation. The island’s residents, all of them, are 
the ones who must make the choice.
The bargaining tale
A pie is to be divided between two diners; let’s call them 
A and B. Both want as much of the pie as possible. Without an 
agreement on how to divide the pie, both will remain without 
anything. Both are hungry and want to eat their piece of pie 
as soon as possible. Unless they are willing to compromise, 
the allocation of the pie will be delayed, to the chagrin of both 
of them. The desire to receive as large a piece as possible leads 
to haggling; impatience leads the two sides to compromise. 
A bargaining process is a procedure that enables the 
parties involved to reach an agreement. In the model of 
bargaining presented here, the negotiation takes places 
along a time axis. Each day, one side offers a proposal and 
the second responds, accepting it or rejecting it. Every time 
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one side rejects the proposal submitted to him, he must 
submit a counter-offer, but not before the next day. In this 
way, the two sides to the negotiation exchange proposals 
until one of them accepts a proposal from the other and 
there is an agreement. At this point, the bargaining ends. 
From the perspective of each of the two parties 
involved, each day that passes without an agreement 
is like losing a part of the pie. This loss might express 
the cost of time wasted in the bargaining process, or the 
mental effort involved in negotiating. Let us stipulate 
that from A’s perspective, the loss incurred from each 
day of bargaining is equal to 2% of the pie. B is more 
impatient and from his perspective the loss from each day 
of bargaining is equal to 3% of the pie. Accordingly, if A 
has to choose between reaching an immediate agreement 
that would give him 57.5% of the pie and reaching an 
agreement the next day according to which he would 
get 60% of the pie, he would wait until the next day: The 
postponement would give him an additional 2.5% of the 
pie, more than offsetting the 2% loss he would suffer 
from prolonging the negotiation for one more day. On 
the other hand, if B has to choose between an immediate 
agreement that would give him 40% of the pie and an 
agreement for 42.5% to be signed the next day, he would 
choose to conclude the negotiation immediately: If he 
tarries, he will gain an additional 2.5% of the pie, which is 
less than the 3% loss he would incur, from his perspective, 
by prolonging the negotiation for one more day. 
A solution, we said, is the principle that links the 
beginning of the tale to its conclusion. Here we will use 
the solution concept called perfect equilibrium. A perfect 
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equilibrium is a pair of plans of action (“strategies”), one 
for each party to the negotiation, such that for each of the 
strategies the following holds: after each chain of events 
that might occur during the negotiation, the negotiator’s 
strategy is the best one for him vis-à-vis the strategy of the 
other party. In particular, if a proposal is made that offers 
one side too little, a proposal that according to his strategy 
he should reject, then if the player who holds the strategy 
reconsiders his moves he would indeed choose to reject the 
proposal. In other words, if a bargainer’s strategy includes 
a threat to reject low offers, then the threat must be credible.
One can show that the bargaining game could have 
only a single conclusion: the negotiation ends immediately. 
If A (the more patient bargainer) makes the first offer, he 
will receive the entire pie, and if B makes the first offer, 
A will receive 98% of the pie. The proof of this statement 
is not presented here, but the following section provides 
an illustration of the logic behind the result. 
First, let us examine the following pair of strategies: 
each negotiator, when it is his turn to make a proposal, 
demands half of the pie for himself. And when his turn 
comes to respond to a proposal, he agrees only to a division 
that awards him at least half of the pie. In other words, 
each side always plans to offer an equal division of the pie 
and threatens to reject any proposal that gives him less 
than half of the pie. This pair of strategies is not a perfect 
equilibrium, because the threat to reject any proposal in 
which the bargainer would receive less than half of the 
pie is not always credible: sometimes it is not worthwhile 
for the negotiator to carry out the threat. For example, if 
A strays from his strategy and offers B only 49% of the pie, 
then B, according to the strategy, is supposed to reject the 
proposal. But if he carries out the threat and rejects the 
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proposal, he expects – according to this pair of strategies – 
the next day, when he makes his counter-offer, he will end 
up with only 50% of the pie, assuming that A now keeps 
to his strategy. If B accepts A’s proposal to give him 49% 
of the pie, he would lose 1% of the pie, but would avoid 
the loss incurred by prolonging the negotiation, which 
from his perspective is equivalent to losing 3% of the pie. 
Therefore, in this situation, B’s threat to reject the proposal 
to receive only 49% of the pie is not credible, and it is best 
for him not to act in accordance with his strategy. 
On the other hand, the following pair of strategies is 
a perfect equilibrium: A always demands 100% of the pie 
for himself and agrees to any proposal that awards him 
at least 98% of it. B demands 2% of the pie for himself 
and accepts any proposal, including one that gives 
him nothing. A’s strategy includes a threat to reject any 
proposal that gives him less than 98%. This is a credible 
threat. If B offers A less than 98% of the pie, A will indeed 
reject the proposal, as his strategy suggests, as he expects 
to reach an agreement the next day to receive the entire 
pie, and the increase of more than 2% is larger than the 
2% loss he expects to incur from an additional day of 
negotiation. B’s strategy includes no threats at all because 
he plans to accept any offer.
This pair of strategies ceases to be a perfect equilibrium 
if we substitute the numbers appearing in the description 
of the strategies with other numbers. For example, let’s 
examine the following pair of strategies: A always demands 
60% of the pie for himself and agrees to any proposal that 
gives him at least 58% of it. B demands 42% of the pie for 
himself and accepts any proposal that awards him at least 
40% of the pie. If A strays from his plan and offers B 39.5% 
of the pie, B would do well to accept the proposal. If he 
carries out the threat to reject the offer, he can expect to 
reach an agreement the next day that would give him 42% 
of the pie. The additional 2.5% would not compensate him 
for the “cost” (3%) of one more day of negotiation. 
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The model of negotiation described here, with the 
assumption that each player incurs a loss that is 
equivalent to a fixed share of the pie for each day that 
goes by without an agreement, “predicts” that the player 
whose time is less “expensive” will receive all (or nearly 
all) of the pie. The model perhaps clarifies the common 
intuition that a player whose time is more expensive is 
in a weaker negotiating position vis-à-vis a player whose 
time is less expensive. But the model does not describe 
reality, where things are always more complex, whether 
because the players’ considerations are more complex 
and also include psychological considerations such as “if 
I already rejected an offer of 60%, I won’t agree now to 
receive less,” or because the negotiators do not always 
act in a rational way, or because negotiations in real life 
are conducted according to less rigid rules than this 
procedure of exchanging proposals.
I thought about this model just before completing my 
doctoral studies in Jerusalem. I was inspired by the market 
in the Old City in Jerusalem where I occasionally bargained 
when purchasing a Bedouin rug or Armenian plate. I really 
hate to bargain. Once, when I was fed up with the bargaining 
games in the market, I said to a trader, “Why don’t we play 
a different game: you make an offer and I’ll simply say ‘yes’ 
or ‘no’ ?” Ostensibly, I was trying to exploit my so-called 
professional expertise to design a different mechanism that 
would spare me the exhausting bargaining process. The trader 
smiled scornfully and threw out a price that I immediately 
rejected. But then the man provided me with an insight that 
put my dreams of using the bargaining model to reform the 
world into a proper perspective: “Tell me, did you think that 
I thought there was some offer I would make and that you 
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would accept?” And then he added: “For generations, we 
have bargained in our way and you come and try to change 
it?” I parted from him shamefaced. 
Tellers of tales
We have seen three examples of economic tales. Let’s again 
ask ourselves the question: what is the connection between 
an economic model and reality? Different economists 
have different answers to this question. According to one 
view, an economic model is supposed to serve as a basis 
for making predictions about the real world, not the world 
of tales. Those holding this view perceive an economic 
model as an attempt to predict human behavior, based 
on data about the actions and interests of the economic 
units included in the model. According to this approach, 
a model is supposed to be an objective description of the 
real world, not a tale. The designer of the model would be 
happy to add more and more details to it to improve its 
ability to predict. If the model does not provide enough 
good predictions, it must be augmented with additional 
details. But the increased complexity of the model exacts 
a steep price: it is hard to understand and is difficult to 
solve.
According to another view, the objective of the economic 
model is to sharpen perception. A model is an intellectual 
exercise. Just as a soldier use simulations in training, the 
economist exercises his intuitions on a model before 
offering advice. The use of formal models helps to develop 
our intuitions about the way things occur in life. Thus, 
for example, economists who specialize in game theory 
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have advised various governments to auction off public 
assets such as government companies and wavebands 
for huge sums. Others have been members of strategic 
teams hired by firms that participate in public auctions. 
These economists did not rely on a particular model, but 
claimed that their work with formal economic models 
sharpened their senses. I am not unequivocally opposed 
to this approach and I assume that those who claim that 
economic models have sharpened their perception are 
genuine in expressing what they feel. I also find myself 
from time to time looking at something from a perspective 
I have acquired from the study of economic theory. 
But I am quite sure that if instead of devoting my 
adult life to economic models I had engaged in a 
non-academic profession, I would view life from 
standpoints that are less abstract but no less useful.
Both of the approaches I have mentioned so far 
look for a purpose in an economic model. Students 
look for a purpose in the material they study, because 
“Otherwise, why study?” The research agencies and 
university presidents like to hear about purposefulness 
since it is easier for them to finance research that has a 
practical aspect. We economists are delighted when we 
find evidence of purposefulness in our work, because 
we are full of guilty feelings about devoting our lives to 
meaningless studies when the world faces innumerable 
problems. 
I would like to advocate another approach, which 
does not aspire toward purposefulness and the practical 
use of a model. According to this approach, an economic 
model is not essentially different from a model in logic. 
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A model in logic is not a prediction of how humans 
judge whether a phrase in ordinary language is true or 
false. It is not a recommendation for a thinking person 
and it is not designed to educate people to think correctly. 
I contend that economics studies the logic of life, but 
does not engage in predictions or recommendations. We 
deal with the wide range of considerations that economic 
decision makers might take into account. We are satisfied 
even if the economic model is merely interesting. To be 
interesting it must focus on considerations that at least 
some people weigh before making a decision and taking 
action.
In particular, I do not think that the bargaining models 
that I myself have studied have significant predictive 
value; I am not more qualified than any reader (but also 
not less qualified than my colleagues) to give advice 
on how to conduct negotiations, and I do not feel that 
dealing with these models has sharpened my ability to 
understand the process of bargaining in the market. 
There are many models of negotiation and many solution 
concepts, and each combination of model and solution 
concept has its own internal logic. At most, we find 
links between natural ways of thinking and bargaining 
processes. That is all.
Yes, I admit that it is tempting for me to think of myself 
as a teller of tales, a philosopher, a researcher of the social 
sciences, in fact, anything but an economist. Whenever I 
am asked “What is your profession?” ‒ for example, on the 
form for entering the U.S. ‒ I do not answer “economist” 
but instead adopt the neutral title of lecturer. Besides the 
immigration official and the sleepy passenger in the seat 
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next to me, no one will see the form, but I still always 
refrain from defining myself as an economist. I have 
limited knowledge of current economic issues. During 
most of my life, these issues have not interested me. 
I usually toss the economics section of the newspaper in 
the bin together with the sections on sports, fashion and 
health. 
This book reflects my debate with myself about 
economic theory. On the one hand, I am captivated 
by the charm of formal models: tales emerge from the 
formal symbols, and these tales have almost miraculous 
powers over me. On the other hand, I am obsessively 
occupied with denying any interpretation contending 
that economic models produce conclusions of real value. 
I feel attracted to economics as a branch of philosophy and 
as an academic field in which an intelligent discussion 
of social arrangements is, or at least can be, conducted. 
But I also feel disgust for economics as an academic field 
that tends toward conservatism and helps the strong in 
society maintain their dominance, and thus serves people 
for whom I have little empathy. 
Snow in Jerusalem
My perspective on economic models is completely 
subjective and describes me no less than it describes 
economic theory. 
When I was a boy and winter came, I would peek in 
the morning from the window of my room at the two 
green trees outside and hope to see them white. I longed 
so much for snow that I wanted to be a meteorologist. 
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A meteorologist, I thought, is the first to know when it 
is going to snow. But several nights that started with a 
forecast of snow – “tonight snow will fall in the hilly 
areas” – left me bitterly disappointed in the morning. 
Then several mornings that dawned with an unheralded 
white vista led me to the conclusion that the meteorologist 
was not the first to know when it would snow. Instead, it 
was Aryeh Mansdorf, the neighborhood grocer – he was 
the first to wake up and say his morning prayers before 
setting out to arrange the bottles of milk.
Later, I wanted to be a lawyer who would defeat his 
adversaries in battles of intellect and razor-sharp logic. 
In order to prepare myself for this heroic task, 
I borrowed Samuel Hugo Bergman’s book “Introduction 
to Logic” from the labor union library. This book did not 
make me a master of debate and did not equip me with 
a wealth of rhetorical tricks. The only thing I remember 
from it is the description of tin soldiers lining up in the 
courtyard. A resounding defeat in a classroom debate on 
“Youth Movements, For and Against” (I was “against”) 
made it clear to me that personal charm is more helpful 
in winning an argument than understanding the law of 
syllogism. 
I had the good fortune to grow up in one of the most 
wonderful areas of Jerusalem. Rabbi Meizel from the 
synagogue my father attended on holidays; the communist 
Sala Marcel, who made a point of eating pork just to annoy 
everyone; Aunt Hannah, who left her husband in Siberia 
and immigrated to Israel with her two children; the ritual 
slaughterer from the Yemenite courtyard; the widow 
whose son got caught up in crime; and the intellectual 
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Yaacovson, who wrote a book explaining the rationale 
of the Jewish commandments — all these characters 
instilled in me a sense of great awe for those people who 
understood the complexities of human interaction so well. 
As far as I’m concerned, the opinion of such people is just 
as authoritative for making social and economic decisions 
as the opinion of an expert using a model. 
So, I do not know when it will snow and when prices 
will change. I am not an advocate of justice and have done 
nothing to change the social order. I do not feel entitled to 
advise anyone on the basis of my professional knowledge. 
I find myself denying that the models I work on can serve 
as a basis for predictions and, in general, I do not think 
that the appropriate test of economic models is whether 
they are useful. 
If the models we develop in yellow notepads or on 
blackboards constitute a basis for predicting human 
behavior, it would be miraculous in my eyes. There are 
no miracles in economics, but there are wonders. In my 
studies in the Department of Mathematics in Jerusalem, 
I learned to see wonders in the world of formalities. 
I sometimes also see them in economic theory. I approach 
economics as someone with a sense of curiosity who is 
trying to understand the logic of human interaction a bit 





I consider myself a very rational man, explaining all 
randomness with statistical tools and refusing to recognize 
the existence of the hand of fate and supernatural forces. 
I was born on Friday the 13th and scorn lucky numbers. 
I like Yeshayahu Leibowitz’s rationalistic definition 
of belief in God as accepting the yoke of Torah and 
commandments. This definition freed me from feeling 
ashamed of my lack of belief in a God who showers me with 
mercy and is furious about my sins. I believe in making 
a calculated analysis of  decision-making situations, and 
always consider it appropriate to ask myself what I can do, 
what my objective is and what action would be best in my 
pursuit of this objective. I am often unsuccessful in doing 
this, but I still continue to try. While I regard rationality 
as an ideal way of life, it plays an even more prominent 
role in my consciousness as a polar opposite to behavior 
that I do not respect: I feel revulsion toward astrologers, 
readers of coffee grounds, and all sorts of experts adorned 
with academic degrees, who manipulate their audiences 
emotionally and whom I suspect of being driven by 
self-interest.
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I associate the rational approach with the path of study 
and learning. The opposite, irrational world is identified 
with urges and emotions. Rational versus irrational, mind 
versus emotion, study versus prayer – for me, all these 
terms describe the contrast between my father and my 
mother.
My mother was proud to be a scion of a family from the 
Slonimer Hasidic community, a small branch of Hasidism 
founded in the mid-nineteenth century that was nearly 
wiped out in the Holocaust. My father, on the other hand, 
came from a devout family of Mitnagdim (opponents of 
Hasidism). When my father wanted to berate my mother, 
he would accuse her of coming from a Hasidic family. 
Nonetheless, on the eve of Passover my father would send 
me to the son of the rebbe (the Hasidic rabbi) to get three 
shmura matzos (special unleavened bread eaten during 
Passover), and the rebbe’s son would tell me that Eli, my 
mother’s brother, had studied in heder (a traditional Jewish 
elementary school) with his father – none other than the 
great rebbe himself. The thought that my mother’s brother 
had played as a child with the rebbe was for me like an 
encounter with royalty.
I hate situations of emotional frenzy. The only ecstatic 
experience in which I participated was when my father 
would take me to the Simhat Torah celebrations at the 
Slonimer Shtibel, a synagogue that appeared to have 
been copied from a faded photograph of a lost Jewish 
town and rebuilt on the edge of the field between the Beit 
Shmuel neighborhood of Jerusalem and the border. I was 
squeezed into a dense ring of men in their holiday kapotes 
(traditional Hasidic long black coats). The smell was at 
	 1. Rational,	Irrational 43
first like that of the bath house, until the scent of soap 
gave way to the stink of male sweat. The elders of the 
community would carry the smaller, lighter Torah scrolls, 
while younger honorees would be called upon to carry 
the heavy ones. The Torah bearers would be surrounded 
by young yeshiva students, who would cling to the inner 
circle. I, as an appendage to the outer circle, would bump 
into tables and benches stacked haphazardly at the sides 
of the room, grasping my father’s hand on one side and 
the warm and moist hand of a stranger on the other 
side. I would try to move with the rhythm of the dance 
and mumble the words of the refrain that was repeated 
endlessly, despite the fact that I was unable to understand 
most of them. I still remember the words: “My God, my 
God, why hast thou forsaken me?” 
But Simhat Torah was just once a year. During the rest 
of the days of the year, the Mitnagdim won. 
My adolescent rebellion erupted when I was about 
fourteen: I wanted to become fervently religious and asked 
my father to buy me a tallit katan (Jewish undergarment 
with fringes). On an afternoon stroll, at the entrance to 
Mea She’arim, my father told me that he had no objection 
to the change, but that before I don the external trappings 
I should learn Talmud and study halacha (Jewish law). He 
even offered to find a suitable teacher for me. My father 
responded in a rational way by demanding that I “hear 
and understand” before “doing”. He kept his cool and 
stamped out the rebellion without a battle. 
My mother believed in every person’s freedom of 
choice, even a child’s, and her wish for me was that I 
would fulfill everything I felt good about, as long as it was 
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not dangerous. My father, just like the rational man who 
stars in economics textbooks, always had a clear objective: 
ensuring survival – physical and economic. Therefore, my 
father supported every military action the government 
conducted, vetoed every request from my mother to take 
a loan in order to buy living room furniture, and scolded 
me about unnecessary expenses. That was why my father 
wanted me to be an accountant or economist.
The rational man 
The rational man’s pattern of thought constitutes the 
foundation for most economic models. At the beginning 
of each course I teach on microeconomics or game theory, 
I find myself conducting an induction ceremony into the 
world of economic theory in which I expose the students 
to the portrait of the rational man in economics. In order 
to endow this ceremony with the appropriate air of 
dignity, I tell them that I should launch the presentation 
with a presidential fanfare. And then I begin to recite: 
 The rational man has preferences regarding the 
consequences that are likely to result from choosing 
various alternatives. When he is required to choose, he:
1. asks himself what alternatives he has;
2. clarifies to himself the consequence that 
would follow upon choosing each of the possible 
alternatives;
3. chooses the alternative that leads to the best 
consequence (as expressed in 2) in accordance with 
his preferences, from among all of the reasonable 
alternatives in the situation (as expressed in 1).
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This is quite abstract and I will try to explain. In economics, 
models are nothing more than stories about interactions 
between units called decision makers. A decision maker 
in the model encounters decision problems to which he 
must respond. We have in mind situations like a buyer 
choosing a car from a catalogue. A fellow choosing a life 
insurance policy from among the plans offered in the 
insurance market. Parents deciding how many children 
they will have (a non-negative integer) by choosing 
at some point not to have any more. If I had to draw a 
decision maker, I would portray him as a person with 
two eyes, two ears, a nose and a mouth. He sits before 
a keyboard with many keys. His hand reaches out and 
must press one – and only one – of the keys. Pressing one 
of the keys leads to a particular consequence. 
A decision problem is described in economic models as 
a set of alternatives available to the decision maker, who is 
required to choose exactly one of the alternatives in the set. 
In presenting the decision problem as a set of alternatives, 
it is assumed that the way in which the alternatives are 
presented to the decision maker does not affect his 
decision. This means, for example, that a default option – if 
one exists – does not influence the decision: the decision 
of someone who is deliberating whether to sign his 
consent to donate organs after his death is not influenced 
by whether the appropriate box on the form has a check 
mark that he can remove, or whether the box is empty and 
he can add a check mark to indicate his consent to donate 
organs. This also means that the decision maker’s choice 
is the same regardless of whether the set of alternatives is 
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described by a characteristic or explicitly. For example, the 
problem “Choose one of the four largest countries in the 
world” is supposed to be identical to the problem “Choose 
between the U.S., China, Canada and Russia.” The order of 
presenting the alternatives is also not supposed to have an 
impact on the decision maker’s choice: the choice between 
“yes” and “no” is not different from the choice between 
“no” and “yes.”
All this is concealed in the innocent definition of the 
decision problem as a set of alternatives from which to 
choose. Of course, we are aware that factors such as a 
default option, the way a set of alternatives is described, 
and the order in which the alternatives enter the 
consciousness of the decision maker are indeed likely to 
have an influence on what most people choose in real 
life. However, we presume that the rational man does 
not take such non-essential factors into consideration and, 
therefore, these factors are excluded from the description 
of the decision problem. Thus, as if by the way, we insert 
elements of rationality into the description of the decision 
maker in economics. 
In regard to the identity of the decision maker – we 
view a decision maker as an independent decision 
making unit whose choices are not influenced by other 
decision makers. We generally refer to a single individual, 
but sometimes a decision maker is a group of individuals 
such as a family, committee or commercial enterprise. 
On the other hand, there are cases when an individual, 
let’s call him Moses, is split into two decision makers, 
Moses 1 is Moses after being slapped by his brother 
Aaron, and Moses 2 is the Moses who has calmed down 
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the next morning. Moses 1 and Moses 2 have the same 
ID number and genetic makeup, but the considerations 
of Moses 1 and Moses 2 can be completely different, and 
neither Moses controls the actions of the other. 
When we introduce a decision maker into an economic 
fable, we equip him with operating instructions that guide 
him in responding to all of the decision problems that 
are likely to arise during the tale. Thus, for example, the 
description of a young person who applies to a group of 
universities should include details about which university 
he would choose if accepted by more than one, i.e., his order 
of priority. If he applies to three universities – Jerusalem, 
Tel Aviv and Haifa – the descriptions should include what 
he would do if accepted by all three, if only accepted by 
Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, if only accepted by Tel Aviv and 
Haifa, or only by Jerusalem and Haifa. Another example: 
many economic models include a type of decision maker 
we call a consumer. We imagine the consumer receiving 
a monetary budget that he can use to purchase products 
that are of value to him. Each product has a price – the 
number of units of money he must allocate to acquire 
a unit of the product. The consumer must decide how 
to allocate the budget between the various products. 
A complete description of the consumer should explain 
what he would consume (that is, which combination of 
products) at every budget level and at every possible price 
structure.
It is possible to think of a decision maker as a 
machine that receives data about a set of alternatives he 
must choose from, and then creates output in the form 
of one of these alternatives. Psychologists and brain 
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science researchers are interested in the structure of the 
machine that processes the data and reaches a decision. 
Traditionally, the economist is not interested, at least not 
as an economist, in the technical details of the machine’s 
operation. He is interested only in the connection between 
the input and output, between the decision problem and 
the action chosen.
Here we reach the core of the assumption of rationality 
in economic models. A rational decision maker has a clear 
ranking of consequences in mind. We call this ranking 
preferences. When a rational decision maker faces a 
decision problem, he chooses the alternative that produces 
the best result in accordance with his preferences. 
Let’s take for example a decision maker who is 
entitled to a monetary reimbursement. The amount of the 
reimbursement is likely to depend on the date on which 
the decision maker collects what is owed to him. The 
result might take the form of “receives X dollars T days 
from now.” Let’s assume, for example, that the decision 
maker feels that postponing collection of the money is 
equivalent to a loss of $3 a day. Such a decision maker will 
prefer, for example, to receive $100 in another ten days 
(which is equivalent to receiving $70 immediately, from his 
perspective) rather than to receive $200 in another 45 days 
(which is equivalent to receiving $65 immediately, from 
his perspective). In general, he assesses the result “receives 
X dollars T days from now” by using the formula X-3T. 
This rule unequivocally defines the decision maker’s 
preferences. The decision maker’s objective function 
is expressed by X-3T. The choice of the best alternative 
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means choosing the one for which the objective function 
gives the maximum value. 
According to the assumption of rationality in economics, 
the decision maker is guided by his preferences. But 
the assumption does not impose a limitation on the 
reasonableness of preferences. The preferences can be 
even in direct contrast with what common sense might 
define as the decision maker’s interests. According 
to this definition, a company director who chooses a 
strategy of production and marketing that minimizes 
the company’s profits is rational. An employer who 
evaluates an employee according to the numerical value 
of the letters in his name (known in Hebrew as gematria) 
is rational. Someone who is concerned only with the 
welfare of someone else is rational, even if this concern 
is detrimental to his own existential interests. A person 
who does what he does because “they told me to do so” 
or because “it was the first thing that came to mind” or “it 
is not the best but it is nearly the best,” or someone who 
tries very hard to do what is impossible, all are irrational 
according to the accepted meaning in economics. 
It is not always clear whether a person is acting 
according to the paradigm of the rational man. When my 
daughter, Michal, was one year old, I wanted to check 
whether she displayed consistency in her choices. I knew 
that she distinguished between colors. We sprawled 
on the floor of the room. I placed three colored blocks 
in front of her – green, red and blue – and asked her to 
choose one of them. She took the green one. I rearranged 
the blocks in a different order and she chose the red 
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one. Even after a dozen repetitions, no consistency was 
evident in her choices. I was really happy and so proud 
of her. Here was my daughter violating the most basic 
assumption of rationality – that there is some consistency 
in choices made. But then I realized that my excitement 
was premature. My daughter always chose the cube 
on the left. In other words, her choices were indeed 
consistent if seen from the perspective of the position of 
the cube rather than its color. 
As if
According to the traditional approach, economists are 
not interested in the question of whether the decision 
maker’s choice was preceded by a stage in which he 
actually conducted an explicit act of maximization, 
that is, if he chose the alternative that maximizes an 
objective function. The only thing that is important to the 
economist is that it is possible to describe the behavior of 
the decision maker as if he had conducted maximization. 
Let’s look, for example, at the worker who wakes up 
after sleeping for S hours. Let’s assume that the worker 
cannot control the number of hours of sleep but that he 
can decide how many of the remaining (24-S) hours in 
the day will be devoted to work and how many to leisure 
activity. Assume that in exchange for his labor, the worker 
will receive wages of W per hour. Let’s assume that the 
worker always allocates half of his waking hours to work. 
That is, he works (24-S)/2 hours and devotes the same 
number of hours to leisure. The worker does not conduct 
any maximization, but acts according to a rule that is 
	 1. Rational,	Irrational 51
ingrained in him, perhaps without even being aware of 
its existence.
Ostensibly, it seems that the worker’s behavior does 
not fit the model of the rational man in economics. 
Nonetheless, we will see that the worker’s behavior can be 
described as if he has a particular objective function and 
always chooses the solution that maximizes it. The result 
for this worker is the combination of the number of hours 
of leisure (L) and the sum of money (M) he will earn that 
day. Let’s assume that the worker’s preferences among the 
group of outcomes are determined according to an odd 
criterion: the product of the leisure hours and the sum 
of money he earns. If he chooses L hours of leisure, he 
will work (24-S-L) hours and receive (24-S-L) × W units of 
money. Consequently, he chooses the number of leisure 
hours that will maximize the function L × (24-S-L) × W. 
In algebra class in high school, we learned that this 
function has a single maximum point at L = (24-S)/2. We 
found, therefore, that an employee who allots his time so 
that the function L x M receives the highest value possible 
will always (whatever S and W are) devote half of his 
waking hours to work. Maximizing this strange function is 
like describing the employee’s behavior. I cannot imagine 
a reasonable person who consciously maximizes the 
product of leisure hours and the sum of wages. But for the 
economist, in order to qualify the decision maker as being 
rational, it is enough that he can describe his behavior as if 
he maximized some preferences. 
I remember the moment as a student when I realized 
that the models in economic theory do not assume 
that the decision maker consciously tries to maximize 
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his preferences, but only assume that the behavior of a 
decision maker can be described as if he had maximized 
some objective function. The words “as if” were magic for 
me then. Suddenly, economics appeared more abstract 
and sophisticated than I had thought previously. Years 
went by until I understood that there is also a potential 
for deception in this sophistication. On the one hand, 
decision makers’ preferences in economics are presented 
only as a means to describe their behavior. In the previous 
paragraph we used the function of the product of wages 
and leisure hours only to describe the behavior of the 
worker who devotes half of his waking hours to work. 
Most economists, however, apply economic models 
to policy questions which require a criterion for the 
welfare of the individuals to be specified. Economists 
often identify an individual’s level of happiness with the 
preferences that explain his behavior. By this approach, 
if the decision maker chooses alternative A when B is 
also possible, this means that indeed he prefers A to B. It 
is far from obvious that the preferences used to describe 
the decision maker’s behavior correspond to his degree 
of happiness. Even if the decision maker’s behavior can 
be described as the result of maximizing some objective 
function, the objective might not relate to promoting his 
happiness. For example, it is possible that he consistently 
works to achieve a “wrong” goal. And here is an absurd 
case: a decision maker has a clear concept of the essence 
of happiness, but he acts determinedly and consistently 
to actually diminish his happiness. A person like this 
is seen by economists as rational in the sense that he 
maximizes a clear goal – to worsen his situation as 
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much as possible. But to identify his happiness with the 
preferences used to describe his behavior is like saying 
that the person is happier the less happy he is. This does 
not sound good. 
In other words, “as if” is not only a magical phrase, 
as I felt back in the days when I was thrilled to discover 
the hidden treasures of economic theory. The underlying 
economic theory is not only that the decision maker can 
be described as someone who maximizes some objective, 
but also that he maximizes a function that expresses 
his happiness. It ultimately became clear to me that the 
phrase “as if” is a way to avoid taking responsibility for 
the strong assumptions upon which economic models are 
founded. 
My entire professional life revolves around the 
definition of the rational man – someone who aspires 
to advance a well-defined objective or whose behavior 
can be expressed as the result of a process in which he 
asks himself what is desirable and what is possible, and 
chooses the best possible alternative. At the end of the 
induction ceremony that I conduct for my students I add 
some reservations about the status of the rational man in 
the real world. I emphasize that by using this definition 
we are not claiming that every person makes decisions in 
a way that is consistent with the definition of the rational 
man. I also note that the accepted definition in economics 
demands that the rational decision maker maximizes 
some function – but not necessarily his happiness. Yet 
it seems to me that these reservations fade away in the 
face of the magic of the clear formulation and joy of the 
formal description of the decision maker as someone 
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who maximizes an explicit function. I believe that the 
image of the rational man that remains in the student’s 
mind is that of someone who maximizes some function, 
and this function also quantifies his happiness. 
Dependence on presentation
The professional literature is full of experiments 
that clash with the assumption of rationality. 
Psychologists, philosophers and economists conduct 
these experiments. Prominent among them are Amos 
Tversky and Daniel Kahneman and their followers. 
Those who worship economic thinking get angry. 
Those who do not like the “square” mindset of the 
rational man applaud. 
Here is one well-known example (on the book’s 
website, you can experiment with the situations 
discussed in this example, and the rest of the chapter: 
www.openbookpublishers.com/product.php/148). 
Physicians at the university hospital at Stanford were 
randomly divided into two groups. The physicians 
in one group were asked the following question 
(Question 1):
 An epidemic threatens the lives of 600 people. Two 
alternative and mutually exclusive plans of action are 
proposed:
Under Plan A, 400 people will die.
Under Plan B, there is a 1/3 chance that no one will die 
and a 2/3 chance that 600 people will die. 
You must choose one plan of action. 
Which would you choose?
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The physicians in the second group were asked the 
following (Question 2):
 An epidemic threatens the lives of 600 people. Two 
alternative and mutually exclusive plans of action are 
proposed:
Under Plan C, 200 people will be saved.
Under Plan D, there is a 1/3 chance that 600 people 
will be saved and a 2/3 chance that no one will be 
saved. 
 You must choose one plan of action. 
Which would you choose?
The need to choose between plans A and B poses a 
dilemma: Plan A is bad, because it will not prevent the 
certain death of 400 human beings. In Plan B, there is 
hope (a 1/3 chance) that the plan will succeed and no one 
will die; but there is also a significant risk that the number 
of dead will reach 600.
The choice between plans C and D also poses a 
dilemma: in Plan D, there is hope of saving all the patients, 
along with a significant risk that all 600 will die. Plan C 
is not especially encouraging, but it offers the certainty of 
saving a substantial number of patients. 
Some readers will be surprised to discover that Plan 
A and Plan C are identical: the death of 400 people is 
equivalent in this story to saving 200 people. Plans B and 
D are also identical: 0 mortalities means 600 survivors, and 
600 mortalities is equivalent to 0 survivors. The problem 
of choosing between A and B is the same as the problem of 
choosing between C and D. Therefore, a rational decision 
maker in the first group who chooses A would also choose 
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C if responding to Question 2; if he chooses B in Question 1, 
he would choose D in Question 2. The fact that A is identical 
to C and that B is identical to D is obvious once it is pointed 
out. But it turns out that there are many intelligent people 
who fail to note they are identical, even when they are 
asked to respond to the two questions one after the other. 
In the original experiment, 78% of the physicians who 
were asked to choose between A and B chose Plan B, the 
alternative that involves risk. 72% of those who had to 
choose between C and D chose the sure plan, C. The 
physicians were divided into the two groups randomly. 
There is no reason to think that the hand of fate divided 
a large group of individuals into two groups in such 
a way that the characteristics of the physicians who 
responded to the first question differed significantly from 
the characteristics of those who responded to the second 
question. Thus, it is possible to conclude that about 78% 
of the physicians at Stanford would choose B if asked 
Question 1 and 28% would choose D if asked Question 2. 
The data do not rule out the possibility that 22% of the 
physicians would choose A and C, and that 28% of them 
would choose B and D. But, the data indicate that at least 
half of the physicians would choose B if asked to choose 
between A and B, and would choose C if asked to choose 
between C and D.
We have noted a lack of consistency among at least 
half of the physicians who participated in the experiment. 
In decision problems under conditions of uncertainty 
that entail losses, we exercise different considerations than 
in decision problems in conditions of uncertainty that 
involve gains. When we look at the decision problem from 
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the perspective of loss, we are drawn to a plan that offers 
real hope of preventing the tragedy, even if it entails a risk 
of enlarging its dimensions if it occurs. When we examine 
the decision problem from the perspective of salvation, 
as a choice between two life-saving medical actions, we 
prefer to go for the sure thing rather than take a gamble 
that would enable us to save a larger number of patients 
but entails a significant risk that no one would be saved. 
Kahneman and Tversky conducted this experiment 
using a routine experimental technique. As noted, the 
respondents were randomly divided into two groups, 
with one group assigned to respond to Question 1 and 
the other group assigned to respond to Question 2. This 
technique provides a solution for the concern that if the 
same person is asked to respond to both questions, one 
after the other, his response to the second question will be 
influenced by the fact that he had just answered the first 
question. It turns out that even when the same people are 
asked both questions one after the other, there is significant 
inconsistency between the answers to the two questions. 
More than 5,000 students of game theory were asked to 
respond to two questions posted on the web that are similar 
in format to the questions the reader can find on this book’s 
Internet site. The students were asked the two questions 
in the order presented here, with a number of completely 
different questions inserted between the two questions. 
72% of the students chose alternative B in the first question 
and far fewer, 49%, chose D in the second question. The 
result regarding the choice between A and B is very similar 
to those of the original experiment whereas in regard to the 
second question, the percentage of respondents who chose 
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D rose significantly, from 28% in the original experiment 
to 48% in the web-based experiment. Apparently, when 
the two questions were presented consecutively, some of 
the students did indeed become aware of the connection 
between the two questions and made sure to remain 
consistent with the choice they made on the first question. 
Nevertheless, more than a quarter of the students made 
the combination of choices B and C.
Begin and Rabin
1977 was one of the most memorable years of my life. I was 
in my first year as a doctoral student, full of enthusiasm 
about the world of formal models I had just discovered. 
In one of the classes, the lecturer referred to a simple 
model I had formulated and I was in seventh heaven. 
I had stepped out into the big world and was living away 
from my parents’ home for the first time. We were a few 
serious youngsters who had founded the “Movement for 
a Different Zionism.” We envisioned it as a harbinger of 
the formation of a large political group that would step 
into the breach against Gush Emunim, the Israeli settlers’ 
movement. We were fearful of the messianism and 
extreme nationalism of certain national religious groups, 
and were disgusted with the settlement policy the Begin 
government was committed to and began to implement as 
soon as it took office. The excitement of political activity 
blended with the romantic intoxication of a Jerusalem 
summer and meetings that lasted into the small hours of 
the night in the quaint Nahlaot neighborhood.
I had already encountered Begin’s rhetorical style 
when I was a child. My father took me to a soccer 
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game only once, but many times to election rallies. At 
Menorah Square in Jerusalem and at the entrance to 
the Mea She’arim neighborhood, I heard Begin speak 
vehemently against the ruling Mapai semi-socialist 
party. My father would make fun of Begin, but still 
admired him enough to take me to shake his hand at 
a barmitzvah celebration where Begin was among the 
guests. When I was a child, I thought Begin’s rhetoric 
made him look as if he were playing the fool or clowning. 
Fifteen years later, in 1977, I was amazed to watch him 
enthrall the masses. I felt helpless and frustrated by the 
reactions of many of my friends, who extolled Begin for 
his rhetorical prowess and in the same breath criticized 
the rhetorical poverty of our own forces. I, who believed 
in the power of level-headed argument, did not regard 
Begin as a role model. 
Begin often explained his decisions in terms of 
carrying out duties and honoring rights: “We must 
all make an effort to… We have to… But we are also 
obliged…” He would start by saying “We must make 
sure that…” and ask “What should we have done?” In 
a meeting with President Carter on 19 July 1977, Begin 
reached new heights of rhetoric: 
Mr. President, in your country there are many cities with 
biblical names. You have eleven places with the name 
Hebron; five with the name Shiloh and seven with the 
name Bethlehem. Can you imagine a governor in one of 
these states prohibiting Jews from living in these cities? 
The Israeli government also cannot prohibit Jews from 
living in Hebron, Bethlehem or Beit El. It is our duty to… 
Begin’s arguments were generally based on “our rights” 
and “our duty.” One could think that there is room for 
60 Economic Fables
discussion and disagreement regarding rights and duties. 
Did our forefathers command us to settle in Beit El in 
1977? Why are we bound by the wishes of our forefathers? 
Are there other obligatory commands that contradict this 
“duty”? However, in Begin’s rhetorical realm, there was no 
room to examine the limits of the possible and to identify 
the desirable. The preferred status of an action derived 
from its being considered part of our rights and our 
duties and not from its being the best action in light of the 
limitations of the possible, according to our worldview. 
Rabin, in contrast to Begin, had a measured tone and 
a matter of fact, down to earth style. I remember the 
satisfaction I felt one morning in the late 1970s when 
I heard Rabin interviewed on the radio. Speaking just 
like the rational man from the economic definition, he 
outlined the possible and the desirable, and after careful 
consideration, drew conclusions. During his victorious 
election campaign in 1992, Rabin made frequent use of 
the concept of priorities. In his book Service Notebook, he 
wrote: “I have no doubt that the dangers of peace are a 
thousand times preferable to the gloomy certainty of war.” 
He asked himself what possibilities were available, even 
after he made a decision: 
I shall always remember the moment just after deciding 
to mount an action: the hush, the sound of the door 
closing; and then the silence in which I remain alone… 
In that moment of great tension just before the finger 
pulls the trigger, just before the fuse begins to burn; in 
the terrible quiet of that moment, there is still time to 
wonder, alone: Is it really imperative to act? Is there no 
other choice? No other way? (from Rabin’s speech at the 
award ceremony of the Nobel Peace Prize in 1994).
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The distinction between Begin and Rabin corresponded 
to the difference in style between the slogans of the right 
and those of the left in Israel at that time. The leading 
slogans of the right claimed rights (“The Land of Israel, 
all of it is ours”), made statements that were ostensibly 
factual (“The Golan is an inseparable part of the State of 
Israel”), and expressed prayers (“Messiah now”), while 
the slogans of the left quoted preferences (“Peace is 
preferable to the greater Land of Israel”) and a demand 
(“Peace now”). It seems to me that the differences in style 
between the slogans of the left and right became less 
acute in later years, as all of Israeli politics was taken over 
by the culture of media advisors and public relations. 
In the final analysis, did Rabin’s preferences really 
have an advantage over Begin’s rights? In my view, the 
answer is not unequivocal. Begin entangled Israel for 
generations with the settlement enterprise and embarked 
on the unnecessary Lebanon War, but also signed the 
historic peace treaty with Egypt. Rabin ordered the army 
to break the limbs of the demonstrators in the first intifada 
and was responsible as IDF chief of staff in the Six Day 
War for Israel’s inhumane treatment of the remnants of the 
Egyptian Army in the Sinai, but his signing of the Oslo 
Accords ensured his place in history (and led to his death). 
As years went by, I realized that I think more like Begin 
than Rabin in regard to the occupation and the occupied 
territories. My unconditional opposition to ruling over 
another people did not derive from my formulation of the 
objectives that the State of Israel is supposed to achieve or 
from asking myself which possible policy would generate 
the best result in terms of these objectives. I simply feel 
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an absolute duty not to be on the side of the occupier 
and oppressor, even if the occupation is economically 
beneficial and brings peace closer. Nonetheless, I do not 
have a shred of sympathy for Begin. Even his signing 
of the peace treaty with Egypt and the fact that he was 
subject to periodic bouts of depression did not soften my 
anger over his demagogic antics. Like the times when I 
was a child and wanted to use a book of logic to prepare 
myself for asserting irrefutable arguments against evil, I 
still find myself looking for ways to understand rhetoric 
and long to defeat demagoguery. 
Mental arithmetic
The following example is Kahneman and Tversky’s. 
Students were divided into two groups. Students in one 
group were asked: 
 Imagine that you have decided to see a show that costs 
$20. You purchased a ticket, but upon your arrival 
you discover that you have lost it. Will you purchase 
another ticket for the show?
The question for the students in the second group was:
 Imagine that you have decided to see a show that costs 
$20. Upon your arrival, you discover that you have 
lost a $20 bill. Will you purchase a ticket for the show?
Rational principles, it seems, dictate that the respondents 
should answer the two questions in the same way. That 
is, regardless of whether the decision maker lost a ticket 
or a $20 bill, he will have $40 less than he had before if 
he purchases a ticket and sees the show; and if he does 
	 1. Rational,	Irrational 63
not purchase another ticket he will find himself with $20 
less than what he originally had and misses the show. 
Thus, whether the decision maker lost a ticket or a $20 
bill, he faces identical problems of choice. Therefore, we 
can expect that a rational man would make the same 
decision in the two cases. But in the original study, only 
46% of the participants said they would purchase a ticket 
after they lost a previous ticket, while 88% answered that 
they would purchase a ticket after losing a $20 bill. On 
my website, among 1,500 students who were randomly 
assigned to respond to one of the two questions, the 
results were less pronounced but similar to the original 
results: 64% and 80%, respectively. We can summarize: 
decision makers are more inclined to purchase a ticket 
after losing a $20 bill than after losing a previously 
purchased $20 ticket. 
What is happening here? Decision makers assess the 
price of purchasing a ticket as the total expense involved 
in seeing the show. After losing a ticket, a decision maker 
tends to assess the price of an additional ticket at $40 
rather than at its nominal value. After losing a $20 bill, he 
regards the loss as an event that is not directly connected 
to purchasing a ticket to the show, and he calculates the 
cost of the new ticket at only $20. This pattern of thinking 
is called mental accounting. The difference in the cost of a 
ticket, as it is calculated mentally, explains the readiness 
of some of the participants in the experiment to purchase 
a ticket in certain circumstances and not in others – those 
for whom the show is worth sacrificing $20 and but for 
whom a payment of $40 is already too much will purchase 
a ticket after losing a $20 bill, but not after losing a ticket. 
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Kahneman and Tversky also report that when the 
two questions were presented one after the other, the 
percentage of participants with inconsistent responses 
declined. The inclination of nearly all of the participants 
is not to purchase another ticket after losing the first 
ticket. But some feel embarrassed after becoming aware 
that they would have purchased a ticket after losing a $20 
bill. A person’s embarrassment in light of a certain choice 
reinforces the view that the choice is not rational. 
My father died
After the army of physicians and interns and nurses 
finished treating my father, the physicians permitted me 
to enter the scrubbed and polished room, which showed 
no traces of the last battle. The room was lit by a pale 
fluorescent light typical of hospital evenings. My father 
lay unconscious on a wide bed, attached to tubes. The 
instruments rose and fell at the pace of an ebbing life. 
A physician told me that it was important that I hold 
his hand. I tried for a moment, but did not discern any 
reaction and let go. I sat near my father, I looked out from 
the hospital window on Mount Scopus at Jerusalem on 
Earth and thought about the nurse in the white robe with 
two open buttons who came every half hour to replace 
the cocktail of medications being pointlessly infused into 
my father’s veins. Around midnight, I left and went home. 
I was awoken the next morning by a phone call informing 
me that the situation had deteriorated. When I entered the 
room, I saw only a white screen that hid the bed on which 
apparently my father’s body was lying. The physician did 
	 1. Rational,	Irrational 65
not say a word. He assumed that I understood. He asked 
me if I wanted to approach the bed. Without hesitation I 
said no. My father was no longer there and as a rational 
man I found no reason to see the body of a dead person. 
And then the physician gently asked me whether I 
objected to having an autopsy performed. 
I first encountered the concept of autopsies in posters 
by the Association for Defending the Dignity of the Dead, 
which often covered the walls of northern Jerusalem. 
The posters called on the public to fast and participate 
in demonstrations against autopsies performed by 
the “butchers” from Hadassah hospital. Sometimes the 
advertisements featured black and white photographs of 
a stomach or brain after the physicians had sawed, cut, 
emptied and sewn it. My father, despite his rejection of 
religion, still observed Jewish tradition to some extent. I do 
not know whether he feared God or felt nostalgic toward 
a lost world. I also do not know what he thought about 
autopsies, because we never dared to speak about death. 
When the physician asked for my consent, I reminded 
myself that I was a rational man and that the operation 
would be performed on my father’s corpse and not on 
my father himself. The lump of flesh laying there was at 
most a container in which my ex-father had resided. It 
was no longer my father whose body was to be dissected, 
and therefore why should I object to the advancement of 
science? If the dead were not operated on, the physicians 
would be less proficient and medical knowledge would 
be the poorer. If I did not consent to the autopsy, the 
responsibility for the death of future patients would also 
be on my conscience. 
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It was the dawn of the Friday before the Purim 
Festival. Mount Scopus was always the object of my 
dreams. I still sing to myself the ever popular hymn to 
Jerusalem “From on Mount Scopus” in times of stress. 
My sister was born on Mount Scopus during the pre-state 
era. My father worked there as a clerk during the British 
Mandate. We were cut off from Mount Scopus before 
I was born. Walking hand-in-hand with my mother on 
Ezra Street in the early evening, I would stare at the trees 
and gray buildings on Mount Scopus, which beckoned 
like an enchanted garden whose gate – the Mandelbaum 
Gate – was locked. I would sometimes watch Maman, the 
police officer, as he peered through his binoculars from 
the balcony on the third floor of the house across the street, 
anxiously tracking the twice-a-month convoy ascending 
the hill, until announcing that the convoy had passed. 
A feeling of relief would then sweep over the street. I did 
my first year of university studies on Mount Scopus. Later, 
my two children would be born in the same building in 
which my father died. Now, on that Friday before Purim, 
I thought about the limits of rationality. 
The physician explained to me that by law I could not 
sign the forms for an autopsy on the spot, and needed 
to wait six hours after being notified of the death before 
signing the authorization. I was impressed by the logic 
and humaneness in the law. But it was impossible to 
tarry. The autopsy needed to be completed before the 
start of the Jewish Sabbath on Friday evening, and Friday 
was a short day. I controlled myself and did not expose 
my emotions. I just asked the physician, with the fear 
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to physicians, whether it was probable that someone’s 
life would be saved as a result of the post mortem. 
Without hesitation he answered in the affirmative. He 
explained that an autopsy would help physicians and 
students understand my father’s heart illness and that 
this might help in treating similar patients in the future. 
The physician had a pleasant countenance and wore a 
yarmulke (skull cap). At that moment, the yarmulke was 
for me a guarantee of his honesty. 
Six hours later, I hurried back to the hospital to sign the 
required form. Before I signed, I stipulated that the post 
mortem should only involve the parts of his body affected 
by the disease. The physician expressed satisfaction with 
my response and promised that my request would be 
honored.
On Sunday afternoon, a few of my father’s 
acquaintances and some friends gathered at the 
funeral home in the Sanhedria neighborhood. The 
burial society in Jerusalem had a bad reputation at 
the time, but I was impressed by the respect and 
sensitivity the thick-bearded undertakers showed to the 
mourners. As is customary, I was asked to accompany 
the undertakers to identify the corpse, which had been 
cleansed, wrapped in a shroud and prepared for burial. 
One of the undertakers asked me in a despondent 
tone whether I had consented to an autopsy. I nodded 
hesitantly, like someone who was caught red-handed. 
I stuttered that I had authorized operating only on the 
parts of the body related to my father’s illness. The 
undertakers glanced at me with skepticism. Slowly, they 
unwrapped the bandages from the skull. It was the first 
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time in my life that I looked upon the face of a dead 
person. My father, with his large face and without his 
false teeth, had already looked shrunken when he was in 
the hospital. I saw now that the skull had been cut open 
and sewn, as if they had emptied it. Then the undertaker 
covered the head again with the shroud. 
Apparently, I had allowed myself to be deceived. Later, 
I also failed to fulfill my father’s last wish – that I recite 
kaddish, the mourners’ prayer, during the shiva, the 
week-long period of mourning. I went to the synagogue 
once for mincha, the afternoon prayer service, but I felt out of 
place there and did not go back again. My father was dead, 
and a rational man has no reason to honor the wishes of dead 
people. Nonetheless, why did it bother me that my father’s 
brain had been cut? And why will I not forgive the physician 
who did not keep his word? And why did I not fulfill my 
father’s last wish? And why does this bother me at all?
Looking for reasons
Tversky and Simonson asked the individuals in one 
group to choose between two alternatives: $6 in cash 
or a high-quality pen. Some 36% of them chose the 
pen. The individuals in the second group were asked to 
choose between three alternatives: $6 in cash, the same 
high-quality pen or a simple pen that was obviously 
inferior to the high-quality one. The percentage of those 
who chose the high-quality pen rose to 46%.
What is the explanation for this finding? Some of the 
individuals presumably have no interest in a pen and 
they would choose $6 when responding to either of the 
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two questions. Some of the individuals may actually need 
a pen and in any case would choose the high-quality 
pen. But there are some individuals for whom the choice 
between the high-quality pen and the cash is not clear-cut. 
The existence of an additional alternative, a simple pen, 
provides “a good reason” to resolve this indecision and 
to choose the high-quality pen: the high-quality pen is 
clearly preferable to the simple pen, while the $6 is not 
obviously preferable to the simple pen. 
On this book’s website I cannot give out pens (and do 
not wish to do so). Therefore, two similar, but hypothetical, 
questions are posed on the site. Half of the readers are 
asked to respond to the following question:
 Assume that you are planning a trip and are interested in 
buying a digital camera. You find a store that sells three 
models produced by the same manufacturer. The models 
and their prices are quite similar to one another. The only 
differences between them is the score they received in a 
professional magazine and the number of pixels. 
Model A received a score of 9.1 and has 6 megapixels.
Model B received a score of 8.3 and has 8 megapixels.
Model C received a score of 8.1 and has 7 megapixels.
Which model would you choose?
The other readers are asked to respond to an identical 
question – except for the fact that they must choose only 
between models A and B. 
More than 1,500 students were asked to respond to one 
of the two questions prior to the publication of the book 
and the following results were received: among those 
who had to choose between models A, B and C, 65% chose 
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B and only 1% chose C. These results show the alertness of 
the participants in the experiment, even without offering 
real prizes. Among those who had to choose between A 
and B only, the percentage choosing B declined to 53%. 
In this experiment, we compared the choices of decision 
makers who chose between A and B with those who chose 
between A, B and C. It turns out that the percentage of 
individuals who chose B from A, B and C was significantly 
higher than the percentage who chose B from only A and 
B. The decision makers who would choose B if choosing 
from the larger selection and A if asked to choose from 
the smaller selection cannot be described as rational: if 
a rational decision maker has preferences and B is the 
preferred alternative from among A, B and C, then B 
should also be the preferred alternative between A and B.
Here is another, similar example, this time from Shafir, 
Simonson and Tversky: individuals in one group had to 
choose, hypothetically of course, between A, a camera 
priced at $170, and B, a more sophisticated camera priced 
at $240. A low percentage of individuals in this first 
group chose B. The individuals in another group were 
given a third possibility, C, a much more sophisticated 
camera, priced at $470. And here, with the addition of the 
very expensive camera, the percentage of those choosing 
B rose (to some extent). A reasonable explanation for the 
change is that adding the expensive camera C made B into 
the middle option between A and C. When we arrange 
the alternatives in our minds linearly, the central location 
of an alternative is a reason to choose it. 
Was it necessary to conduct experiments to prove the 
tendency of people to choose the middle option? This 
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is well known not only to those engaged in marketing 
but also to my son, Yuval. When he was small, he told 
me that when his favorite fast food chain added an 
extra-large cup to the drinks menu, in addition to the 
large and medium cups, it was conducting a marketing 
ploy aimed at encouraging people to choose the large cup. 
This logic should have also led to the conclusion that in 
an election battle between a candidate from the right and 
a candidate from the left, it would be beneficial for the 
former if an extreme right-winger joins the race. Political 
experience shows that this is not always true: adding 
an extreme right-wing candidate often arouses aversion 
toward the moderate right-winger. 
No one argues that the irrational considerations 
attributed here to decision makers are always decisive 
considerations. All of the examples presented here are 
only intended to illustrate the existence of considerations 
that sometimes influence decision makers and are 
contrary to the assumption of rationality. We have a lot 
to learn before understanding when these considerations 
arise in decision making and what determines their 
weight vis-à-vis other considerations.
What would my mother have said?
We use expressions like a dead person rolling over in his 
grave, my grandmother would have been happy to see 
me now, or, I observe the Sabbath because my forefathers 
observed the Sabbath. In our dreams, we see our deceased 
loved ones summoning us to do things that we might not 
have done if they had not appeared to us. For those who 
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believe that the deceased are situated somewhere and 
are watching over us until we are gathered up to join 
them, it is easier to justify such behavior as rational. But 
as someone who believes that the souls or spirits of the 
dead are not hovering anywhere, I do not have much 
respect for those who use the kingdom of the dead to try 
to influence what happens on the planet of the living. 
On one Rosh Hashanah (Jewish New Year) morning 
in faraway Princeton, I was informed that my sister had 
been rushed to a hospital in Jerusalem. At the end of the 
holiday, en route to Israel, I prepared myself for the worst. 
At the entrance to the hospital ward, a physician met me 
and explained her condition in detail: a “manufacturing 
defect” of nature had been discovered in one wall of an 
artery in the brain; nature had been negligent and had 
not provided a warranty. The wall of the artery was too 
thin and, with age, could not withstand the pressure. It 
had inflated like a balloon and exploded; its contents had 
leaked and perhaps caused damage to adjacent brain cells. 
There was a probability of 90%, the physician said, that 
the initial leak would lead to a second and fatal leak. The 
solution: a dangerous operation – though its description 
sounded like a routine plumbing operation. And here the 
physician confronted me with the most difficult decision 
of my life: the operation could be performed in Jerusalem, 
where the surgeons had limited experience with this 
procedure, or we could fly my sister to a medical center in 
the U.S., with the most experienced physicians in this type 
of surgery. On the one hand, undergoing the operation in 
the U.S. would diminish the risk of irreversible damage 
that could occur during surgery. On the other hand, it 
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would involve a logistical project the like of which I had 
never had to contend with in the past. I was concerned 
about detaching her from the supportive environment. 
I also felt a twinge of fear about the possibility that in a 
foreign environment she might ultimately be operated on 
by a surgeon who did not have extensive experience. It was 
impossible to receive an unequivocal recommendation 
from the physicians. This situation arose soon after the 
community of neurosurgeons in Israel had been harshly 
attacked by a public figure who had traveled overseas for 
a brain operation and complained about the ostensibly 
inferior professional capabilities of neurosurgeons in 
Israel. The physicians were on the defensive and showed 
a lack of confidence in their recommendations. Friends 
I visited at 2am offered me conflicting advice. 
Only rarely had I faced a real dilemma that was so 
similar to the decision problems under uncertainty that 
we discuss in our models. The alternatives were clear: 
an operation in Israel, or an operation in the U.S., or no 
operation. The last option was clearly inferior to the other 
two. The results were a matter of chance and the dice 
were in the hands of God. I had time to consult, learn and 
weigh the arguments. It was solely my decision to make. 
I was an adult and had even written several papers on the 
theory of decision making. If decision making theory has 
any practical value, it should have become evident then. 
I lay on my bed and felt a tightness in my chest, signs 
of the tension and distress I was experiencing. I could not 
decide. I needed a convincing reason. And then I found 
it. “What would my mother have said if she were alive?” 
I asked myself, despite the fact that my mother had died 
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several months earlier and even before her death had lost 
the ability to make real decisions. “My sister belongs to 
our mother. Our mother is responsible for my sister’s fate 
and she will decide.” Everything became clear and the 
dilemma was resolved: it was clear that my mother would 
have chosen for my sister to be operated on in the place 
where she was born and in the city in which she lived. The 
decision was made. 
They do not understand the causal 
connection
Let’s return to the picture of the decision maker who sits 
at the keyboard and knows that each keystroke leads to 
a given result. Let’s say that we know and that he knows 
that pressing the A key leads to receiving $1 and pressing 
the B key leads to receiving $2. It is clear to us that the 
decision maker is interested in receiving as much money 
as possible: he says so, and every time that we offer the 
decision maker two envelopes with $1 and $2 he chooses 
the larger sum. Rationality, as we understand it in life 
and also as it is perceived in economics, requires that 
the decision maker understands the connection between 
pressing the A or the B key and the consequences ($1 or 
$2, respectively) and that he will press the B key. We can 
state this in a more abstract way: when there is a causal 
connection between an action and a result, the assumption 
of rationality includes the requirement that the decision 
maker is aware of the causal connections and will choose 
the action that will generate the preferred result, without 
making an error. 
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But human beings err, and do so systematically. Here 
is another example by Tversky and Kahneman:
 Imagine a die with six sides, four of them green (G) 
and two of them red (R).
 You must choose one of three strings of the letters G and 
R. The die will be rolled 20 times and you will receive 
$25 if the series of results includes the string you chose. 




Which string would you choose?
Choosing any of the three strings will lead to a result that 
in our professional terminology is called a lottery. If the 
string appears in the series of rolls of the die, the decision 
maker will receive a prize; if the string does not appear, he 
will not receive anything. It is reasonable to assume that 
the decision maker will prefer one lottery over another if 
it offers him a higher probability of winning a prize. 
We note that every series that includes the second string 
(GRGRRR) also includes the first string (RGRRR). Every 
series of rolls of the die that awards a prize to someone 
who chooses the second string will also award a prize to 
those who choose the first string. Moreover, the string 
RRGRRR is the first string with the addition of another R 
at the beginning; thus, there are series that award a prize 
to those who choose the first string but not to those who 
choose the second string. Therefore, without calculating 
probabilities, one can discern that the first alternative 
offers a higher probability of winning a prize than the 
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second alternative. Nonetheless, the overwhelming 
majority (65%) of the 125 students who participated in 
the original study chose the second string (GRGRRR). 
A similar result was found among 2,000 students who 
responded to the question (without receiving any real 
reward) as presented on the book’s website: 59% chose 
the second string. And, incidentally, only 4% chose the 
third string (GRRRRR), which is easily seen to be less 
likely than the second string. 
As noted, the rational decision maker must be aware 
of the causal connections between his choice and the 
result that derives from it, and he is supposed to choose 
an action that generates the result that he views as 
preferable. This assumption is sometimes violated due to 
errors, as in the experiment discussed here. It is clear that 
most of the respondents misunderstood the connection 
between the choice of the string and the probability of 
winning the prize. They did not understand that choosing 
the string GRGRRR means choosing an option with a 
lower probability of winning than the string RGRRR. The 
reason, apparently, is related to the fact that probability 
is often confused with representativeness. Given that 
the probability of the result G on any roll of the die is 
2/3, the string RGRRR, in which only 1/5 of the letters are 
G, is perceived as less typical than the string GRGRRR, 
in which 1/3 of the letters are G. But, the probability of 
finding the string RGRRR in the series of rolls of the die is 
always greater than the probability of finding the string 
GRGRRR. 
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Not only errors hinder the understanding of the 
connection between a choice and its result. Sometimes the 
problem stems from the fact that we feel that we are able 
to influence the connection between the action and result, 
despite knowing full well that we have no such influence. 
Imagine that you are a student. The teacher, who 
generally means what he says, announces that a 
memorization test will be held the next day on a text 
you have never read, and you would like to achieve 
a high score. You have to decide whether or not to 
prepare for the test. If you prepare, you will have to give 
up your favorite leisure activity, but you will ensure 
your success in the test. If you do not prepare, you will 
be able to spend your time as you wish, but you will 
fail the test. You clearly understand the connection 
between the action and the consequence. As a rational 
person, you will weigh the fun you are missing while 
preparing for the test and the satisfaction of success, 
on the one hand, against the pleasure derived from 
your leisure activity and the unpleasantness of failing 
the test, on the other. But let’s assume that you noticed 
that in the past a strange coincidence has occurred: 
when you repeated a secret word, the test did not take 
place. If you choose to use your magical power and 
do not prepare for the test, you will fit the definition 
of being irrational despite the fact that you are doing 
your best within the framework of your beliefs and are 
trying to affect the connection between an action and 
its result. It will immediately become clear that you 
would not be the only one I would label as irrational… 
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Whisper
In high school, I was a good student, but only in the 
subjects that interested me: mathematics, Jewish law 
and citizenship. I did not do homework in the rest of the 
subjects. I would come to class before everyone, lie in wait 
for the first students and copy from them the homework 
in all the subjects I detested – literature, history, chemistry 
and biology – in return for the homework I prepared in 
math. The school conducted many surprise exams. The 
teacher would enter the classroom and pronounce the 
words that even now unnerve me a bit: “Take out paper for 
a test.” I usually did not know the answers to the questions 
in the test and I became expert in copying them from my 
neighbor behind the broad back of my friend Yuval, who 
sat in front of me. During the moments of dread, when the 
teacher entered the classroom, I discovered a surprising 
correlation. Always, yes always, if I muttered the words 
“There is going to be an exam, there is going to be an exam” 
when the teacher was about to enter the classroom, there 
wouldn’t be one. All of the exams took place on days when 
I failed to mutter my abracadabra. 
This is how I encountered the power I have over 
the events in the world. When I say to myself: “This 
bad thing will happen,” it actually does not occur. Just 
yesterday I lost my university ID card. The loss ignited 
an exaggerated burst of emotions in me. The ID card can 
be reissued. In the worst case, I would need to inquire 
about the procedures for replacing a lost ID card, to 
report the loss, to call and check the office hours, to stand 
in line until the new ID is issued… that’s all. Really not 
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so terrible. Nonetheless, I was terribly agitated. I looked 
in my wallet again and again; I searched everywhere 
and did not find it. I returned home to check whether 
the ID had perhaps fallen from my pocket when I was 
undressing or dressing. Nothing. It was not on the floor, 
not on the bed, and not under the bed. There was no ID 
card anywhere. I decided to check just one more time 
in case it was hiding in my wallet after all. But before I 
began the final probe, I muttered to myself: “The ID card 
is lost, the ID card is lost.” I again rummaged through 
the wallet and… there it was, in one of the pockets of 
the wallet, tucked behind a credit card. 
I did not pray to God. I did not speak with creatures 
from outer space. All I did was note the connection 
between what I say and what happens, a dependence 
that has proven itself time and again as an act of magic. 
As a rational person, I am struck by the urge to look for 
an explanation for this strange coincidence. Of course, I 
suspect that the success of my spell is related to the fact 
that I chose to use it in cases when it was likely that the 
thing I feared would not really occur in any case. The 
rational person within me protests: why should I shatter 
this wonder? After all, I had found an effective tool for 
protecting myself in stressful situations. And perhaps I 
had simply reached the limits of my own rationality.
Experiments
The heroes of most economic models are rational 
decision makers. The traditional economic view, the one 
that dominates in the textbooks at least, asserts that the 
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assumption of decision makers’ rationality enables us to 
describe human behavior quite accurately. The flood of 
experimental results in the field of economics, primarily 
from cognitive psychology, contradicts this view.
Results that are inconsistent with the model of the 
rational person elicit skeptical reactions (sometimes 
justifiably). The attitude of economists toward results that 
conflict with the paradigm of the rational man reminds 
me of the natural reaction to the optical illusion generated 
when subconscious mechanisms create a picture that 
does not conform to our perception of the world. In both 
cases, we smile, become irritated, suspect that someone is 
pulling a fast one on us, are happy to discover that even 
“perfect” beings fall into the snares that nature sets for us 
all, and we look for explanations. 
Some criticize the experiments pertaining to decision 
making because the participants are offered insignificant 
incentives. The important decisions of life, the critics say, 
involve interests that are much more significant than a 
few dollars and therefore we cannot infer what people 
will do when faced with major economic decisions from 
the way they behave when offered the chance to earn 
negligible sums. I do not agree with this criticism. First, 
not only fateful decisions are important. In life, people 
make many small decisions and the cumulative economic 
impact of these decisions is significant. And second, most 
of the major economic decisions are made by people for 
whom such decisions are an everyday matter. The small 
decisions we make in life are no less important to us than 
the major decisions of the rich and powerful are to them. 
I see no reason to think that when senior executives decide 
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on matters involving millions they exercise different 
considerations than those that common folks use when 
making decisions about a few dollars. 
In most of the experiments we mentioned in the previous 
sections, the participants were only asked to imagine a 
decision problem and did not receive any compensation 
(not even symbolic) related to their choices. In my view, 
material compensation for participants in experiments is 
completely unnecessary. People are very good at imagining 
hypothetical situations. The fact that the results of the 
experiments in which no material incentives were provided 
are very similar to those received when participants were 
given material incentives indicates that offering incentives 
usually makes no real contribution to the identification of 
patterns of thinking used in decision making.
It is customary to evaluate research results via a 
statistical test. At best, this entails an attempt to assess 
the chance that we are drawing an erroneous conclusion 
from the data. For example, let’s return to the question of 
the epidemic that was presented to physicians at Stanford. 
In the original experiment, of 152 physicians who 
responded to Question 1, 109 (78%) chose option A. Of 
155 physicians who responded to the same but differently 
worded question, Question 2, only 34 (28%) chose C. We 
deduced from these results that the differences in wording 
between the two questions influenced the responses. We 
only assigned the title rational to those who chose A in the 
first question and C in the second, or B in the first question 
and D in the second. We concluded that a large group of 
individuals acted irrationally. But perhaps this conclusion 
is wrong and the differences in percentages between those 
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who chose A in the first question and C in the second 
question can be attributed to pure coincidence? Perhaps 
all of the physicians at Stanford are rational, but some 
prefer the sure plan (A or C) while others prefer the more 
risky plan (B or D)? Perhaps, by sheer coincidence, the 
physicians were divided into the two groups in such a way 
that it just happened that more of those who preferred A 
(and, therefore, also C) were in the group asked Question 1, 
while more of those who preferred B (and, therefore, also D) 
were in the group asked Question 2?
A statistical test is designed to examine the extent 
of unreasonableness of the assumption that the results 
we received were only coincidental. We assume that 
all 307 participants are rational and would respond in 
the same way to the two questions: 143 of them prefer 
A to B (and, therefore, also C to D), while the other 
164 participants prefer B to A (and, therefore, also D 
to C). A statistical test is based on assumptions about 
the random factors involved. The test we employ here 
(Fisher’s exact probability test) assumes that the 307 
participants were randomly assigned to two groups, 
one with 152 participants who responded to Question 1 
and the second with 155 participants who responded 
to Question 2. The test assumes that all of the possible 
distributions of the 307 participants into two groups 
of 152 and 155 have the same probability. The test 
calculates the probability that the randomness created 
a distribution that is so biased that at least 109 of those 
who preferred A (and C) happened to be in the first 
group. Statistical programs greatly facilitate such 
calculations and it turns out that the probability of such 
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an event is very (very!) close to zero. It is so close to zero 
that the possibility that the results are consistent with 
the hypothesis of rationality is unreasonable, and we 
reject the hypothesis. Incidentally, it was not necessary 
to have such dramatic results in order to reject 
the hypothesis. According to the conventional criteria, the 
test results would be considered significant even if 
the percentage of those choosing C dropped from 78% 
to just 72% (and not to 28% as occurred).
I have not addressed statistical tests at all in this chapter. 
The findings are so clear that it seems to me that such an 
addition would constitute nothing more than paying lip 
service to the professional conservatism expected in such 
reports. Incidentally, Kahneman and Tversky, for example, 
also did not bother to conduct (or at least to report) a 
statistical test that examined the results they obtained in 
the epidemic problem. 
In general, the mechanical use of the concept of 
statistical significance is dangerous. The logic in its 
use rests upon important assumptions that are usually 
ignored or taken for granted but which should be 
examined. Researchers and newspaper readers love 
to use indices and rarely ask themselves what stands 
behind them. For example, the conventional tests of 
significance in economics completely ignore factors 
such as errors in measurement, documentation, 
analysis and reporting – factors that could have a major 
impact on the validity of the results. And, of course, 
the researchers have interests and biases and these, 
consciously or subconsciously, are liable to influence 
the reported results. It seems to me that the uncertainty 
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regarding the credibility of the researchers is much 
more significant that the uncertainty taken into account 
in the conventional statistical tests. Therefore, I would 
be more impressed by two experiments conducted by 
two different researchers with small samples and results 
that are not considered significant, than an experiment 
conducted by one researcher with a sample twice as 
large and a result that is considered significant. 
Is there any need for experiments at all?
Experiments are born in the feverish and fruitful mind of 
a researcher who is not detached from reality and knows 
how to surmise the considerations that pass through 
the minds of human beings faced with decision making 
problems. Whoever conceived the problem of the lost 
theater ticket certainly knew that people feel compelled 
not to purchase another ticket after losing the original 
one because the loss makes the purchase seem more 
expensive. The researcher understood that some of the 
participants find this consideration to be decisive when 
deliberating whether to purchase another ticket, while 
some take comfort in thinking that it really does not 
cost $40, but just $20. The product of the experiment is 
qualitative, supporting the assumption that more people 
would include the loss in their calculation of cost after 
losing a previous ticket than after losing a $20 bill. 
Quantitative results have very limited significance 
in any case because the sample of participants does not 
represent more than a group of psychology, economics, or 
MBA students in a particular university. The qualitative 
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results are usually insights that common sense had 
already suggested prior to the experiment. So why is there 
a need for experiments at all? Why is it not possible to 
suffice with self-reporting by researchers, as is customary 
in philosophy? For years I thought that experiments in 
economics were nothing but a waste of research funds. 
I still do not find great relevance in quantitative 
results, and I believe that the most reliable test of the 
reasonableness of an idea is that of common sense. But 
my appreciation of experiments grew after I realized 
that composing an array of questions that succeeds in 
illustrating a certain thought process is a work of art, and 
after I became convinced that common sense sometimes 
does deceive even the most experienced of us. 
In recent years, I have myself been guilty of conducting 
experiments. I felt the captivating excitement when results 
started to arrive and a hypothesis became a proven fact, or 
the pervasive disappointment when it became apparent 
that “something went wrong here.” I have never bet at 
horse races, but I imagine that the feelings of a researcher 
as the results of an experiment come in are similar to a 
gambler’s feelings when the horses are racing round the 
track. And incidentally, the risk taken by researchers 
is no less than that of professional gamblers. At stake 
are the researcher’s honor, satisfaction, professional 
advancement and the monetary compensation awarded 
to him. 
My personal experience with experiments has led 
me to doubt the validity of the results of experiments in 
economics. Economists are not cheats, but like everyone 
else they make mistakes, for the most part unwittingly, 
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and have a tendency to further their own interests. The 
economist wants his results to confirm his hypothesis. 
He is sure that he is right and the experiment is merely 
designed to confirm what he knows. He regards caution 
and meticulousness as unnecessary obstacles on the path 
of advancing human knowledge. I myself felt an urge to 
refrain from extending an experiment after the results 
I received in the initial stage were favorable, and I felt 
compelled to check the results seven times when they 
did not support a hypothesis I “knew” to be correct. The 
fear of being embarrassed if the conclusions are refuted 
by other researchers is almost non-existent in economics 
because we have no tradition of checking data and 
repeating experiments. 
It is strange that according to the economic view of 
the world, people are economic agents who respond 
to incentives, primarily material ones. The economist 
describes them as aspiring to attain an objective that rates 
money, and perhaps status, highly, and gives a low rating 
to moral values. In this world view, all human beings are 
economic agents and their actions should be regarded 
from the perspective of their motives. All of them, except 
a group of angels who look at the world from above: the 
economists. 
Rationality on the defensive
There are those who defend the assumption of rationality, 
arguing that behavior that appears to be irrational at first 
glance is indeed rational if only we define the decision 
problem correctly. Take for example the case in which 
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we must choose one alternative from among a very large 
set of possibilities. What we normally do is we examine 
a relatively small number of options until we find an 
alternative that satisfies us. At that moment, we know 
that there might be better options than the one we are 
about to choose. Ostensibly, we are not acting rationally. 
We are not choosing the best alternative from among the 
set of choices. But it turns out that this pattern of behavior 
can be explained within the framework of the rational 
decision maker. In order to do this, one must describe the 
decision maker not only as someone who decides which 
alternative to choose, but rather as someone who also 
must decide when to bring the decision process to a close, 
taking into account the physical or mental demands the 
decision process entails. 
There are those who justify the assumption of 
rationality by evolutionary considerations: if people 
in the world had used patterns of behavior that clash 
with rationality, a manipulator would have emerged to 
exploit their irrationality for his own benefit and to their 
detriment – until they realized this and changed their 
behavior or until they became extinct.
For example, consider a decision maker who is ready 
to pay a dollar to exchange object A for object B, and is 
ready to pay a dollar to exchange B for object C, and is 
ready to pay a dollar to exchange C for A. Let’s also assume 
that he prefers more money to less money in his pocket. 
The decision maker is not rational: we cannot attribute 
to him an order of priorities that explains his behavior. 
If someone like this initially holds A and $1 million, he 
would be susceptible to a manipulator offering him a 
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series of exchanges for a dollar. At first the manipulator 
would offer to exchange A for B for one dollar. After this 
offer was accepted, he would offer to trade B for C for one 
dollar, and then C for A for one dollar… and so on. Before 
long, our decision maker would wake up and change his 
behavior – and if not, he would find that his bank account 
had been depleted. 
This is a fascinating argument for the assumption 
that individuals whose behavior is inconsistent with the 
assumption of rationality cannot survive for long. But it is 
not so obvious that such individuals would become extinct. 
The manipulators waste energy in hunting the irrational 
creatures, and may be expected to cease their activities 
before they destroy all their source of sustenance (or they 
may become extinct themselves). The survival of those 
who eradicate the irrational individuals requires the 
survival of their irrational victims. This is similar to 
the argument that in nature the fact that one creature is 
stronger than another and depends on it for food does 
not mean that the weaker creature will become extinct, 
but actually explains the mutual existence of both.
And there are those who approach the criticism of the 
assumption of rationality as if they were a labor union, 
arguing that the criticism is fundamentally destructive, 
that it does not offer alternative working frameworks and 
should therefore be ignored. 
In recent years, economic theory has actually 
responded positively to criticism and we have witnessed 
the development of fields of research called “bounded 
rationality” and “behavioral economics” – fields that lay 
an infrastructure for building economic models in which 
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the rational person is replaced by decision makers with 
other characteristics. 
And do I want to be rational?
I refuse to answer this question rationalistically. That 
would require me to grapple with the meaning of life, to 
define the goals of my life, to clarify which paths of life are 
open to me, to face the certainty of death and to embrace 
maximization – which I have no idea how to describe, let 
alone solve. I prefer not to go down that route. 
I can only say that I take pleasure in watching the 
rational man defeated. I do not like his perfection. The 
more I imagine him as flesh and blood, the more I realize 
that he is unbearable, even inhuman. The fact that this 
person does not actually exist – and that it is possible, 
using simple tricks, to make fun of anyone who considers 
himself rational – really makes me happy. I like the 
fact that I myself would make “problematic” choices in 
most of the problems I presented in this chapter. When 
explaining the concept of the rational man and discussing 
these issues in my economics courses, I make a point of 
saying that even after discerning the inconsistency in 
my behavior, I will continue to break all the rules and 
promise to violate the economic principles of rationality. 
“Why?” I ask myself. First, I recoil from the aura of 
dogmatism emanating from the assumption of rationality 
in economics. I have a feeling that economics preaches 
that there is something that should be called correct 
behavior. That makes me feel as if I am denied the right 
to be myself and am forced into a mold designed to train 
90 Economic Fables
me to behave as the economic models assume I behave. 
I refuse to obey.
Second, the assumption of rationality is supposed to 
make me predictable. I do not want someone to anticipate 
my moves and I do not want to be able to predict the 
activity of other people. I never understood why the 
world would be better if there were someone who knows 
what we will do before we do it. I am prepared to make 
significant sacrifices if only to do the opposite of what the 
perfect prophet predicts when he appears one day. And 
even if he tarries – I will wait for him. I so much want to 
defeat him. 
Nonetheless, when all is said and done, I see myself as 
a very rational person, explaining every coincidence with 
statistical tools, refusing to recognize the existence of the 
hand of fate and supernatural forces.
2. Game Theory:  
A Beautiful Mind
1973
I encountered the word Nash. I was a student at Hebrew 
University in Jerusalem and I came across Nash in an 
introductory Game Theory course. For me, Nash was 
then just a short and catchy adjective attached to two 
abstract concepts that are central to game theory: Nash 
Equilibrium and the Nash Bargaining Solution. If the 
concept of equilibrium were named Cournot (who had 
already thought of this concept in a narrow context in 
1838) or “Alpha Equilibrium” or even “Smiley,” it would 
really have made no difference to me. I must have realized 
that the word Nash was connected to a person. And if I 
had asked myself who Nash was, I probably would have 
guessed he was an English intellectual who died at the 
beginning of the twentieth century.
Autumn 1980
I arrived at Princeton for the first time. I heard from other 
students that a crazy genius would roam around the 
campus, sitting for hours in the cafeteria with a pile of 
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computer printouts in front of him, reading newspapers 
he collected from abandoned tables. This crazy person 
could be seen riding back and forth on the “Dinky,” a 
short rail line connecting Princeton Junction to the 
campus. It was rumored that he had an account on the 
university’s computer and was busy with mysterious 
calculations. They said there was one student who had 
dared to approach him and speak with him, and that 
he had readily helped the student. It was hard for me 
to identify him; a lot of weird people roam the lawns at 
Princeton. 
One afternoon, I was about to give a lecture in the 
Economics Department. Before the lecture, I asked 
my host to take me to the cafeteria and show me this 
ethereal character. My host looked toward one of the 
tables, lowered his eyes and whispered to me: “That’s 
John Nash.” The man whose name rolled off my tongue 
more often than any other name in my professional life 
and whose work was the basis for the bargaining model 
I was about to present that day, was hunched over the 
table, wrapped in a long and shabby coat, wearing 
worn-out sneakers, and not looking at anyone. He was a 
solitary figure in the cafeteria, which looked like a dining 
hall in an Oxford college. I did not approach him, of course. 
I was not merely shy; I was afraid to speak with someone 
who was crazy.
Game theory
Whoever invented the name “game theory” was also a 
genius in public relations. Who would be interested in 
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this theory if it were called “A Collection of Models of 
Rational Decision-Making in Interactive Situations”?
The word “game” has a mischievous, youthful and 
accessible ring to it. We all play board games, social games, 
political games and other games. Add to this the fact that 
the basic terminology of game theory includes words like 
“strategy” and “solution,” and it becomes a real celebration. 
After all, we are all frustrated experts in war strategy and 
everyone is searching for a solution to the conflict in the 
Middle East. So here, maybe, just maybe, we have found 
the lost box of tricks with the hidden secrets that will 
improve our game skills. But it is not quite so simple. 
I will try to explain, but first I will reiterate that some of 
the things I am going to say here are not uncontroversial. 
I think that the body of knowledge called game theory 
is a collection of formal models that enables us to analyze 
strategic and rational patterns of human thought. It 
sounds terrible, so I will elaborate a bit. 
In game theory, as in most economic theories, the 
operating units are rational decision makers. The 
decision maker, who is called a player in game theory, 
seeks to attain a well-defined objective. Whenever he is 
required to carry out an activity, he behaves (or at least 
can be regarded as behaving) in the following way: he 
asks himself what is desirable and what is possible, and 
does what is best in his (subjective) view, given what is 
possible (objectively speaking). 
Not every decision problem is a game theory problem. 
Let’s say that I am about to leave my house and I am 
contemplating whether or not to take an umbrella. I have 
four possible scenarios in mind: “I have an umbrella and 
94 Economic Fables
it’s raining,” “I have an umbrella and it isn’t raining,” “I 
don’t have an umbrella and it’s raining,” and “I don’t 
have an umbrella and it isn’t raining.” I have some sense 
of how much pleasure or discomfort I would experience 
in each of the four situations. Whatever I decide the 
outcome is uncertain, which in our professional jargon 
we call a lottery. If I take an umbrella with me, there is 
a chance I will find myself opening it and will stay dry, 
and there is also a possibility that I will drag it with me 
for no reason. If I do not take an umbrella, there is a 
chance that I will get wet, and there is also a chance that 
I will be able to enjoy strolling around without having 
to schlep an umbrella around. I assess the chance of rain, 
something I have no control over that is determined by 
nature, compare the two possibilities, and decide. I do 
not have to predict anyone’s action or imagine anyone 
else’s calculations. It is just me, alone. I face a decision 
problem that is not a game. 
On the other hand, let’s say that I believe there is a 
rain god up above who holds the key to the floodgates 
of heaven and that this rain god has interests of his own. 
Maybe he cares about me, but maybe he really doesn’t 
like me, and has it in for me. My forecast of the rain god’s 
behavior will be based not only on the meteorological 
service, but also on an analysis of the god’s considerations. 
Maybe he will want me to get caught in a heavy storm if 
I make light of his powers and ignore threatening skies. 
And maybe if I believe in his being merciful and leave 
the house without an umbrella he will reward my faith in 
him by scattering the clouds. 
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Or, let’s say that I plan to go for a romantic walk in 
the rain under one umbrella with a friend, who will be 
coming from her home, and that she too must decide 
whether to take an umbrella when she leaves her house. 
My rational decision will be affected by my expectations 
of my friend’s behavior and my expectations will be based, 
among other things, on the fact that both of us dream of 
walking in the rain under one umbrella.
In such situations, I must exercise strategic thought: 
I ask myself what the rain god (or my friend) will do. My 
expectations develop as I ask myself how they analyze 
the situation and what they think about me. Game theory 
deals with situations in which each of the players is a 
rational decision maker and puts himself in the shoes of 
the other before making a decision.
March 2002
I brought my son Yuval to the first meeting of the 
beginners’ group of a chess class. The veteran Tel Aviv 
teacher who directed the activity began with a direct 
appeal to the children. She encouraged the children, who 
came from various neighborhoods, to become friends 
and added, with feeling: “Children, I think chess is very 
important because it teaches you to look at other children 
from their point of view.” I said to myself: what a nice 
approach she has, teaching the children to think about 
others through the game of chess. I recalled the words of 
the game theorist, John McMillan, in the summary of a 
chapter on negotiating:
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What advice for negotiators does Game Theory generate? 
The most important ideas we have learned… are the 
value of putting yourself in the other person’s shoes and 
looking several moves ahead.
I was excited – I recognized game theory in the words 
of a children’s teacher. But after the initial excitement, I 
wondered: game theory and the game of chess perhaps 
encourage a person to think about a situation from the 
perspective of the other, but only in order to do the best 
thing for himself. The chess teacher confused strategic 
thinking with developing empathy. Strategic thinking 
does not encourage a person to think about the wellbeing 
of the other. Game theory speaks of a player who steps 
into the shoes of the other in order to assess what the other 
will do, and he does this for his own benefit, in accordance 
with his own preferences. But these preferences may reflect 
affection, sympathy and benevolence, or hatred, bitterness 
and revenge. An educational task such as developing 
empathy remains in the realm of the kindergarten teacher, 
not the chess teacher and not the expert in game theory. 
The Traveler ’s Dilemma
Let’s play (you can experiment with the situations 
discussed here and in the rest of the chapter: 
http://www.openbookpublishers.com/exsites/136). Here 
is a well-known situation called the Traveler’s Dilemma 
or Basu’s Game. Originally, it involved a story about 
two travelers returning from the same holiday resort, 
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both bringing the same souvenir in their suitcases. The 
suitcases are lost and the lost-baggage clerk at the airport 
must compensate them for the real value of the loss. The 
clerk has only a vague idea of the value of the lost object: 
between $180 and $300. Therefore, he plans to award 
compensation according to the declarations of the two 
travelers, but he knows they are liable to exaggerate the 
value of the loss and that they do not feel obliged to tell the 
truth. He takes the two travelers into separate rooms and 
asks each of them to declare the value of the souvenir – an 
amount between $180 and $300. He promises to 
compensate both of them according to the lower of the 
two values they declare. In addition, if they give different 
prices, he will impose a “fine” of $5 on the traveler who 
states the higher price and will “award a prize” of $5 to 
the traveler whose demand is more modest. 
In order to consider this situation in terms of game 
theory, we must answer several questions:
1. Who are the players?
2. For each player, what choices does he face? (We 
sometimes call these choices: “strategies.”)
3. For each combination of choices by the players, 
what will be the result of the game? (Unlike non-
game decision problems, the consequence of a 
player’s decision does not depend solely on the 
action he chooses. It depends also on the actions 
the other players choose.) 
4. For each player, what are his preferences? (That is, 
how does he rank the possible results of the game?)
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Only after answering all of these questions can we say 
that we have defined the story as a game in the accepted 
sense of game theory.
In the case of the Traveler’s Dilemma, the answers to 
the four questions are:
1. The players are the two travelers. 
2. For each player, the possible choices are amounts 
between $180 and $300.
3. Each player receives a number of dollars equal 
to the smaller of the two numbers chosen by the 
players, plus $5 if the number he chooses is lower 
than the number the other player chooses, or 
minus $5 if the number he chooses is higher than 
the number the other player chooses. 
4. Each player is interested in receiving as much 
money as possible. 
The answer we gave to the fourth question does not 
derive from the initial description of the situation. The 
need to answer all of the questions made us describe the 
players’ preferences. In answering the fourth question, we 
assumed that each player is only interested in the amount 
of money he will receive at the end of the game, and that 
he is not interested in what the other player receives 
or the ratio between the two sums. This assumption is 
not obvious and is probably not realistic. Game theory 
certainly allows for an analysis of this situation even when 
we attribute additional considerations to the players, such 
as “I do not want to be seen as petty in trying to earn a 
few dollars at the other guy’s expense,” “It is important to 
me that both of us together receive as much as possible,” 
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or “I do not want to be the sucker of that smart-aleck.” 
But in game theory, an unfortunate convention has taken 
root: when we state that game theory says the outcome 
of the game will be this or that, we assume that the only 
thing a player cares about is the amount of money he will 
receive at the end of the game. 
Clearly, each player faces a strategic decision here. 
The best action from one player’s perspective depends on 
what he expects the other player to do. The rationality of 
a player is defined in game theory as choosing the best 
action in light of his beliefs about the behavior of the 
other players. This definition does not impose constraints 
on these beliefs and, in particular, does not demand that 
the beliefs be reasonable in any sense.
In the current case of the Traveler’s Dilemma, it seems 
that the choice of $300 is not rational for me as a player 
in the game. Regardless of what I believe the other player 
will do, there is another declaration of price that would 
result in my receiving more than $300. If I believe that the 
other player will choose $300, my choice of $300 would 
bring me $300, while if I chose $299 I would receive $304. 
And if I believe that he will choose a number N, which is 
less than 300, then the choice of $300 would compensate 
me with only $(N-5), while if I choose the number N, for 
example, I would receive $N. 
Even if I am not sure about the other player’s price 
declaration, the action $300 cannot be rational.
Let’s assume that I am certain that he will choose a 
number no greater than M, and that I attribute a positive 
probability to both of the other possibilities: that he 
will choose exactly M or a number less than M. We will 
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show now that choosing the number M-1 is preferable 
to choosing the number 300. To be precise, we will 
show that there are circumstances in which declaring 
M-1 would yield a higher sum than declaring 300, and 
that there are no circumstances in which declaring 300 
would yield higher revenue than declaring M-1. If the 
other player declares M and I declare M-1, I will receive 
$M+4. And if I declare 300, I will receive at most $M. If 
the other player chooses M-1 and I do the same, I will 
receive $M-1 and that is more than the $M-6 I would 
receive if I choose 300. Finally, if the other player chooses 
a number less than M-1, the payment I receive will be the 
same regardless of whether I choose M-1 or 300. 
So we have rejected the rationality of choosing $300. 
Could it be rational from my perspective to choose the 
number $299? Yes. For example, if I am sure the other 
player will choose the number 300, it will be best for me 
to choose 299. But if I put myself in the shoes of the other 
player and assume that he also is rational, I will reach 
the conclusion that he will surely refrain from choosing 
the number 300 too. Thus, the highest number he might 
choose is 299. Consequently, following the principle of the 
previous argument, the choice of 299 is also not a rational 
choice for me. And if I again put myself in the shoes of 
the other player and assume that he puts himself in my 
shoes, I will reach the conclusion that he believes I will 
not choose 300 and, therefore, he will also refrain from 
choosing the number 299. Accordingly, the choice of 298 is 
also not rational from my perspective. And now, in order 
to decide what is good for me, I must step into the shoes 
of the other and think how he puts himself in my shoes 
and imagines my stepping into his shoes. It is difficult for 
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me to keep track of this reasoning. This circular thinking 
simply drives me crazy. It is like the sentence: “I think 
that she does not think that I think that she will smile 
at me if I go up to her.” It is a proper sentence and has 
meaning, but it is annoying.
Nash equilibrium: In the introductory chapter, we said 
that a solution concept is an array of rules by which an 
economic tale is allowed to develop from its beginning to its 
end. In the context of game theory, the beginning of the tale 
is a description of the game, and its end is the actions the 
players choose. Nash equilibrium is a solution concept that 
extricates us from the whirlpool of “I think that he thinks 
that I think…” The concept is built upon two assumptions: 
First, the action attributed to a player is the best for him 
in light of what he believes the other players will do. 
Second, the player’s belief regarding the actions of the 
other players is correct. 
In other words, according to Nash, the answer to 
the question “What will happen?” is consistent with the 
assumption that each individual is able to step into the 
other’s shoes, correctly predict his moves, return to his own 
shoes and choose the best action from there.
There are also other interpretations of Nash equilibrium. 
For example, sometimes we think of Nash equilibrium as 
a stable norm of behavior. A norm of behavior is a rule 
that tells individuals what to do in the various situations 
they are liable to encounter. A norm of behavior in a game 
situation is stable if the action prescribed by the norm for 
each player is the best one for him when he expects the 
other players to act according to the same norm. In other 
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words, a stable norm of behavior is a rule of behavior 
that advises the players in the game to act in accordance 
with Nash equilibrium. For example, in the context of 
the Traveler’s Dilemma, the norm of asking for as much 
as you can is not stable because it is worthwhile for each 
individual to deviate from the norm and to demand a bit 
less. (The slightly more modest demand is rewarded with 
an extra payment.) On the other hand, the norm of being as 
modest as possible in your demands is stable in this game.
Nash was not the first one to use the concept of 
equilibrium, but he was the first to formulate it in an 
abstract way and not in the context of a specific game. 
There is no guarantee that a Nash equilibrium exists in 
a game; there are games that do not have an equilibrium. 
Nash showed that if a game meets certain conditions, a 
Nash equilibrium does indeed exist. This is the original 
mathematical part of his work. 
Back to Basu and the travelers: what is the Nash 
equilibrium in Basu’s Game? One player chooses $250 
and the second chooses $240 – this is not an equilibrium. 
When the second player declares $240, it is not optimal 
for the first player to declare $250. The first player can 
receive higher compensation if he chooses, for example, 
$239. Similarly, there is no equilibrium in which the two 
players choose any two different numbers.
If both of the players choose $240, this is also not 
an equilibrium. Each player can enlarge his payoff by 
subtracting a dollar from his demand. Similarly, there 
is no equilibrium in which both players choose another 
identical number. There is only one exception and it is 
when both players choose $180. One cannot go lower. 
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Choosing $180 is the best for a player who believes that 
the other player will choose $180.
Conclusion: The Traveler’s Dilemma has a unique 
equilibrium in which both players choose $180. We asked: 
“What will happen?” And here, in this game, the Nash 
equilibrium gives us an unequivocal answer. (Incidentally, 
this is quite a rare situation.) Hallelu-Nash. 
How is the answer the Nash equilibrium provides in 
this game related to human behavior in reality? We do not 
know how people would behave in such a situation in real 
life. At best, it is possible to bring people to a laboratory 
and watch them play a similar game. This would be a costly 
experiment. Alternatively, it is possible to ask people, like 
the readers of this book, to imagine themselves in this 
type of situation. People are quite imaginative and like to 
play such games. The participants can be encouraged to 
take the game seriously by awarding a symbolic payment. 
In my view, as I already noted in the previous chapter, 
such a reward is completely unnecessary and may even 
be detrimental. 
I have data on the responses of more than 13,000 people 
who were asked to answer (via the website http://gametheory.
tau.ac.il) the question of what they would do if they were 
players in the game. One third of the respondents were 
students in game theory courses in about thirty countries, 
and half were people invited to eleven public lectures on 
“Game Theory and John Nash” that I delivered in recent 
years in seven countries. Before each lecture, I asked the 
audience to answer a number of questions, including those 
in Basu’s Game. Of course, the sample is not representative 
of the world’s population. But our objective is not to describe, 
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even approximately, how the world’s population plays the 
game. Our interest is to peek into the considerations of the 
people participating in this game, and we would be happy 
to get even a rough impression of how common these 
considerations are world wide. 
Among the respondents, 45% chose the price $300, a 
choice we have just termed irrational. Only 20% of the 
respondents chose $180, the choice recommended by the 
concept of Nash equilibrium. Another 19% chose between 
$295 and $299, while the choices of the remaining 16% 
were in the broad range of $181 to $294.
The players who chose a number in the range of 295 to 299 
apparently used strategic thinking. That is, they said to 
themselves something like: The other player will choose 298, 
so I will choose 297, or to be sure I’ll even go down to 296. 
On what basis do I determine that the respondents in 
this range were more strategic than the respondents who 
chose a number from 181 to 294? First, I do this based on 
introspection: I can find a reasonable explanation for the 
choice of 297, but cannot find one for choosing a number such 
as 236. And I also have additional support for the assumption 
that the choice of a number in the range of 295 to 299 
is the outcome of more serious thinking: I also recorded the 
response time of the participants in the experiment – that 
is, the time from the moment the computer sent them the 
question until it received their answer. The response time 
of those whose choice was in the range of 295 to 299 was 
significantly greater (a median of 107 seconds) than the 
response time of those quoting in the range of 181–294 and 
of those who chose the number 300 (a median of 77 seconds). 
I suspect that most of the respondents who chose 
the number 180 are members of the Victims of Game 
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Theory organization, who implemented the concept of 
Nash equilibrium without exercising common sense. If 
you had to play against a randomly selected participant 
in the experiment, I would not recommend that you 
choose an equilibrium action. According to the rules of 
the game, you will be able to win a maximum of $185. 
On the other hand, a simple calculation shows that if 
you choose 298 or 299, and you play against one of the 
subjects in my database you can expect to receive an 
average payment of $262. 
And here is another interesting fact: The distributions 
of the answers in various countries (among audiences at 














































































































































Distribution of declared values
I have no substantiated explanation for this fact. Perhaps 
people are divided into different types and their type 
determines their choice in this game. For example, 
perhaps there are four types: the instinctive (who chooses 
the number 300 in this game); the sophisticated (who 
106 Economic Fables
chooses a number in the range of 295–299); the disciplined 
(who took a course in game theory and, obeying the 
equilibrium, chooses 180); and the capricious (who 
chooses a number randomly). And perhaps every society 
has a similar distribution of these four types. Of course, 
this is a far-reaching hypothesis that I cannot substantiate. 
If this hypothesis were firmly based, we would expect that 
we could assess the distribution of types and estimate the 
distribution of behaviors in various games. 
Despite the fact that the distributions of answers in 
the seven countries are similar, there are also significant 
differences, particularly in the percentage of those 
choosing the game theory solution, 180. This fact is 
perhaps related to the percentage of respondents who 
had taken a course in game theory. I find support for 
this assumption in the results from 9,300 students in 
game theory courses who were presented with the 
same question. The percentage of those choosing the 
equilibrium action was 23%, compared with 14% in 
the more diverse population of those attending public 
lectures on game theory. This increase in the share was 
derived primarily from a decline in the percentage 
of those choosing 300. This outcome strengthens the 
suspicion that a small group of students had internalized 
the ideas presented in the game theory course, even to the 
point of choosing the equilibrium point when this action 
was not really the most intelligent thing to do. 
Does Basu’s Game show that the concept of Nash 
equilibrium does not explain the way people play? Not 
necessarily. Nash equilibrium is a solution concept 
applied to a description of a game that includes 
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not only the procedure of the game, but also the 
preferences of the players. We saw that the popular 
choice of the maximum number, 300, is not rational 
if the players care only about the sum of money they 
will receive at the end of the game. But the choice of 
$300 can be optimal for a player whose preferences 
include considerations such as unpleasantness about 
profiting at the expense of others or embarrassment 
for appearing to be petty. Therefore, the norm of 
behavior of seeking to collaborate with the other player, 
expressed in this game by choosing $300, is not a Nash 
equilibrium if the players care only about the cash in 
their pocket, but this norm is stable in the sense of 
Nash equilibrium if the players’ preferences are such 
that the unpleasantness caused to a player who made 
a few dollars at the expense of the other player is the 
same as losing more than $4. 
The Ultimatum Game 
Here is another game. Two individuals, who are capable 
of reaching an agreement, participate in the Ultimatum 
Game. There are several possible agreements that they 
would prefer to accept rather than remain in disagreement. 
Some of the agreements are better for one player and 
others are better for the other player. One of the players 
in the game is assigned the role of the proposer and the 
second player is the responder. The proposer must offer 
a proposal for an agreement and the responder must 
accept or reject the proposal. If the responder accepts 
the proposal, the agreement is executed. If the responder 
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rejects the proposal, the two players part ways without 
an agreement. 
Ultimatum games are common in everyday life: in 
the labor market, unskilled workers can only say yes or 
no when offered a job. They usually say yes even when 
offered meager wages. In every visit to the supermarket, 
you are actually participating in an ultimatum game. 
You want a carton of milk. The supermarket places an 
ultimatum before you – either buy it at the set price or 
don’t buy it. There is no point in arguing with the cashier 
at the supermarket about the price of milk. Sometimes 
the situation occurs not in real life, but rather in the 
imagination of someone who believes that he can make 
the other side an offer he cannot refuse. How disappointed 
he is when it turns out that he was mistaken in his in 
assessment of the considerations of the other side.
To keep it simple, we will focus on an ultimatum 
game involving $100. The agreement is any allocation 
of the sum between the two individuals. If there is no 
agreement, the two individuals will receive nothing. 
In order to complete the description of the situation, 
we must describe the preferences of the players. And 
again, as usual, we will assume (something that is not 
self-evident) that each player is only concerned with the 
sum of money he gets at the end of the game, and that he 
is interested in getting as much as possible. 
As always, in order to analyze the game, we must 
apply a solution concept. For this type of game, the 
conventional practice in economics is to apply a solution 
concept called perfect equilibrium. This is a version of 
Nash equilibrium, adapted for games involving a series 
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of moves. We will now apply this concept, which was 
discussed in the opening chapter of the book, to the 
Ultimatum Game. A perfect equilibrium describes a pair 
of plans of action, one for the proposer and one for the 
responder. The proposer’s plan of action is the proposal 
he intends to offer to the responder. The responder’s plan 
of action is a policy that describes which proposals he 
will accept and which he will reject. Perfect equilibrium 
demands that the pair of plans of action meet two 
requirements. The first requirement pertains to the 
proposer’s plan of action: the proposal he intends to offer 
to the responder must be the best one for the proposer, 
taking into account the responder’s policy of acceptance. 
The second requirement pertains to the responder’s plan 
of action: if the responder intends to accept a certain 
proposal, he would not benefit by rejecting it; and if the 
responder intends to reject a certain proposal, it would 
not be preferable for him to accept it. In other words, after 
each proposal that the proposer might offer (and not only 
the proposal he is supposed to offer according to his plan 
of action), the responder’s plan of response is best for him.
Here is one perfect equilibrium of the game. The 
proposer’s plan: offer $1 to the responder. The responder’s 
plan: accept any offer except $0. Now let’s check whether 
the plan of each player is optimal in every possible 
scenario in which he is likely to implement it. 
The proposer starts the game. His decision problem is 
to choose one of 101 possible proposals. According to the 
responder’s strategy, each proposal of a positive number 
of dollars, X, will be accepted and is “worth” $100-X to 
the proposer. The proposal $0 will be rejected and is 
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therefore worth $0 to the proposer. Thus, the best action 
for the proposer is indeed to offer $1 to the responder.
The responder will have to act after receiving the 
proposal. If the proposal is a positive sum, it is best 
for him to accept it, because rejecting it would mean 
receiving nothing. If the proposal is $0, then he would be 
left with the same $0 regardless of whether he accepts or 
rejects the proposal. Therefore, rejecting the proposal, as 
planned, is an optimal action from his perspective.
It is easy to confirm that the game also has a second 
perfect equilibrium in which the proposer offers $0 and 
the responder plans to say yes to any proposal offered to 
him, including the insulting offer of $0.
We will now see that in every perfect equilibrium 
the proposer ends the game with at least $99. In other 
words, there is no perfect equilibrium in which the 
proposer receives less than $99. Accepting any proposal 
that gives the responder at least $1 is better for him than 
the alternative of rejecting the proposal and receiving 
nothing. Therefore, in every perfect equilibrium, the 
responder plans to accept every offer that gives him at 
least $1 and, consequently, the proposer can receive at 
least $99. In a perfect equilibrium, the proposer chooses 
an optimal plan and it awards him at least $99. 
Let’s summarize: game theory “predicts” what many 
people think. The player who is able to issue an ultimatum 
has a great advantage over the player who can only accept 
or reject the proposal. The first player will receive all (or 
almost all) of the pie that is to be allocated. 
The Ultimatum Game and its analysis by means of the 
concept of perfect equilibrium serve as a basis for many 
other and more complex economic models. I know very 
few games that have been given so much attention. Is 
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the outcome of the model consistent with behavior in 
real life? This question has been examined in various 
experiments in many cultures – with money, with lots of 
money and without money – and with a large number of 
participants. On the book’s website, the Ultimatum Game 
is expressed in this way:
 Imagine you and someone you do not know can share 
$100. It is up to you to propose how to divide the $100 
between the two of you, and the other player will 
need to accept or reject your proposal. If he rejects the 
proposal, neither of you will receive anything. 
What sum will you offer the other player?
I have data on the choices of about 12,300 people, most of 
them students, who were asked this question. Nearly half 
of the participants (49%) offered the other player the fair 
offer of $50. About 9% took advantage of their position 
to some extent and offered the other player a sum in the 
range of $40 to $49 – that is, just a little less than $50. Some 
12% offered the other player only $1 (and only 1% made 
the even more absurd offer of $0). And 13% offered the 
responder a sum in the broad range of $2 to $39. 
One group, not mentioned above, stood out: the 
18% of the participants who offer the other player 
more than $50. Some of them apparently got confused 
between receiving and giving – for example, writing 
the number 60 and expecting to receive $60 if this offer 
was accepted. But the fact that 7% of the proposers 
offered a proposal in the range of 51 to 59 (compared 
to only 3% who made an offer in the parallel range of 
41 to 49) suggests that there is a significant group of 
“annoyingly” generous people who feel better if they 
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receive less than what they are entitled to under the 
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The figure presents distributions of the proposals of 
nearly 5,000 people invited to public lectures on game 
theory in seven countries. The distributions are similar, 
but there are also differences. I might be tempted to say 
that the Dutch are tougher than the Israelis because the 
Dutch, on average, offer $4 less than the Israelis. I might 
also be impressed by the fact that the highest percentage 
of those offering the fair allocation is in the U.S. (59%). 
But I do not attribute significance to these findings: at 
most, they are interesting observations. One result that 
is perhaps more significant pertains to the differences 
between the genders: in nearly all of the universities, 
the average proposal by women was higher by $3 to $5 
than that of men. Some 56% of the women chose the fair 
allocation, compared to only 46% of the men. No more 
than 8% of the women offered a proposal consistent with 
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the game theory solution, compared to 14% of the men. 
In other words, the women are more generous and less 
attracted to the game theory analysis. 
What would people do as responders? The following 
question also appears on the book’s website:
You and a person you do not know can share $100. He 
offers a proposal and you can only accept or reject it. 
If you reject it, both of you will receive nothing. 
He offers you $10 (and if you accept the offer, he will 
receive $90). 
Would you accept the offer?
I have the responses of 8,100 participants. Some 63% of 
them accepted the proposal. The percentage of those 
accepting the proposal ranged from 52% in Bangkok to 72% 
in Tel Aviv. If I took the results of the survey seriously (and 
I do not), I would predict, based on these data, that a large 
number of Israelis would acquiesce to an international 
ultimatum to return more or less to the 1967 borders. (As 
a matter of fact, I think this is true – not because of these 
data, but based on my familiarity with Israeli society.) And 
another finding related to gender: about 60% of the women 
accepted the offer of $10, compared with 65% of the men. 
Are women tougher? Are they less materialistic? Or are 
they endowed with a more developed sense of fairness? In 
any case, in my view they are more pleasant. 
As is customary in economic models, at least until 
recent times, the classic analysis of the game assumes 
that each player is interested only in the sum of money 
he himself will receive at the end of the game. Is this 
description of the players’ preferences in the game 
correct? It is very doubtful.
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First, many people also show interest in a fair 
allocation and not only in the sum of money they receive. 
There are even those who are happier if the sum of 
money is split equally between the two players than if 
they receive the entire sum. A situation the literature calls 
the Dictator Game clearly reveals the existence of these 
considerations. In the Dictator Game, one player – called 
the dictator – is asked to divide a sum of money between 
himself and another anonymous player. The other party 
plays no active role in the game, so it is actually a decision 
problem. Thousands of students in game theory courses 
were asked to imagine a situation in which they play 
the game as the dictator. About 36% took the entire sum, 
about 35% divided the sum equally between them and the 
anonymous player, and nearly all of the others allocated 
something to the other player, but less than the sum they 
allocated to themselves. On average, the dictator gave the 
other player about a quarter of the sum to be allocated. 
These facts indicate that in such situations most people 
are not so selfish and also consider the fairness of the 
allocation. 
People care not only about the sums of money they 
will receive at the end of a game, but also about the way 
they obtain the money. Let’s say that $100 is about to fall 
from the sky, with $10 falling into my hands and $90 
into the hands of my neighbor, and I have the ability to 
prevent this shower of dollars. The choice I face is between 
the allocation of $10 to me and $90 to the neighbor, or 
a situation in which both of us receive nothing. I would 
be considered malicious if I preferred that we both 
receive nothing rather than my neighbor receiving much 
	 2. Game	Theory:	A	Beautiful	Mind 115
more than I do. On the other hand, let’s say that in the 
Ultimatum Game I receive an offer of $10, which leaves 
$90 in the hands of my brazen neighbor, the proposer. In 
this case, I would undoubtedly surrender the $10 as long 
as it would put the proposer in his place. I thought that 
nearly everyone feels like me, but to my surprise only 
about a half of the respondents in the survey declared 
that they would reject the proposal to receive $10 out of 
the $100.
It goes without saying that I would not use classic 
game theory analysis as a basis for advising a person 
who is about to deliver an ultimatum demanding “all” 
or “nearly all” of the pie. There is reason to believe 
that at least 75% of the participants would reject the 
offer of $1 and that (almost) everyone would accept 
the 50–50 offer. Thus, a proposer who acts according 
to the recommendation of game theory would receive 
$0 in 75% of the cases and the average (expected) 
number of dollars in his pocket would be less than $25. 
If he acts in a less sophisticated way and proposes the 
fair allocation, he would almost certainly receive an 
affirmative response and could expect to have nearly 
$50 in his pocket. The participants in the experiment 
who make the embarrassing offer of just $1 because 
they learned this in a game theory course are again the 
distinguished members of the Victims of Game Theory 
organization. And if they played the game in real life, 
their achievements would be inferior to those who had 
not become wise by studying game theory. 
This does not prevent some strategic experts from 
treating the game theory solution of the Ultimatum 
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Game as a sacred rule. Some say that a certain prime 
minister of Israel issued an ultimatum to the head of the 
Palestinian Authority that granted the Palestinians 90% 
of the territory of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The rais 
refused and the rest is written in another bloody page 
in the chronicles of the Middle East. When the other 
side believes that it deserves 100% or that the pie is part 
of another pie and 90% of the small pie is less than 50% of 
the large pie, it is likely to reject even an offer of 90% 
of the small pie.
Autumn 1985
I was a young, fresh lecturer in the Department of 
Economics in Jerusalem. One day, a letter from the Nobel 
Prize Committee landed in my mailbox. I was surprised. 
I later understood that the selection committee for the 
prize was seeking to identify important fields and 
worthy candidates by approaching researchers who 
were in the early stages of their careers. I began my 
response to the committee’s query with banal remarks 
about the centrality of game theory in economic theory. 
I listed many fields in which game theory is used. When 
I came to candidates, I cited four names. And then, I 
added a paragraph on a fifth candidate, John Nash. 
I wrote that Nash, the outstanding person in the group, 
lives in Princeton and had stopped working due to 
personal problems, but that the three articles he wrote 
during 1950 to 1953 were the most important and most 
inspiring in game theory and in all of economic theory 
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since the book Theory of Games and Economic Behavior 
by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern. Nash 
was clearly worthy of the Nobel Prize. My remarks 
had at most a marginal influence on his winning the 
prize nine years later. And I was left to wonder: was 
I motivated only by academic judgment or did I also 
want to rectify the injustice suffered by someone 
who had been abandoned and had not received 
the recognition he would have gained if he had not 
been mentally ill? Is it possible and is it desirable to 
separate the goal of correcting human injustice from 
pure academic assessment?
Hotelling’s Game
Let’s return to the games. The next game, in a slightly 
different form, was discussed in the introductory 
chapter. 
Imagine that you are the manager of a chain of coffee 
shops competing against two other chains. A new 
beachfront residential neighborhood is being built, 
with seven huge apartment blocks equal in size 
and equidistant from one another. The towers are 
numbered from left to right: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7.
Each of the three chains plans to open a branch 
in one of the blocks. The three coffee shops will be 
very similar. The manager of each of the chains must 
decide in which block to open a branch, with the goal 
of attracting as many customers as possible. He must 
make a decision immediately, before knowing where 
his two competitors will set up their coffee shops. 
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The clientele is expected to consist of residents of 
the seven blocks and each customer is expected to 
patronize the cafe that is closest to his apartment. 
1 2 3 4 5 6
7
Hotelling’s Main Street
In which block will you set up the coffee shop of the 
chain you manage?
Hotelling spoke about a main street and stores. Here, the 
main street becomes seven blocks on a beachfront and the 
stores become coffee shops. I admit that this is an expression 
of my fondness for coffee shops. While I try to boycott the 
coffee chains that annihilate the intimate neighborhood 
coffee shops that I love so much, I have compromised here 
in order to make the story more realistic.
The assumptions in the story are reasonable, even if 
they do not perfectly describe reality. In real life, coffee 
shops are not absolutely identical. Some people prefer to 
patronize a particular coffee shop even if it is further from 
where they live. The coffee shops in our game compete 
with their rivals only in terms of location, while in reality 
competition is frequently conducted via the price and 
quality of the coffee. We assume that the decisions are 
made simultaneously: each player chooses his location 
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without knowing the location of the other two. In real life, 
the players try to preempt their rivals or, conversely, wait 
until the picture becomes clearer. 
Let’s assume first that only two (and not three) chains 
are competing in our example, and proceed to translate 
the story into a game. The two players in the game are 
the managers of the chains. Each chain must choose 
a tower, a number from 1 to 7. The chain’s objective is 
to maximize the number of its clients, a number that 
depends on its location and the location of the other 
chain and is calculated as follows: for each block, we 
will check which chain has the nearest cafe and we will 
count the residents of the block as clients of that chain. 
If the two cafes are located at an equal distance from 
the tower, the residents of the tower will divide equally 
between them. For example, if Chain A opens a branch 
in Tower 4 and Chain B opens a branch in Tower 6, 
the residents of Towers 1, 2, 3, 4 will be customers of Chain 
A and the residents of Towers 6 and 7 will be customers 
of Chain B, while the residents of Tower 5 will be split 
between the two chains. In this case, Chain A’s market 
share will consist of the residents of 4.5 towers, and the 
market share of Chain B will consist of the residents of 
2.5 towers.
With two players in the game, there is a single 
Nash equilibrium: when both of the players set 
up their coffee shops in the middle block (No. 4). 
A unilateral move by one of the players from the 
center will diminish his clientele. The proof that 
there is no other equilibrium is similar to the one we 
saw in the introductory chapter: a situation in which 
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one or more blocks separate the two cafes is not an 
equilibrium because if either of them moves to one of 
the blocks located between them, it would increase its 
market share. If the two cafes are located in adjacent 
towers, one of them enjoys less than half of the market 
and if it moves to the block in which the competitor is 
located, it would increase its market share to 50%. If 
the two cafes are located in the same block, and it is 
not the middle one, then each of them enjoys half of 
the market and can increase its share to at least 4/7 of 
the market by moving to the middle block.
Indeed, if I asked the readers to consider the game 
with two competitors, I am sure that an overwhelming 
majority would choose to locate in the middle block, thus 
confirming the game theory prediction. I have the results 
of a survey conducted among 8,100 participants. About 
68% of them chose No. 4. This sounds like good news 
for those who look to game theory to help predict what 
will happen in real life. As I noted in the opening chapter, 
this game is important and resembles familiar real life 
situations. In as early as 1929, Hotelling said the following 
about the two players choosing to locate themselves in the 
middle: 
So general is this tendency that it appears in the 
most diverse fields of competitive activity, even quite 
apart from what is called economic life. In politics it 
is strikingly exemplified. The competition for votes 
between the Republican and Democratic parties does 
not lead to a clear drawing of issues, an adoption of 
two strongly contrasted positions between which the 
voter may choose. Instead, each party strives to make its 
platform as much like the other’s as possible.
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But… our joy is premature. What happens if three 
competitors, instead of two, operate on the beachfront?
It is not difficult to see that Hotelling’s Game with 
three players does not have a Nash equilibrium. I will just 
explain here why locating the three cafes in the middle 
tower is not an equilibrium. If a player thinks that his two 
competitors will choose to locate their shops in No. 4, then 
his choice to locate his shop there will bring him a third of 
the total number of residents in the neighborhood. That is, 
the number of his customers will be equal to the number 
of residents in 2⅓ blocks. On the other hand, if he opens a 
shop in No. 3 or 5, his market share will be the residents 
of 3 blocks. Thus, the choice of No. 4 is not optimal for 
a player who anticipates that his two competitors will 
locate in the center. Therefore, setting up all three cafes in 
the middle block is not a Nash equilibrium. 
Hotelling’s Game with three players is a symmetrical 
game in the sense that the description of the game does not 
discriminate between the players. In games of this type, 
it is customary to look at the concept called symmetric 
equilibrium, an extension of the concept of Nash 
equilibrium. One can think of this kind of equilibrium 
as the distribution of behaviors in a large population 
of individuals, with each individual programmed to 
play the game in a specific way. The distribution of 
behaviors describes the percentage of individuals in a 
population who would choose Block No. 1 in the game, 
the percentage who would choose No. 2, and so on. Each 
individual in the population is programmed to locate 
himself in a particular apartment block and expects to 
play the game against two random competitors from 
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within the population. In a symmetric equilibrium, none 
of the individuals programmed to set up in a certain block 
would be able to increase his anticipated market share by 
moving to another one. 
Let’s look at the following distribution of behaviors: 
Half of the population is programmed to choose Block 
No. 3 and the other half is programmed to choose No. 5.
A player who must decide where to locate his shop 
and knows that his competitors will be randomly 
selected from this distribution faces uncertainty 
regarding the location of his two competitors. He 
expects a probability of ¼ that both will locate their 
shops in No. 3, a probability of ¼ that both will locate 
their shops in No. 5, and a probability of ½ that 
one competitor will set up in No. 3 and the other in 
No. 5. Therefore, if he locates his shop in No. 4, there 
is a probability of ¼ that his clientele will include the 
residents of blocks 4, 5 ,6, 7; a probability of ¼ that 
his clientele will include the residents of Blocks 1, 
2, 3, 4 ; and a probability of ½ that his clientele will 
only include the residents of No, 4. Consequently, the 
average market share of a player who locates his shop 
in No. 4 is equal to the number of residents in 2.5 
blocks. On the other hand, the choice of No. 3 or No. 
5 leads to an average clientele of the residents of only 
7/3 blocks. (This is evident for reasons of symmetry, 
even without doing the calculation.)
All of this demonstrates that when a player expects 
that his two competitors are randomly selected from 
this population, the average market share he receives 
if he locates his shop in Block No. 4 will be greater 
than the average market share he can expect if he 
chooses what he was programmed to do. Therefore, 
this distribution is not a symmetrical equilibrium.
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It is possible to show (and this demands a little work) 
that Hotelling’s Game with three players has only one 
symmetric equilibrium, when 40% of the players choose 
No. 3, 20% choose No. 4 and 40% choose No. 5. 
The following table presents the equilibrium 
distribution, alongside the distribution of choices of 7,400 
people, most of them students in economics and game 
theory courses: 
Tower 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Equilibrium 40% 20% 40%
Survey distribution 5% 8% 16% 43% 14% 8% 6%
As the game theory solution predicts, the proportion 
choosing the middle tower, 43%, is significantly lower than 
the proportion choosing this tower in Hotelling’s Game 
with two stores, 70%. But there is no similarity between the 
distribution predicted by game theory and the distribution 
in the survey. The choice of the middle tower remains the 
most common even in a game with three players. This 
choice reflects the instinct (which we already noted in the 
previous chapter) of people when faced with a linear group 
of alternatives to choose the alternative in the center. An 
examination of the participants’ response times supports 
the hypothesis that the choice of the middle tower is the 
instinctive action. The median response time (54 seconds) 
of the participants who chose Tower 4 is similar to the 
median response time of the individuals who chose the 
towers at the end of the line, which is clearly an irrational 
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choice. On the other hand, the median response time 
of those who chose Towers 2, 3, 5, 6 was much higher 
(80 seconds). 
The rise of game theory
Despite the lack of agreement between Nash equilibrium 
and the experimental evidence, game theory has 
become established as a central tool in economics. Nash 
equilibrium became an accepted solution concept that 
is used to predict behavior in so-called non-cooperative 
games – that is, games in which the players operate 
independently and do not form groups (coalitions) who 
make coordinated decisions. In the 1950s and 1960s, 
game theory languished at the margins of economics. 
Von Neumann and Morgenstern’s Theory of Games and 
Economic Behavior, which many regard as the beginning 
of game theory, was published at Princeton during World 
War II and was immediately recognized as an enormous 
intellectual achievement. Nonetheless, for half a century 
the study of game theory barely extended beyond the 
mathematics and operations research departments. 
Only in the 1970s did game theory penetrate into the 
core of economics. If till then a market and competitive 
equilibrium constituted the major tool of economic 
analysis, they were now joined by the related duo of a 
games and Nash equilibrium. Since the 1980s, countless 
people have delighted in declaring that game theory is 
useful in all fields: competition between few competitors 
and company takeovers in economics, strategic voting 
and negotiation between countries in political science, 
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the relations between flowers and butterflies and the 
evolution of animals in biology, moral issues in philosophy, 
developing communication protocols in computer science, 
and even the biblical stories of the binding of Isaac and 
the judgment of Solomon – all have been examined with 
the tools of game theory.
Game theory won media acclaim in 1994 thanks 
to “the mother of all auctions”: some $7 billion in 
communications frequencies were sold by the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) in a public auction 
planned in consultation with game theorists. The bidders 
in the tender also hired game theory experts to advise 
them. In the media, and not only there, this event was seen 
as definitive proof of the applicability of game theory. I 
have my doubts.
I personally know some of the people who planned this 
tender and similar tenders. They are undoubtedly bright 
and intelligent. They are also people with two feet firmly on 
the ground. However, to the best of my understanding, they 
based their recommendations on basic intuitions and human 
simulations, and not on sophisticated models of game theory. 
I do not find any basis for claiming that it was game theory 
that helped them in planning the tender. At most, these 
advisors were intimately familiar with a specific type of 
strategic considerations that we often study in game theory.
During the years that game theory flourished, John 
Nash was diagnosed as a paranoid schizophrenic. He 
was hospitalized a number of times in mental hospitals, 
received insulin treatments, heard voices that crowned 
him “King of Antarctica,” and communicated with other 
worlds via the pages of The New York Times. 
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November 1994
I sat in my office at Princeton. It was evening, the 
door was open. John Nash walked by in the hallway 
and seemed to be looking for something. He entered 
my room and asked politely whether I knew the fax 
number of someone at Stockholm University. The 
number he had was a six-digit number and since all 
telephone and fax numbers in the U.S. have seven 
digits, Nash figured that there was a digit missing in 
the number he had. Based on what I knew, I explained 
to him that in Stockholm the telephone and fax 
numbers have six digits (as they did at the time). He 
felt relieved. I exploited the moment to do something 
that I had wanted to do for quite a while and had not 
dared. I mustered the courage and handed him a copy 
of a text book about game theory that I had written 
together with Martin Osborne. Nash took the book. 
I do not remember him thanking me. He mentioned 
that he already had two books on game theory on his 
shelf and now he would have “two plus one = three 
books.” And then, leafing through the book, he said in 
surprise: “I see that my name appears here.”
Usefulness
Is game theory useful? The popular literature is full of 
nonsense about the applications of game theory. Here is 
an example from a serious newspaper, the Financial Times 
(17 April 2002): 
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Kofi Annan is famously active in seeking advice from 
a variety of sources, and recent propositions from the 
United Nations’ secretary general suggest he has found a 
new font of inspiration as he casts about for tips on how 
to solve the seemingly intractable crisis in the Middle 
East: game theory. Even Mr Annan’s language has taken 
a turn for the mathematical. In several of his most recent 
speeches, the career bureaucrat has called on the US to 
help Israel and the Palestinians abandon their ‘logic of 
war’ for a ‘logic of peace.’
And here is another example: February 2006 was a tense 
month in Thailand. The opposition demanded the prime 
minister’s resignation. Seven months later, the pressure 
culminated in a military coup. During the same month, 
I happened to be in Bangkok and delivered one of the 
public lectures about game theory that I mentioned 
earlier. I emphasized my opinion that game theory is 
not relevant to practical questions. Of course, I did not 
make any reference to the political situation in Thailand. 
The closest I came to making a reference to Thailand was 
when I complimented the audience for being particularly 
generous in the Ultimatum Game. That was sufficient 
for a reporter from the Thai newspaper The Nation, who 
attended the lecture and wrote about it the following day, 
to lead with a headline: “Time to go to the polls, game 
theory says.”
There is disagreement in the game theory community 
regarding the applicability of the theory. Some believe that 
the function of game theory is to provide useful predictions 
of behavior in strategic situations. The economist Hal 
Varian wrote in a review of the film A Beautiful Mind: 
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“Mr. Nash’s contribution was far more important than 
the somewhat contrived analysis about whether or not 
to approach the beautiful woman in the bar. What he 
discovered was a way to predict the outcome of virtually 
any kind of strategic interaction” (The New York Times, 11 
April 2002). We will get to the beautiful woman at the bar 
later, but I have absolutely no idea how Varian reached the 
conclusion about the predictive ability of Nash equilibrium. 
Even when a game has a single equilibrium, there remains 
a huge disparity between the prediction of game theory and 
reality. In addition, in many games there are multiple Nash 
equilibria and this narrows their potential to predict. And 
this is before noting the fundamental difficulty of predicting 
the behavior of individuals when they are exposed to a 
prediction and are likely to respond to it. Incidentally, the 
article (published in the journal Econometrica in 1951) for 
which Nash was awarded the Nobel Prize is devoid of any 
pretension of usefulness in economics. The only “economic” 
example you will find there is a simplification of a poker 
game with three players.
Economists such as Avinash Dixit and Barry Nalebuff 
believe in the power of game theory to enhance strategic 
intelligence. The study of game theory is supposed 
somehow to foster the ability to play in strategic situations. 
But even they do not regard game theory as a collection of 
guidelines on “how to...”. 
Game theory rhetoric switches between usefulness 
on the one hand, and awareness that it is dealing with 
simplified models, on the other. All in all, it seems 
to me that game theory tends to present a false front 
of usefulness. The Thai journalist evidently heard in 
my remarks what he wanted to hear. Nonetheless, I 
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do not believe that he would write such a headline 
if I were a physicist or mathematician. Something in 
the language we use in economics and game theory 
creates an illusion that we understand and leads to the 
hasty application of ideas. 
My view of game theory is consistent with my 
approach to economic models in general, as explained in 
Chapter 0. Game theory does not try to describe reality 
or be normative. Game theory investigates the logic 
of strategic thinking. But just as logic does not make 
people truthful or guide judges to just decisions, game 
theory does not assist players in playing games. If game 
theory has a practical aspect, it is derived indirectly. It 
enables us to conduct an orderly discussion of the 
concept of rationality in interactive situations. It enriches 
the discussion of economics and other fields of social 
sciences by focusing on strategic considerations, some of 
which we might not have been aware of. It is entertaining. 
And that is something; but it is not what people generally 
describe as useful. Incidentally, sometimes I wonder 
why we need to address the question of the usefulness 
of game theory at all. Does academic research have to be 
judged according to the immediate and practical benefit 
it brings?
Despite my reservations about the predictive ability 
of game theory, I do not deny the fact that people’s 
behavior in game situations follows certain rules or 
patterns, which can be discovered by observing events in 
the world or by experimental results. But it is connected 




Treasure Hunt was my favorite radio program during my 
childhood. The program was broadcast once every four 
weeks at 9 pm. The theme music sounded as if it came 
straight from the courts of medieval knights. The treasure 
hunter in the studio would receive the riddle and turn 
to the audience with questions, and the listeners would 
call the studio and offer their answers for a price. If the 
treasure hunter identified the location of the treasure and 
his emissary reached the treasure before 10:20 pm, he 
would receive 1,000 lira, minus the payments he made 
to listeners. I would collect in advance all of my Land of 
Israel books and would concoct innovative solutions to 
infiltrate the busy phone lines. My excitement reached a 
peak during the few occasions when the treasure hunter 
purchased the answer of “a schoolboy from Jerusalem” 
for 5 lira. When I think of examples for the game theory 
course, my thoughts wander to Treasure Hunt. This radio 
program was also the inspiration for the following game 
that appears on the book’s website:
You have a treasure that you can hide in one of four 
boxes that are set up in a line and marked as follows: 
Your competitor will have an opportunity to open only 
one box. Your goal is for the competitor not to find the 
treasure. 
In which box will you hide the treasure?
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This situation can be thought of as a game with two 
players – the hider and the seeker. The hider has four 
strategies, one for each box in which he can hide the 
treasure. The seeker has four strategies, one for each box 
in which the treasure may be hidden. A pair of choices 
by the hider and the seeker leads to one of two possible 
outcomes: the seeker finds the treasure or the seeker does 
not find the treasure. The seeker prefers the first outcome 
and the hider the second. 
There is an absolute conflict of interests between the 
two players in this game. The hider wants to reduce the 
probability of the seeker finding the treasure. The seeker 
seeks to increase the probability of finding the treasure. 
Anything that is good for one player is necessarily bad for 
the other player. In professional jargon, it is customary 
to call this type of game a zero-sum game. Public figures 
and columnists frequently use this concept, appropriately 
or inappropriately, in order to embellish their remarks 
with learned terms. 
In this game, a candidate for Nash equilibrium is 
a pair of choices: the box in which the hider places the 
treasure and the box the seeker opens. If the two choices 
are identical, the seeker finds the treasure, and thus the 
hider would have done better to place the treasure in 
a different box. If the two choices are not identical, the 
treasure will not be found, and thus the seeker would 
have done better to open a different box. Therefore, this 
game does not have a Nash equilibrium. 
The situation is different when the description of 
the game includes the possibility that a player chooses 
a box randomly. According to this approach, the hider 
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chooses four non-negative numbers that must add up 
to 1. In the professional jargon, we call this type of 
choice a mixed strategy. Each number corresponds to 
the probability of the treasure being placed in one of 
the boxes. For example, the choice of (0.3, 0.2, 0.2, 0.3) 
means that there is a probability of 30% that he will 
hide the treasure in each of the two outermost boxes 
and a 20% probability for each of the two innermost 
boxes. Or, the choice of (1, 0, 0, 0) means that the hider 
definitely places the treasure in the left-most box. 
Similarly, for the seeker, a mixed strategy is a choice of 
four non-negative numbers that add up to 1, with each 
number corresponding to the probability that he will 
open a particular box. 
Each player can be regarded as someone who spins 
a roulette wheel with four slots. Each slot in the roulette 
table corresponds to one of the boxes and its relative area 
corresponds to the probability that the player chooses the 
respective box. The result of the spin of the roulette wheel 
determines which box the player will choose. We do not 
necessarily think of the player as someone who actually 
spins the wheel. The randomness can be a result of a 
process that occurs inside the mind of the player when he 
decides to choose one of the four boxes. And, for someone 
looking on from the side, it may seem that the player uses 
a random method to choose the particular box.
A pair of mixed strategies defines the probability 
that the treasure will be found. For example, if the hider 
places the treasure in the four boxes (A, B, A, A) with the 
probabilities (0.3, 0.2, 0.2, 0.3) and the seeker opens the 
boxes with the probabilities of (0.1, 0.4, 0.4, 0.1), the seeker 
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will have a 22% probability of finding the treasure. There 
is a probability of 30% that the treasure will be hidden in 
the left-most box and a probability of 10% that the seeker 
will open this box. Consequently, there is a probability of 
3% that treasure will be hidden in the left-most box and 
that the seeker will also open this box. Similarly, there is 
an 8% probability that the treasure will be hidden and 
found in the box marked “B”, and so on. 
A candidate for Nash equilibrium is a pair of mixed 
strategies, one for the hider and one for the seeker. In order 
for the pair of strategies to be an equilibrium, neither of 
the players benefits by switching his strategy to another 
strategy. That is, when the hider is aware of the seeker’s 
strategy, the hider does not have an alternative strategy 
that reduces the probability that the treasure is found; 
and when the seeker is aware of the hider’s strategy, the 
seeker does not have an alternative strategy that increases 
the probability of finding the treasure. 
Each of the following two reasons is sufficient to 
determine that the aforementioned pair of strategies is 
not an equilibrium: (i) The seeker’s strategy is to open 
the boxes with probabilities (0.1, 0.4, 0.4, 0.1). The hider 
can reduce the probability that the treasure will be found 
from 22% to 10% if he places the treasure in one of the 
outermost boxes with a probability of 1. (ii) The hider 
places the treasure in boxes with probabilities (0.3, 0.2, 
0.2, 0.3). The seeker can increase the probability of finding 
the treasure from 22% to 30% if he searches for the 
treasure in one of the outermost boxes.
It is possible to confirm that in the game’s only 
equilibrium each of the players chooses each box with a 
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probability of ¼ and, therefore, the probability of finding 
the treasure is ¼.
Of course, one can also think of the Treasure Hunt Game 
in ways other than Nash equilibrium. Here is one alternative. 
Let’s say that you are participating in the game in the role 
of the hider. You are a pessimistic person and believe that 
whichever mixed strategy you choose the other player will 
correctly guess this strategy and then choose the best action 
for him (and therefore the worst from your perspective). If 
you choose a mixed strategy in which all of the probabilities 
are not equal, then there is at least one box in which you 
could hide the treasure with a probability greater than ¼. 
The pessimistic approach leads you to think that the seeker 
will surely open this box and, therefore, the treasure will 
be found with a probability of more than ¼. On the other 
hand, if you hide the treasure with a probability of ¼ in 
each of the four boxes, you will ensure that the seeker finds 
the treasure with a probability of only ¼. Consequently, 
in light of the pessimistic expectations regarding your 
competitor’s moves, you would hide the treasure with 
equal probabilities in each of the boxes. In game theory, we 
call this type of strategy a max-min strategy.
Similarly, we can see that the seeker’s max-min 
strategy is to search for the treasure at equal probabilities 
in each of the four boxes. Thus, we found that in the 
Treasure Hunt Game the equilibrium strategies and the 
max-min strategies are identical. This is no coincidence. 
We noted that the game is a zero-sum game: Whatever 
is good for me is bad for the other player, and vice versa. 
A central result in game theory, called the max-min 
theorem, teaches us that in every zero-sum game (and 
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not only in the Treasure Hunt Game), Nash equilibrium 
strategies are identical to max-min strategies. In this way, 
it becomes clear that the two ways of looking at the game, 
which appear to be so disparate at first glance, lead to 
identical conclusions in games with absolute conflicts of 
interest. This is game theory at its best.
Let’s return to the Treasure Hunt Game. Imagine 
for a moment that you are the seeker. If you believe in 
the predictions of game theory, you are not particularly 
anxious, because you know that the treasure is hidden 
with equal probabilities in each of the boxes. Therefore, it 
makes no difference to you which box is opened. But in 
light of the survey results of 5,500 hiders, I hope for your 
sake that you will indeed devote some attention to your 
choice. The distribution of the choice of boxes (A, B, A, A) is: 
(19%, 25%, 34%, 22%). The middle box marked “A” is the 
most popular choice in nearly every group of students 
participating in the survey. (I have no idea why the box 
marked “B” was the most popular choice in one very 
large group, at Tilburg University in Holland.) If these 
data predict the behavior of the hider you are competing 
against, then if you choose the middle box marked A, 
your chances of finding the treasure will increase to 34%.
In another survey, 3,500 students were randomly 
assigned to be hiders or seekers. Among the hiders, the 
distribution of choice was strikingly similar to the large 
sample population (17%, 25%, 35%, 23%). Among the 
seekers, the results were even more dramatic (11%, 27%, 
47%, 15%). This result leads me to think that if I had 
hidden the treasure I would have placed it in the 
left-most box and had a 89% chance of keeping it for 
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myself, which is much higher than the game theory 
prediction of only 75% probability of success in hiding 
the treasure from the seeker. 
So here is a “useful” finding. Let’s say that I was a 
strategic advisor to the U.S. Army in its efforts to wipe 
out Saddam Hussein in 2003, and let’s assume that there 
were four palaces in Baghdad arranged along the Tigris 
River like the four boxes in the diagram, that one of them 
(marked with the letter “B”) was the most prominent 
palace, and that it was possible to bomb only one palace. 
If I had assumed that they had not read the results of 
this study in Baghdad, then I would have recommended 
attacking the central palace marked A.
If I had thought that Saddam Hussein’s advisors 
had read the results of this study and had assumed that 
the U.S. Army was unaware of the study, I would have 
concluded that his advisors would recommend to him 
that he hide in one of the outermost palaces and I would 
have recommended to the Americans that they attack one 
of them. 
And if it was well known that they had read about the 
study in both Washington and Baghdad – I would have 
had no idea what to advise.
In any case, even if this finding is useful, and can be 
used for good or bad (depending on which side uses it), 
it is totally unrelated to an analysis of the game with the 
tools of game theory. 
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1998
For years, I believed that teaching game theory is not 
helpful and is even harmful because it can potentially 
encourage selfishness and deviousness. In 1998, a wonderful 
group of students gathered at Tel Aviv University for a 
seminar on economic theory. Most of the participants were 
pursuing academic studies as part of their military service 
and, because they appeared in uniform, the seminar was 
nicknamed “the officers’ seminar.” I proposed to them 
that they tackle the mission of proving that the teaching 
of game theory is harmful. We composed a questionnaire 
that included a series of imaginary decision problems. It 
seemed to us that certain decisions express a tendency 
toward egoistic and manipulative behavior. We asked 
students who were about to start a game theory course, 
as well as other students who had already completed the 
course, to respond to the questionnaire. We expected that 
a comparison of the responses by the two groups would 
show that studying game theory at the undergraduate 
level makes the students more selfish and devious. But 
nothing of the sort happened. We did not find any effect 
of game theory on anything. But I still believe such an 
effect exists.
A Beautiful Mind
Dozens of journalists wrote about Nash’s winning of the 
Nobel Prize in Economics in 1994. Everyone applauded 
game theory. Sylvia Nasar was the only one who 
138 Economic Fables
recognized that the announcement of the prize was more 
than just a triumph for game theory – it was an event 
with a strong human touch. She published an article 
that stretched over two full pages in The New York Times, 
describing Nash in three stages: a young and handsome 
genius; a sick person roaming the idyllic campus of 
Princeton like a ghost; and finally, the happy ending: Nash 
recuperates, returns to activity and wins the Nobel Prize. 
The article touched people’s hearts and led to the writing 
of the book in which Nasar delved into the depths of 
Nash’s mind and delusions. The book’s success led to its 
being made into a film. From the public perspective, the 
book and film focused the attention of millions of people 
on mental illness and the discrimination against those 
who suffer from it, and instilled new hope in patients and 
their families. 
There are a number of inaccuracies in the film. For 
example, after Nash is notified that he has been awarded 
the Nobel Prize, there is an impressive scene: a ceremony 
of academic deference in which we see Nash sitting in 
the coffee room of Fine Hall and one professor after 
another comes up to him and places a pen on the table 
(you can watch this scene on this book’s website: http://
www.openbookpublishers.com/exsites/136). I happened 
to be there.
11 October 1994
In the morning, the announcement was made that John 
Harsanyi, Reinhard Selten and Nash would jointly 
receive the Nobel Prize “for their pioneering analysis 
of equilibria in the theory of non-cooperative games.” 
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Princeton University reacted to the announcement 
with embarrassment. Nash had no formal affiliation 
with the university at the time. Only out of kindness 
had the university provided him with a computer 
account. Nash was umbilically connected to the 
Mathematics Department at Princeton and resided in 
the town of Princeton, which was also the home of 
most of the people in the world who cared about him. 
How do you explain to the world that the Nobel Prize 
recipient is from Princeton, but not from Princeton 
University? In consultation with the governors of 
the university, the Mathematics Department decided 
to arrange a modest celebratory gathering to toast 
Nash’s award. In the department’s tea room, a number 
of math professors gathered, along with students who 
happened to be there and a very small number of 
economics professors. The senior university officials 
were there and perhaps a photographer too. The 
beginning of the ceremony was delayed for reasons 
that were unclear. Glasses were raised, and a few 
very brief congratulatory remarks were made. The 
guest of honor maintained the right to remain silent. 
When the participants finished their drinks, a general 
uneasiness spread over the room. Nash stood alone 
in the center of the room. No one approached him. 
He walked toward the table of refreshments and 
said to me and others who stood near the table: “The 
cookies today are better than they usually are.” To 
the best of my knowledge, there was and is no pen 
ceremony anywhere. No such ceremony even took 
place metaphorically. Nash received an office from 
the university and an ID card that enabled him to 
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enter Princeton’s faculty club. But no one addressed 
Nash as “master” as in the film.
The bar scene
What happens when Hollywood tries to explain 
game theory? In one scene in the movie (which, again, 
you can view on the book’s website: http://www.
openbookpublishers.com/exsites/136), a group of 
students, including the young Nash, enter a pickup bar. 
Which girl to approach? The proud, stunning blonde 
who will only react to you if no one else approaches her, 
or one of the many unexceptional brunettes at the bar 
with whom your chances are much higher? You do not 
need to have experience in bars to realize that there is 
a place here for strategic thinking. The rational courtier 
will choose his objective in line with his expectations of 
his friends’ behavior. 
We will simplify the story and assume that Nash goes to 
the bar with only one friend (although in the movie, there 
are four men in the group). Each contemplates whether 
to pursue the striking blonde or turn his attention to one 
of the many brunettes in the bar. In keeping with the 
film, we will assume that if both men pursue the blonde, 
she will turn her back on both of them and they will end 
up alone that evening. If only one of them pursues the 
blonde, he will win her coveted company while his friend 
will have to settle for one of the less desirable brunettes. If 
both of them refrain from approaching the blonde, both 
of them will be able to spend the evening with a brunette.
We can present the story in the following table:
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The outcome if...













One player controls the choice of row and a second player 
the choice of column. Each square contains a description 
of the result from the perspective of the player who 
chooses the row. For example, if the row player chooses 
to pursue the blonde and the column player turns to the 
brunette, the result from the perspective of the row player 
is winning the blonde. 
This description brings us closer to presenting the 
situation in the conventional language of game theory. 
In each square, we insert a number that represents the 
amount of utility the player derives from the result 
described in the square. If the number assigned to one 
square is higher than the number assigned to another 
square, this means that the player prefers the result in the 





The highest number was assigned to the result in which the 
row player wins the blonde’s company. The lowest number 
was assigned to remaining alone. In the middle are the two 
possibilities in which the row player finds consolation in 
the arms of a brunette. His consolation will be greater if the 
other player does not find a way to the blonde’s heart.
In the game theory literature, this game is called 
Chicken. It has two Nash equilibria. In one equilibrium, 
Nash pursues the blonde and his friend suffices with the 
brunette. In the second equilibrium, Nash suffices with 
the brunette and his friend pursues the blonde. 
Just for fun, I asked the audience at the lectures 
on “Game Theory and John Nash” to play the game. 
About 46% of some 3,000 men and 48% of about 1,500 
women chose the blonde. The Dutch and the Israelis 
were the boldest: 56% of the men and women chose the 
blonde. Actually, I do not know whether this finding 
is an expression of strategic boldness in bars or simply 
differences in the preference of hair color. 
The discussion of the game in the movie is confused 
and misleading. Nash in the movie says that he discovered 
a contradiction in a principle that has been accepted in 
economics since the time of Adam Smith: 
Adam Smith said the best outcome for the group comes 
from everybody trying to do what’s best for himself. He 
was wrong. The best outcome comes from everybody 
trying to do what’s best for himself and the group.
The message attributed to Smith in the film is simplistic. 
In what sense does each individual’s concern for himself 
generate the best result? What is best for a group that 
includes individuals with disparate interests? In any case, 
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the discovery attributed to Nash – who argued that if 
people act in a self-centered way the result for the group 
is actually liable to be worse than if people act in a socially 
responsible way – is not well demonstrated in the bar scene. 
The idea is presented clearly in the game called the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma, a game that has lost some of its 
luster after being used so often to illustrate game theory. 
The Prisoner’s Dilemma involves two prisoners who are 
apprehended while committing a misdemeanor and are 
suspected of committing a serious crime. But the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma Game can also be expressed as follows: there 
are a number of residents on a street, and the level of 
cleanliness in the street depends on whether or not the 
residents of the street keep it clean. Let’s say that each 
resident believes that, regardless of what the neighbors do, 
his exertion in maintaining cleanliness is more bothersome 
to him than the marginal increase in environmental 
damage that would result if he discontinued this effort. 
At the same time, let’s also assume that every resident 
would prefer a situation in which all residents maintained 
the cleanliness and the street remained clean, rather than 
having all residents, including himself, neglecting the 
cleanliness and living amidst the stench of garbage. Of 
course, each resident only controls his own actions. 
This game does not require a player to enter the other’s 
shoes. Whatever the player believes regarding the behavior 
of the other players, it would be best for him to not make 
an effort to preserve the cleanliness. Consequently, if 
all of the residents are rational, the sad result is that no 
one maintains the cleanliness and the street smells. Each 
player acts only to promote his own interests and the result 
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is worse than if all of the residents maintain the street’s 
cleanliness. To the best of my knowledge, the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma Game was formulated by Albert Tucker, and he 
has no connection to Nash’s contribution to game theory.
A beautiful mind
Nash is depicted in the movie as someone who managed 
to gain control of the delusional voices he heard, as 
someone who discovers the true meaning of life when he 
lovingly offers his wife a white kerchief, and as someone 
who returns to the academic world. If I were to choose an 
ending to the movie I would choose a different one, a bit 
more melancholy. In his autobiography, Nash noted that 
he also lost something during his recuperation process. 
He characterizes the period of irrationality as a time of “ 
dream-like delusional hypotheses” and describes his 
return to “thinking rationally again in the style that is 
characteristic of scientists,” as a process that “is not entirely 
a matter of joy” because rationality of thought “imposes a 
limit on a person’s concept of his relations to the cosmos.”
The story of Nash is the journey of his transformation 
from a descriptive term in an abstract mathematical 
concept into a human being. The title crazy genius is for us 
an invitation to an encounter with other worlds. We try to 
imagine the voices that Nash heard and ask where he was 
during the thirty years when he walked among us but was 
not with us. People who are different scare us, but we are 
also attracted to them. Curious and scared, we confront our 
prejudices and try to accept that someone who is mentally 
ill, even if he is different from us, deserves to be one of us.
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As for me, I was fortunate to be present at stages of 
Nash’s journey and the march of game theory from the 
margin of economics to its core. And what do I find in 
game theory? A beautiful mind. It is interesting because 
it touches upon the way we think about the world. It is 
beautiful because it offers lucid formulations for what 
appears to be confusing. It has the same interest and 
beauty that I find in philosophy, mathematics, logic and 
literature. If in a circuitous way that I am unaware of it 
can also be useful – then so much the better. But, in my 
view, usefulness is neither the criterion nor the essence. 

3. The Jungle Tale and the 
Market Tale
An exercise in rhetoric
This chapter summarizes the very first lectures in two 
Introductory Economics courses. One lecture is from 
the Introduction to the Jungle Economy course. This is 
a unique course that you cannot learn anywhere else. 
I will ask you to imagine that you are listening to it in 
the straw huts of Lubungulu University, located deep 
in the thick, dark, green jungle. The purpose of this 
lecture is to present the basic idea of the jungle economy. 
The second lecture launches the Introduction to the 
Market Economy course. There is no need to travel to a 
far-off, exotic venue in order to attend this course. It is 
a course that anyone can take as part of the curriculum 
in the nearest Department of Economics, assuming, of 
course, that he is accepted into this prestigious club. 
Many people cram for this course, believing that it is 
essential for reaching the top. Some regard it as a guide 
to the economic galaxies – the nearby galaxy where we 
live, and the distant galaxy, where they would like us 
to live. The goal of this lecture is to present the basic 
idea of the market economy.
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In both of these lectures, I will follow economic 
tradition and demonstrate the ideas via models – tales 
or fables. I will try to present the models precisely, with 
each claim accompanied by a real proof. But I will not use 
formal language, which would indeed make the models 
easier to understand for the few who are familiar with 
this language, but would pose an impenetrable barrier for 
all the rest. 
Throughout this chapter, we will skip back and forth 
between the two lectures: jungle, market, jungle, market, 
and so on. You can consult two means of illustration – one 
for the jungle model and one for the market model – that 
are posted on the book’s website. When we are done, you 
will be asked a somewhat banal question: what are the 
similarities and differences between the two?
First lesson in the introduction to jungle 
economics course
Ladies and gentlemen, distinguished students, welcome 
to the first lecture in the Introduction to Jungle Economics 
course. In this lecture, we will study the principles of 
the economic system practiced in our society. We will 
see how an iron hand – not an invisible one – leads 
to an efficient result without the need for government 
intervention. 
You know that you have come to the most popular 
course at the Lubungulu Jungle University. All of you 
passed the JAT (Jungle Aptitude Test) before being 
accepted to the class. You all excelled in marksmanship 
and pushups. But the truth is that the principles we 
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will discuss are simple, and the abilities you have 
demonstrated are not essential for understanding the 
course material. Take a good look at the man on your 
right, and then on your left; because next year both of 
them will be here as well. 
What is economics? I do not pose this question 
because it is important for me to put something into your 
heads that is not there, but rather to remove something 
that already is there. I assume that you have drawn your 
impressions about the field of economics primarily from 
the economics sections of the daily newspapers. However, 
academic economics does not deal with boring tables and 
gossip you are accustomed to calling economics. Our main 
task is to study the social mechanisms that determine 
what goods are available to us and that allocate them 
among individuals. If you hope the course will help you 
succeed in the complex environment of the jungle, I am 
afraid you are in for a disappointment. We, the teachers 
at the Jungle University, do not engage in professional 
training. We place the practical matters in the trusty 
hands of our brave military heroes. I am convinced that 
you jungle cadets will know how to conduct your lives 
successfully thanks to your common sense. You have 
come this far because you and your forefathers survived 
the hardships of the world. There is no useful advice that I, 
whose attention is entirely devoted to academic issues, 
can offer you. The aim of the courses in our research 
university is purely and simply to satisfy your curiosity, 
to enrich your language and to introduce you to new, 
unfamiliar ways of thinking. 
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Common interests and conflicts of interests intermingle 
in the jungle experience. There are things we can achieve 
only through collaboration: nearly every act of production 
requires a series of coordinated activities conducted 
by many people. It is vital for all of us to mobilize for 
defend and conquer missions. Nonetheless, the resources 
available to any society, even a flourishing society like ours, 
are limited. Everyone seeks to receive as much as possible 
of what he likes. And, often, what one person likes others 
also like. 
In our view, economics is no more than a tool that 
helps us to achieve common objectives and to overcome 
conflicts of interests. Our economic perspective is part of 
our broader social and political outlook. We are aware 
of the fact that some countries try to separate economics 
and politics. Economic questions that ought to be decided 
democratically via the political system are treated there 
as if they were professional matters and are deferred to 
experts to decide. We believe this is a ploy that serves the 
stronger members of society (including, just by chance, 
the community of experts). In this course, we will see that 
our economic system brings order to the chaos, leads to 
an effective allocation of what we have, and enables us to 
realize our aspirations for territorial expansion.
There are no invisible hands in the jungle. Everything 
is clear and simple. Our economic system was designed 
based on an understanding of human nature. We are 
aware of the aggression inherent in each of us. We 
are not ashamed to admit that we believe in anarchist 
philosophies. Actually, our cultural heroes are anarchist 
philosophers. Our slogans are: “We owe each other 
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nothing” and “Men merely use each other as tools.” 
Our flourishing and prosperous jungle culture does not 
suppress man’s drives. We encourage aggression and 
harness it for the just and eternal struggle of the tribe 
against the enemies who rise up against us and seek 
to annihilate us. We also know how to channel these 
aggressive impulses to lubricate the wheels of the social 
and economic order. And if you become faint-hearted 
and start having doubts about our use of the aggressive 
instinct, remember that you cannot argue with success. 
Just look at the prosperity our economic system has 
brought us. 
In the lecture today, we will see that recognizing that 
each individual should grab what he can with “a strong 
hand and an outstretched arm” brings about an efficient 
outcome, prevents (or at least reduces) the need for 
wasteful and corrupt government intervention and frees 
us of the central planning mechanisms that have failed 
time and again throughout human history.
In the best economic tradition, we will understand the 
economic mechanism of the jungle via a model, which we 
will affectionately call the jungle tale. 
First lesson in the introduction to 
market economics course
Ladies and gentlemen, distinguished students, welcome 
to the first lecture in the Introduction to Market Economics 
course. In this lecture we will study the principles of the 
market economy. We will see how an invisible hand 
152 Economic Fables
leads to an efficient result in a competitive environment, 
without the need for government intervention. 
I salute you for being accepted into the economics 
program, the most popular in our university. You are 
here thanks to your wonderful achievements in the SAT 
(Scholastic Assessment Test), which predicts – among 
other things – your ability to succeed in multiple-choice 
tests, a skill that is essential for the final exam in the course. 
The Introduction to Market Economics (or Principles as 
it is commonly named) is a challenging course. As Paul 
Samuelson used to say: “Take a good look at the man on 
your right, and then on your left; because next year one of 
you won’t be here.” 
We cannot start the lecture without first saying 
something about the question, what is economics? 
Economics deals with individuals’ and society’s decision 
making processes. It examines how people make decisions. 
For example, should we send our son to university 
or buy him a car? Should we develop the health system 
or build highways? Should we enjoy more leisure time or 
try to increase our earnings? Economics helps us to best 
exploit our limited resources. It enables us to anticipate 
the changes engendered by government measures or 
environmental change. Economics has something to say 
about almost every issue, public or private. Economics 
will help us to conduct our lives rationally.
We act with the awareness that in our society there are 
common interests as well as conflicts of interests. In order 
to realize the aspirations of prosperity and growth, we all 
need to work vigorously and harmoniously to increase 
production. However, the resources available to any 
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society, even a prosperous society like ours, are limited; 
and everyone wants to receive more and work less. 
The market economy is designed to promote common 
interests and deal with conflicting ones. 
Our economic system is based on an understanding 
of human nature. We, in the advanced world, are aware 
of the selfishness inherent in each of us and harness it 
to the achievement of economic prosperity. Our system 
channels individuals’ desire for wealth so that it serves as 
the fuel that powers the economic order. As Adam Smith 
said: “Every individual … [is] led by an invisible hand to 
promote an end which was no part of his intention. Nor 
is it always the worse for the society that it was no part of 
it. By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes 
that of the society more effectually than when he really 
intends to promote it” (The Wealth of Nations, Book 4, 
Chapter 2).
In today’s lecture, we will see how the realization that 
each individual should strive to obtain maximal wealth 
for himself without considering others results in an 
efficient outcome, prevents (or at least reduces) the need 
for wasteful and corrupt government intervention, and 
frees us of the mechanisms of central planning that have 
proved throughout history to be dangerous. The course 
also has practical objectives. After completing your 
studies, most of you will become economists, managers, 
merchants and bankers. Understanding the market 
mechanism will help you to succeed in whatever path 
you choose. The course will help you to think intelligently 
about economic questions that trouble the public. 
How unfortunate it is that economic affairs are left in 
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the hands of populist politicians and not in the hands of 
professional economists capable of implementing what 
the course teaches and putting the world to rights.
In the best of economic tradition, we will present the 
economic mechanism of the market via a model which 
we will call the market model.
The jungle tale
The territory controlled by our tribe is divided into 
a number of homesteads, inhabited by our notables, 
the heroic warriors whose courage enabled us to 
conquer our homeland. The number of heroes is equal 
to the number of homesteads. Each homestead can 
accommodate one hero, and each hero occupies only 
one homestead. The homesteads differ from each 
other. Each hero ranks the homesteads according to 
his own individual preferences. One might think that 
the conflict of interests between the heroes would 
generate chaos: a number of heroes might claim the 
same homestead, arguing “I deserve it” or “I was here 
first” or “God promised me this homestead” or “my 
ancestors were here 3,000 years ago.” In this lecture, we 
will see how the laws of the jungle allocate homesteads 
among the heroes. 
Let’s say that the tribe has six homesteads. One 
of them has oil and one includes a beach. One has 
a vineyard and there is a thick forest in another. 
The tomb of King Gulu I is located in one distant 
homestead and the big city homestead incorporates 
the famous nightclub Desire. The six heroes, A, B, 
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C, D, E, F, will settle in the homesteads. In the table 
below, each column shows one hero’s ranking of the 
homesteads (in declining order). In a moment, we will 
explain the meaning of the number that appears in the 
table under each hero. At this stage, you can ignore 
the asterisks.
The Jungle Model 
Hero A B C D E F
Strength 55 50 45 40 35 30
Ranking
1 Vineyard* Vineyard Oil* Beach Beach Nightclub*
2 Oil Beach* Forest Oil Vineyard Oil
3 Nightclub Oil Vineyard Forest* Oil Tomb
4 Beach Forest Beach Nightclub Tomb* Vineyard
5 Tomb Nightclub Nightclub Vineyard Forest Forest
6 Forest Tomb Tomb Tomb Nightclub Beach
It is impossible to satisfy the wishes of all of the heroes. 
Two of them put the Vineyard homestead at the top of the 
list, and two have set their sights on the Beach homestead, 
but there is only one Vineyard homestead and only one 
Beach homestead. It is true that C snorts oil fumes, while 
A only ranks the Oil homestead in second place. But if 
A receives the oil fields, perhaps this will resolve the 
well-known centuries-old conflict between A and B over 
the wine country and bring peace to the residents of the 
jungle.
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A mechanism is needed to allocate the homesteads 
and we can envisage many such mechanisms. One 
mechanism is the lottery. The homesteads are raffled 
between the heroes. They might grumble about the 
result of the lottery, but they cannot change it, even by 
consent. This mechanism is known to us from biblical 
times: “Notwithstanding the land shall be divided by lot; 
according to the names of the tribes of their fathers they 
shall inherit. According to the lot shall their inheritance 
be divided between the more and the fewer” (Numbers 
26:55–56). When Joshua conducts this lottery in the biblical 
tale, God was also in the picture. But we’ll disregard this 
fine detail. In any case, here in the jungle, we cannot 
accept the idea that a toss of the coin will determine who 
wins the land flowing with milk and honey, and who gets 
stuck with the desert wasteland. Here, we have a Basic 
Law of Good Reasons: every public decision must be 
predicated on appropriate and well-formulated reasons. 
The casting of lots is not listed in the Book of Good 
Reasons and Joshua’s mechanism would not meet the 
criteria of the Supreme Court. Moreover, there are likely 
to be many dissatisfied individuals after the lottery who 
would be happy to engage in “swaps” between them if 
they could. Just imagine if the one who is allocated the 
Beach homestead cannot swim and the one who gets the 
Forest homestead is afraid of bears. 
Another mechanism is an organizing committee. The 
elders of the tribe sit in the center of the village and 
members of the tribe come before them, one after the other, 
and report on their needs and aspirations. The honorable 
elders search (perhaps via the biological supercomputer 
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we invented recently) for the best match of individuals 
and homesteads, for the glory of the tribe and to fulfill the 
vision of the prophets of efficiency. But here in the jungle 
we have little enthusiasm for organizing committees. We 
know that each committee of this type will turn us all into 
cheats and will corrupt our elders. And we believe not 
only in the Covenant of Thugs, but also in the values of 
the Movement for Quality Government. 
And now we come to the mechanism that drives our 
prosperous economy. The allocation of homesteads in our 
society is dictated by the relative strength of the heroes. 
The balance of strength between any pair of heroes is 
defined unequivocally: either the first is stronger than 
the second, or the second is stronger than the first. In 
addition, we assume that if one hero is stronger than a 
second hero, and the second hero is stronger than a third 
hero, then the first hero is necessarily stronger than the 
third. In the table, the numbers assigned to the heroes are 
the strength indices. The numbers themselves have no 
significance beyond the fact that the higher the number, 
the stronger the hero. 
The strength ranking of the heroes is known to all the 
jungle residents. All of the heroes are prepared to make 
unbridled use of their strength. The fact that one hero is 
stronger than a second hero means just one thing: the 
stronger one can grab any homestead held by the weaker 
one. There are no ownership contracts in the jungle. 
A hero can hold a homestead, but has no rights protecting 
him against someone who wants it. In our economy, 
unlike in a market economy, an exchange does not require 
a meeting of interests. One person, with one strong wish, 
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is sufficient for a homestead to change hands. When a 
hero wants the homestead of someone who is weaker 
than him, he approaches him, greets him politely, and the 
two confirm their relative strength. In the worst case, they 
exchange a number of polite blows and the weaker one 
leaves the place submissively. Our inspiration for acting 
this way comes from nature – after all, we are part of it. In 
nature, it is enough for the stronger animal to remind the 
weaker one of the balance of strength between them to 
make the weaker one leave the nest or abandon the prey 
it is holding. 
In our tale, as in a real jungle, the heroes cannot forge 
alliances to fight shoulder to shoulder for the interests 
of the members of the alliance. In the absence of a legal 
option to sign binding agreements, they find it impossible 
to organize into groups, even though they realize that they 
would benefit from forming such a coalition. In addition, 
we also have an antitrust law that prohibits individuals 
from organizing with the aim of exercising force against 
other heroes. 
Like any tale, the jungle tale does not describe reality 
exactly as it is, but it simplifies what is complex and omits 
certain factors so that we can understand the operating 
principles of the jungle economy. In the tale, for example, 
the balance of strength decides every conflict between 
two heroes: in attack, the strong hero banishes the weaker 
hero from his homestead; and in defense, he prevents the 
weaker hero from expelling him from his home. In real life, 
on the other hand, things are a bit more complex. There is 
uncertainty, and sometimes David strikes down Goliath… 
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Another realistic factor that is not included in the model 
is that each evacuation of a homestead entails costs for both 
the one who is evicted and the one who expels him. These 
costs sometimes prevent a strong hero from exploiting his 
advantage over a weaker one. Some of the costs are real, such 
as removal costs. In addition, sometimes the weaker hero 
makes an error in judgment and rejects the demand of the 
stronger one and in the ensuing conflict the stronger one 
also pays a price and makes sacrifices. Some of the costs are 
mental ones: our warrior heroes are all sensitive souls, who 
experience profound discomfort when they are compelled to 
expel someone weak from the homestead he occupies. 
In summary, the jungle tale begins with a presentation 
of the heroes and the homesteads, a description of the 
strength ranking and a list of each hero’s preferences 
regarding the homesteads. 
The market tale 
The territory controlled by our society is divided into 
homesteads. A number of traders operate in the market, 
and each one owns a different homestead. There is no 
ownerless homestead. The ownership of a homestead 
cannot be divided among several traders, and each trader 
can own only one homestead. The homesteads differ from 
each other and each trader ranks the homesteads in a way 
that reflects his own preferences.
Let’s say there are six homesteads in the market and six 
traders. In the following table, each column represents a 
trader. The homestead he owns at the beginning of trading 
appears at the top of the column, with his homestead 
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rankings listed below it – in declining order. At this stage, 
you can disregard the asterisks and the row of prices. 
The Market Model 
Trader A B C D E F
Ownership Beach Oil Tomb Vineyard Nightclub Forest
Price 25 21 10 25 10 10
Ranking
1 Vineyard* Vineyard Oil Beach* Beach Nightclub*
2 Oil Beach Forest* Oil Vineyard Oil
3 Nightclub Oil* Vineyard Forest Oil Tomb
4 Beach Forest Beach Nightclub Tomb* Vineyard
5 Tomb Nightclub Nightclub Vineyard Forest Forest
6 Forest Tomb Tomb Tomb Nightclub Beach
One might think that the process of allocating the 
homesteads is very chaotic, with several traders 
descending upon one trader and demanding that he 
swaps with them, making such claims as: “I deserve it,” 
or “I have more to offer you,” or “I came to you first,” or 
“I’m the man, and if you don’t comply with my demand 
I’ll kick you out.” In this lecture, we will see how the 
market mechanism imposes order on trading and leads 
to a stable and efficient allocation of homesteads. 
Our economy sanctifies the concept of ownership. 
Owning a homestead means that no one is allowed to take 
the homestead from the owner against his will. This is not 
a jungle! A strong desire on one side is not sufficient for 
an exchange to be transacted. Each transaction requires 
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a meeting of interests between two traders. Mankind 
has come a long way from the laws of the jungle to laws 
of ownership and contracts. The first commandment in 
our constitution is that no one has the right to impose 
anything on another person, and certainly no one is 
allowed to take something from someone else by force. 
Everything is conducted politely even though each trader 
is closely accompanied by an attorney. Each person is free 
to do what he wants… within the framework of budget 
constraints, of course. 
We are aware that the concept of ownership in our 
model is simplistic. Sometimes there are disputes over 
ownership, resulting in violence between the rivals. Our 
legal system is designed to prevent situations in which 
two people try to occupy the same homestead, with each 
person insisting “It’s mine.” 
In our model, the traders act as individuals. They 
are not allowed to form themselves into a group that 
coordinates the activity of its members in the market 
in order to obtain better assets. Such unions are also 
prohibited in real life by antitrust laws – laws that we 
enforce… sometimes.
The model ignores the existence of transaction costs. 
These include real costs – legal expenses and the costs 
of moving from one homestead to another; and mental 
costs – the traders are sensitive people and the heart of 
a trader cringes when he takes part in a deal that greatly 
improves his own situation but leaves his counterpart 
with only a small return. An expansion of the model to 
take into account the transaction costs would take us 
beyond the scope of this introductory lecture.
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In summary, the presentation of the market model 
begins with introducing the traders and homesteads, a 
listing of homestead ownership, and a ranking of each 
trader’s homestead preferences.
Solution of the jungle tale 
Every tale seeks an ending. The conclusion of the jungle 
tale must be an allocation – that is, a description of 
which hero holds which homestead. There are many 
possible allocations, with the number increasing rapidly 
as the number of heroes grows. When there are only six 
homesteads and six heroes in the jungle, there are 720 
possible allocations. We are interested in possible endings 
in which the force that might generate instability is 
neutralized – that is, no hero has an interest in exploiting 
his strength against those who are weaker than him.
A trumpet blast and we will unveil the solution concept 
that guides us in selecting the tale’s ending.
Definition: We say that an allocation of the homesteads 
to the heroes is a jungle equilibrium if no hero prefers a 
homestead held by a weaker hero. In other words, in an 
allocation that is not an equilibrium, there is a hero who 
has his eyes on a homestead that is held by a weaker hero 
and is therefore up for grabs for him. 
In general, after we define an equilibrium concept in 
economics, we verify that the requirements included in 
the definition are not so severe as to preclude any ending 
to the tale. Here as well, we are interested in proving 
that regardless of the heroes’ preferences and the balance 
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of strength between them, the jungle tale has a jungle 
equilibrium. Claims of this type are called existence 
theorems. Advanced mathematical tools are sometimes 
used in proving these theorems, but in the model of the 
jungle we need only basic logical deductions.
Jungle Claim 1: For each beginning of the jungle tale, the 
tale has an ending that is a jungle equilibrium. 
Proof: We will prove the claim by constructing an 
algorithm that will always lead to a jungle equilibrium. 
The algorithm is no more than a tool for proving the 
claim. It is an imaginary process and does not purport to 
describe the jungle dynamics. 
We summon the heroes, one after another – from the 
strongest to the weakest. First, we enable the strongest 
to choose one out of all the homesteads. Then we call 
upon the second strongest hero and allow him to choose 
any homestead, except the one already chosen by the 
stronger hero. And we continue onward: at each stage, 
we call upon the next hero in the ranking of strength 
and let him choose from among the homesteads that 
were not selected in the earlier stages by the stronger 
contenders. Each hero chooses the homestead that 
he considers the best one for him among those still 
available. 
The allocation resulting from the application of this 
algorithm is necessarily a jungle equilibrium. Why? 
The algorithm allocates to each hero the homestead he 
considers the best of those that have not been taken 
by those stronger than him. In other words, the hero 
regards his homestead as preferable to any of the 
homesteads allocated via the algorithm to those who 
are weaker than him. Therefore, no hero has an interest 
in attacking a weaker hero. It is definitely possible that 
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there are homesteads that he would prefer to the one the 
algorithm allotted to him, but these are held by stronger 
heroes, so he cannot seize them.
Let’s apply the algorithm in the proof to the example of 
the six homesteads. Hero A is called first and chooses 
Vineyard. Hero B is called next. He would have liked to 
take Vineyard, but this homestead is already held by A. 
Of the homesteads that remain after A’s selection, Hero 
B chooses Beach. Hero C will take the homestead that he 
ranks highest, Oil, since it was not allocated in the first two 
stages. Hero D can choose one of the three homesteads 
that remain after the three stronger heroes took Vineyard, 
Beach and Oil, and he decides to settle for Forest. Hero E 
will take Tomb and the weakest hero, F, is left with only 
one “choice,” Nightclub, the only homestead that was 
not taken by one of the others. Fortunately for him, this 
homestead happens to be his heart’s desire. The allocation 
of the homesteads is marked by asterisks in the table in 
the jungle model.
Now we know that the jungle model always has at 
least one ending that can withstand the forces threatening 
to undermine its stability. But an additional danger 
threatens the solution concept: perhaps there are too 
many possible endings that comply with the definition of 
jungle equilibrium. This would make the solution concept 
uninteresting. But there is no need to worry: whatever 
the heroes’ preferences and balance of strength might be, 
there is exactly one equilibrium. This equilibrium will 
depend, of course, on the balance of strength and how the 
heroes rank the homesteads. 
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Jungle Claim 2: For each beginning, the jungle tale has 
only one ending that is a jungle equilibrium. 
Proof: To prove that there is only one allocation that 
constitutes a jungle equilibrium, we will show that in 
this equilibrium each hero must hold the homestead 
allotted to him by the algorithm from the proof of Jungle 
Claim 1.
First, we will demonstrate that this is true with respect 
to the strongest hero. According to the jungle equilibrium, 
this hero does not prefer a homestead held by any other 
hero to the one he owns. Hence, in equilibrium, of all of 
the homesteads in the jungle he necessarily holds the one 
that he prefers. This is also the homestead the algorithm 
allocates to him. In order to see that in equilibrium all the 
other heroes also hold the homesteads allocated to them 
by the algorithm, we will use the method called proof by 
induction. 
Inductive step: If, in equilibrium, each of the N 
strongest heroes holds the homestead the algorithm 
allocated to them, then this is also true for the (N+1)th 
hero in the hierarchy of strength. 
Proof of the argument by induction: Let’s assume 
that in equilibrium each of the N strongest heroes 
holds the homestead the algorithm allocated to him. 
It follows that the homesteads that remain available 
after the algorithm has allotted N homesteads to the N 
strongest heroes are in equilibrium in the hands of the 
weaker ones. According to the definition of the jungle 
equilibrium, the (N+1)th hero prefers the homestead he 
possesses in equilibrium to all of the homesteads held 
by those weaker than him. Therefore, in equilibrium, 
of all the homesteads the algorithm did not allocate 
to the N strongest heroes, he holds the homestead he 
prefers, and it is precisely the homestead the algorithm 
has allocated to him. Since we have proven that,  
in equilibrium, the strongest hero holds the homestead 
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the algorithm has allotted to him, it follows by induction 
that this is true for the second hero, the third hero, and 
thus for all the heroes. 
Let’s summarize: the concept of the jungle equilibrium 
predicts a single ending for each jungle tale. 
Solution of the market tale
Let’s go back and look at the example of the six 
homesteads. There are many barter transactions that 
would improve on the starting positions of the traders. 
Which of these transactions will be executed? It is 
worthwhile for C and E to swap Tomb and Nightclub. 
Will they indeed do so? Will B, who owns the Oil 
homestead, trade it with E for Nightclub (despite 
the fact that Nightclub is less preferable to B than his 
current holding) because he plans to make a trade with 
D subsequently in which he will receive Nightclub, his 
greatest dream, in exchange for Vineyard? The traders 
D and E compete to obtain the Beach homestead owned 
by A. Trader D can offer A the Vineyard homestead and 
E can offer Nightclub. Will the fact that D has more to 
offer help him get the Beach?
The solution of the model of the market must describe 
who ultimately owns each homestead. We believe in a 
solution concept called competitive equilibrium, whose 
definition is based on the concept of price. A sign is posted 
next to each homestead. When the traders wake for a 
morning of commerce, they see on each sign a number 
called a price. The prices on the signs comprise a price list. 
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from the road, signs are posted that restrict the passage 
of certain types of vehicles. Every driver knows that he is 
allowed to turn only at an exit that does not have a sign 
restricting entry to his vehicle. Of the permitted turnoffs, 
he will choose the one that is best for him. Similarly, a 
trader knows that he cannot obtain a homestead whose 
price is higher than the price of his own, and he chooses 
the one he most prefers from among the homesteads 
within his price range. 
Not every set of prices posted on signs will direct the 
flow of commerce without collisions. It is very possible 
that a certain homestead will be sought by more than one 
trader. We are looking for a set of prices that will steer 
commerce in such a way that each homestead will be the 
right one for only one trader. The fateful hour has arrived. 
The clamor of Wall Street can be heard in the background, 
creating a festive atmosphere as the moment when we 
announce the central concept of the lecture approaches.
Definition: A set of prices is called a set of competitive 
equilibrium prices if it satisfies the following requirement: 
for each homestead, there is exactly one trader who 
regards it as the best among the homesteads whose price 
is not higher than the price of the one he owns at the start 
of trading. The allocation that results from the traders’ 
choices is called a competitive equilibrium. 
In the table in the market tale section, one price list 
is displayed. In each column in the table, an asterisk 
marks the homestead the respective trader seeks to 
purchase given the price list. Trader A can acquire any 
homestead and he chooses Vineyard. Trader B would 
like to acquire Beach and Vineyard, but their prices 
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are higher than that of his initial homestead. He has no 
alternative but to settle for the Oil homestead. Trader 
C, who owns the Tomb homestead, can only trade it for 
Forest or Nightclub, and the Forest homestead is higher 
in his preferences. Similarly, D would like the Beach, 
E wants the Tomb and F seeks Nightclub. Thus we find 
that for each homestead there is exactly one trader who 
is interested in it at the given price. We have found a 
competitive equilibrium
Underlying the definition of competitive equilibrium, 
we have a story about the way prices change: in a situation 
in which more than one trader would like a certain 
homestead, its price rises; and when no trader wants it, the 
price goes down. One can imagine an announcer declaring 
the prices, revising them, and revising again and again… 
until, wonder of wonders, each homestead has a single 
trader who is still interested in it and can afford it. But there 
are only a few markets that have such an announcer. In 
the absence of an announcer, the long arm of the invisible 
hand operates, steering the prices toward competitive 
equilibrium. 
Does a competitive equilibrium always exist? 
The following claim states that whatever the traders’ 
preferences and the initial state of ownership, there is 
always at least one equilibrium.
Market Claim 1: A competitive equilibrium always 
exists. 
Proof: We will prove the claim by constructing an 
algorithm that always leads to a competitive equilibrium.
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We will call a “cycle” any sequence of traders in 
which each trader prefers most the homestead of the 
trader who follows him in the series, with the last trader 
preferring the homestead of the first trader. How do 
we know that such a cycle exists? We will arbitrarily 
choose one of the traders,(let us call him Trader 1). The 
homestead he prefers most is the homestead belonging 
to a trader called Trader 2. Trader 2 prefers most the 
homestead of Trader 3 and Trader 3 prefers most the 
homestead of Trader 4. We will continue on until we 
again reach a trader who has already appeared in the 
chain. For example, if Trader 4 prefers the homestead of 
Trader 2, then we identify the cycle: Trader 2 → Trader 
3 → Trader 4 → Trader 2. If Trader 4 prefers his own 
homestead, we get a so-called degenerate cycle: Trader 
4 → Trader 4. We will assign a single arbitrary price to 
each of the homesteads owned by the traders in the cycle. 
We will continue the algorithm without the homesteads 
whose prices we just set and without their initial owners. 
At every stage, we will identify a cycle of traders in which 
each trader regards the homestead held by the next trader 
in the cycle as the best of the homesteads that were not 
allocated during the earlier stages. We will assign to the 
homesteads of the traders in the cycle a lower price than 
the prices assigned to the homesteads in the earlier stages. 
We will allocate the homesteads whose prices we just set 
and their initial owners and we will continue this as long 
as traders and homesteads remain. 
The algorithm can progress in various ways, but 
eventually it has to end because at each stage at least 
one trader leaves the cycle (when he is allocated a 
homestead). In this way, we will create a series of cycles 
of trade and will assign prices to each of the homesteads. 
We assigned an identical price to each of the homesteads 
whose owners are in the same cycle. We assigned a lower 
price to a cycle we found at a later stage. 
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We will prove that this set of prices is one of 
competitive equilibrium. Given a set of prices, we will 
see that each homestead has a single trader who would 
like it. 
A trader whose initial homestead is assigned price 
P considers purchasing a homestead from among the 
group of homesteads whose prices are not higher 
than P – that is, all of the homesteads whose owners 
were not involved in the previous cycles of trade.  
The algorithm built the series of cycles such that his 
preferred homestead, among those left in his cycle, is the 
one that belonged to the next trader in the cycle of trade 
at the start of trading. Thus, each homestead has a single 
trader who would like it: the trader who appears before 
its owner in the current cycle of trade.
We will illustrate the algorithm with the example of 
the six homesteads: A is most interested in the homestead 
of D, who is most interested in that of A. Therefore, A→ 
D→ A is a cycle of trade: each of the traders in the cycle 
is most interested in the homestead of the trader who 
comes after him. We will arbitrarily determine that the 
price of each of the two homesteads they own, Vineyard 
and Beach, is 25. After removing these two homesteads 
and their owners, we are left with four traders (B, C, E, F) 
and four homesteads (Oil, Tomb, Nightclub and Forest). 
Trader B C E F
Ownership Oil Grave Nightclub Forest
Ranking 
1 Oil Oil Oil Nightclub
2 Forest Forest Tomb Oil
3 Nightclub Nightclub Forest Tomb
4 Tomb Tomb Nightclub Forest
We will continue in the same way. Among the 
homesteads that remain, Trader B is most interested in Oil, 
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the homestead he already possesses. Therefore, B → B is 
a cycle. We will assign Oil a price of 21. Finally, we will 
identify the cycle of trade C → F→E → C. Of the remaining 
homesteads, C prefers the homestead of F, who follows 
him in the cycle; F prefers the homestead of E, who prefers 
that owned by C. We will set the price of Forest, Nightclub 
and Tomb (the homesteads owned by these traders) at 10 
(or any number less than 21)… and we have finished. 
The wealth of a trader in the market means his ability to 
choose a homestead from among many. The source of the 
wealth in the market is based on a meeting of interests 
among the traders. For example, A is very interested 
in D’s homestead and D is very interested in A’s. Their 
homesteads have a relatively high price. On the other 
hand, the fact that there is someone (F) who wants E’s 
homestead very much does not guarantee that E will be 
wealthy; the market price of E’s homestead may be low 
because there is no one who really wants F’s homestead.
There are many price systems that have competitive 
equilibrium. Nonetheless, the following claim shows that 
the market model still has a single ending. 
Market Claim 2: All competitive equilibria result in the 
same allocation (the proof of this claim is more complex 
than the other proofs in this chapter and the reader who is 
interested can find it in my article with Michele Piccione, 
“Equilibrium in the Jungle”). 
How impressive! The competitive equilibrium provides 
a single prediction of the final allocation of homesteads, an 
allocation that depends, of course, on the initial ownership 
of the homesteads and the traders’ preferences. 
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The efficiency of the jungle 
equilibrium 
The jungle equilibrium makes the use of force unnecessary. 
In equilibrium, no hero can or wants to take over a 
homestead held by another hero. 
In our jungle, a hero’s takeover of another hero’s 
homestead by force is a legitimate action, but – unlike in 
the market – there are no mechanisms that allow a group 
of individuals to trade homesteads of their own volition. 
It is easy to imagine the unrest in the jungle if a number 
of heroes were to discover that they could enhance their 
situation if they adopted foreign ways and agreed among 
themselves on a round of homestead swaps. If they did 
this, the masses would accuse the economic system of 
the jungle of inefficiency and would demand reforms. 
The next claim shows that there is no reason for concern. 
Before formulating it, we will present one definition: an 
allocation is efficient if there is no cycle of homestead 
swaps between some of the heroes that would enhance 
the situation of all of those participating in the swap. 
Jungle Claim 3: The jungle equilibrium is an efficient 
allocation.
Proof: We start with a situation in which each hero 
possesses the homestead allocated to him in the jungle 
equilibrium. 
Let’s look at any cycle of homestead swaps and 
focus on the strongest hero in the cycle. The homestead 
the hero holds after the swap is different from the one 
he held before the swap. Therefore, in equilibrium, 
the homestead must have been held by one of the 
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heroes weaker than him, as our hero is the strongest 
one participating. This homestead is necessarily less 
preferable for him than the homestead he possessed 
when in equilibrium: otherwise, he would have taken 
it over and the initial allocation would not have been 
an equilibrium. 
Let’s summarize: After the jungle reaches equilibrium, 
any cycle of homestead swaps would worsen the situation 
of at least one of the participating heroes. Therefore, the 
allocation of the jungle equilibrium is efficient.
Until now, we assumed that each hero is concerned only 
with the homestead he owns and does not care which 
ones the other heroes own. In reality, the situation is 
sometimes different and the location of each hero affects 
the welfare of another hero. For example, we all want the 
strongest ones to live in the outlying areas so they can 
protect us from our enemies. A matter of concern for many 
of us is who lives in the neighboring homestead. In the 
language of economists, we say this is a situation where 
externalities exist. In such circumstances, the jungle 
equilibrium may not have the attribute of efficiency. 
We will illustrate this point with an example: 
Consider a jungle that has three heroes: A, B and C, 
and three homesteads: Beach, Forest and Oil. There are 
six possible allocations of homesteads to heroes. Let’s 
say that Hero A is stronger than Hero B, and Hero B 
is stronger than Hero C. The table below shows how 
the three heroes rank the six possible allocations. Each 
allocation is denoted by a threesome. For example, the 
threesome (Forest, Oil, Beach) denotes the allocation in 
which A settles in Forest, B in Oil and C in Beach. 
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Hero A B C
1 (Forest, Oil, Beach)** (Oil, Forest, Beach) (Forest, Oil, Beach)**
2 (Beach, Oil, Forest) (Oil, Beach, Forest) (Oil, Forest, Beach)
3 (Beach, Forest, Oil)* (Forest, Beach, Oil) (Beach, Oil, Forest)
4 (Oil, Forest, Beach) (Forest, Oil, Beach)** (Oil, Beach, Forest)
5 (Forest, Beach, Oil) (Beach, Forest, Oil)* (Beach, Forest, Oil)*
6 (Oil, Beach, Forest) (Beach, Oil, Forest) (Forest, Beach, Oil)
Note that Hero C is primarily concerned with the 
homestead he receives. On the other hand, Heroes A and 
B also attribute importance to the homestead in which 
the other heroes settle. Each of them wants the other to 
settle in the Oil homestead. 
The definition of equilibrium in the jungle with 
externalities is a bit subtle. The hero who sets out to grab 
a different homestead must take into consideration not 
only which homestead to choose; he must consider also 
how the displaced hero will react. Here, we’ll assume 
that the evicted hero moves to the homestead of the 
hero who evicted him. Thus, we’ll say that the allocation 
is a jungle equilibrium if there is no hero who prefers 
the allocation that would result from an exchange 
of homesteads with a weaker hero. For example, the 
allocation marked in the table with two asterisks (**) is 
not a jungle equilibrium. B could impose a swap with 
C and the result of this exchange (Forest, Beach, Oil) is 
ranked higher by B than the allocation marked by two 
asterisks. 
The allocation marked with one asterisk (*) is an 
equilibrium allocation, but it is not an efficient allocation: 
the three heroes prefer the allocation with the two asterisks. 
It is possible to implement a more efficient allocation, but 
in order to do this the government would need to declare 
the Beach homestead a closed military area and use its 
power to ensure the allocation of Beach to C. 
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Yes, we are proud that the anarchy of the jungle usually 
leads to an efficient allocation, but we recognize that there 
are circumstances in which government intervention is 
necessary. 
The efficiency of competitive 
equilibrium
Competitive equilibrium is defined by the existence of a 
price list in which each homestead has a single trader who 
is interested in acquiring it and able to do so. We will now 
see that the action of the invisible hand which leads to a 
competitive equilibrium also achieves the virtue of Pareto 
efficiency: there is no other allocation of homesteads to 
traders that would benefit some of them without being 
detrimental to any others. (Incidentally, under the 
conditions of the model, this characteristic is equivalent to 
what we called efficiency in the jungle.) Achieving Pareto 
efficiency is a central goal of our economy. An allocation 
that is not Pareto efficient is not a good allocation because 
it is possible to improve the welfare of at least some of 
the individuals without this coming at the expense of one 
of the other individuals. The following statement (which 
is called in the economic literature the first fundamental 
theorem of welfare economics) stipulates that the market 
mechanism achieves the ideal of efficiency. 
Market Claim 3: The allocation in a competitive 
equilibrium is Pareto efficient. 
Proof: We’ll start with a competitive equilibrium 
allocation. Let’s consider some other allocation. We’ll 
176 Economic Fables
call a trader differentiated if he receives two different 
homesteads in the two allocations. We will focus 
on differentiated Trader X, who possesses the most 
expensive of the homesteads held by the differentiated 
traders in equilibrium. In the new allocation, he 
received a homestead held in equilibrium by another 
differentiated trader, Y, and the price of the homestead 
Y held in equilibrium is not higher than the price of 
the homestead X held in equilibrium (because X is the 
richest of the differentiated traders). Consequently, 
given equilibrium prices, X could have acquired the 
homestead assigned to him in the new allocation but 
nonetheless refrained from doing so. This means that he 
values this homestead less than the homestead he held 
in equilibrium. 
Let’s summarize: After the market reaches 
competitive equilibrium, any other allocation, even if it 
is advantageous to some of the traders, is detrimental 
to at least one of the others. Therefore, the allocation of 
competitive equilibrium is Pareto efficient.
There is usually no need for the government to intervene 
and disrupt the market forces from doing their work. But 
we realize that there are exceptional situations in which 
Pareto efficiency is not achieved and there are grounds 
for considering government intervention in the market 
mechanism, for instance by offering benefits to traders 
to settle in sensitive regions. These situations might arise, 
for example, when there are traders who care not only 
about their own location, but also about the location of the 
other traders. In the language of economists, we say that 
this is a situation in which externalities are present. In such 
a case, there is room for payment to traders who settle in 
sensitive regions. We will elaborate in another course. 
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We noted that sometimes competitive equilibrium 
does not lead to efficiency, but we forgot to teach this fact 
to the devoted supporters of the market economy, who 
continue to cite the first fundamental theorem of welfare 
economics without mentioning that its conclusion is 
based on the assumption that an individual’s welfare 
depends solely on the homestead he obtains. 
Summary of the first lecture on the 
jungle economy
I hope that the first lecture was not too intensive, despite 
the fact that I crammed a summary of the entire course 
into it. Before I conclude the lecture, allow me to make a 
few more comments.
Yes, we are proud of the fact that our economic system 
compensates the strongest heroes, and that the weaker 
ones receive only the stronger ones’ leftovers. Our 
economic system encourages people not to be weaklings. 
The School of Economics is named after mighty Samson. 
Our business school awards the MBA degree to those 
who have specialized in taking over the assets of others 
in elegant and original ways. Our best people devote 
their energies to the army, security, and the construction 
of walls and fences, and do not waste their talents on 
luftgeschäft, pie in the sky ideas. 
It is true that in order for the jungle economy to function, 
the heroes need to clearly identify who is stronger than 
whom. In the jungle, Valentine’s Day is the Festival of 
Strength and not of love. On that day, all of the heroes 
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gather and wrestle until they collapse from exhaustion, 
or… until night falls. At night, fatigued but standing 
proud, the heroes line up in a row in the moonlight, ranked 
from strongest to weakest. At first glance, it seems like a 
meaningless ancient pagan ritual. But we, the economists, 
have discovered the logic behind this tradition: its 
objective is to let all the heroes know who is strong and 
who is weak in the jungle. In this way, our economy can 
function without unnecessary friction. You see, economics 
has just as much to say about anthropological issues as it 
has to contribute to so-called economic issues.
True, the use of power to grease the wheels of our 
economy sometimes leaves victims in its wake. Our 
heroes are also human and sometimes make mistakes. 
A weak hero sometimes gets confused, fails to recognize 
his weakness, and resists when a stronger hero demands 
that he evacuate his homestead. A commotion ensues 
and the stronger hero must resort to force – reasonable 
force, of course – to remind the weaker hero of his inferior 
standing. In the language of economists, we call the 
damages incurred in such clashes transaction costs. We 
will remember the victims of the jungle economy, upon 
whose backs the system was built, and continue on. 
Of course, we understand the feelings of the social 
lobby which is frustrated that the jungle economy is liable 
to generate an unfair allocation. Those who have asthma 
or who suffer from humidity in the summer prefer to live 
far from the sea. If the asthmatic is weaker, the outcome 
of the jungle economy will be unjust. Alas, the jungle is 
green, but it is not the Garden of Eden.
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To summarize the first lecture in the Introduction to 
Jungle Economics course: we showed that the laws of 
the jungle lead to a stable and efficient outcome, without 
markets, without money, without commercial law and 
almost without the need for government intervention.
Summary of the first lecture in the 
market economy
I know that the first lecture of the course was quite a 
load. No wonder. My colleagues say, with a wink, that 
the Introduction to Market Economics course contains all 
the ideas an economist really needs to understand. Before 
I conclude the lecture, I would like to add a few more 
points. 
Some argue against us that our system encourages 
people to be greedy and hedonistic. That is not true. 
We have a marginal influence on the nature of human 
beings. Human beings bring credit to evolution. By 
nature, they always aspire to obtain the best of what is 
possible. Many people engage in a feverish search for 
business opportunities. When someone is ready to sell 
something at a low price and someone else is willing to 
buy it at a high price, there will always be someone who 
immediately identifies the opportunity to buy from the 
former and sell to the latter. 
A system of prices can be created without the need for 
a centralized mechanism to manage commerce. You will 
ask: how does the market arrive at equilibrium prices? 
This mystery is the magic behind our economic system. 
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The commerce in the market entails transaction costs – the 
time and effort needed to identify and execute a transaction. 
But these are negligible costs that we can ignore, and we can 
move on. 
We will sadly note the sense of frustration among 
members of the social lobby, who argue that the laws 
of the marketplace ignore considerations of fairness. If 
someone who suffers from asthma and someone who is 
allergic to sweat in the summer would benefit by living in 
a homestead far from the sea, but the desirable homestead 
is owned by a wimp who happened to inherit it from his 
parents, then the outcome of the market is unjust. Yes, 
alas, the market is only almost the Garden of Eden. 
To summarize the first lecture on the market economy, 
we will say only: behold, look and see how great are the 
wonders of the market. 
End
The presentation of the two Introduction to Economics 
lectures is over. In one lecture, the model of the market 
took center stage. It is a familiar model that is taught 
in every Department of Economics. It is conventionally 
regarded as a basis for understanding the economic 
world in which we live, even though it is quite unrealistic, 
imaginary, does not provide an explanation for the 
wonder of equilibrium prices, and its predictive qualities 
are limited. The other lecture focused on the model of the 
jungle, a model that does not appear in the textbooks and 
seems to be taken from a Walt Disney movie, completely 
detached from the developed world in which we live.
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Is the jungle economy relevant only to cultures that 
are far from us in place and time? I’m afraid not. Here 
is a scenario that does not sound imaginary to me at 
all: as a result of climate change and the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons, the great Gog and Magog apocalypse 
erupts. The survivors do not need any consumer product 
except for a magic capsule called manna that falls from 
heaven every morning. Some people are unfortunate and 
nothing good ever falls upon them from above. Others 
are lucky, groaning under mountains of manna. In this 
post-traumatic world, those who lack manna try to use 
physical force to take what they need to subsist from those 
who have an abundance of manna. The market mechanism 
cannot be used for an exchange of goods because in this 
world there are no goods other than manna. At most, the 
market mechanism can regulate the barter of manna and 
strength; the owners of manna pay some of those who 
lack manna to physically protect them. A version of the 
jungle model would describe this world better than the 
model of the market. 
But even without such a horrible scenario, the 
jungle model is more relevant to our world than might 
appear at first glance. Physical strength constitutes an 
influential factor also in the contemporary economy. 
Property crimes are aggressive actions in which assets 
are transferred from individuals to individuals. The bully 
in the prison cell gets the best bed and this is also true in 
many decent families. Strength played an important role 
in the allocation of assets in regimes that have collapsed. 
Nations have robbed and continue to rob other nations by 
exercising military power.
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But when we speak about the use of force as a 
factor that determines the distribution of goods in a 
society, we are referring not only to military power. 
In our world, it is not uncommon for people to use 
gentle force to allocate goods, and in some cases we 
do not even see anything wrong with this. The power 
of rank determines the parking arrangements even 
at universities. The power of seniority determines 
priority in awarding special privileges in elite army 
units and in nursing homes. The power of persuasion 
leads participants in negotiations to agree to what they 
are not interested in. And let’s not forget the power 
of attraction, male or female, that drives the process 
of allocating men to women and vice versa. Let’s say 
He-1 is with She-1 and He-2 is with She-2. But now 
He-1 prefers She-2 to his present partner, bless her soul, 
and He-1 is more attractive than He-2. So He-1 appears 
before She-2, exercises his manly powers – and the deal 
is closed. I shudder at the thought of using the market 
mechanism to make matches between the sexes. 
The models presented in the two Introduction to 
Economics lectures are nothing but fables. Neither of them 
describes reality, but both of them still describe something 
from reality. Neither of them provides an unequivocal 
argument in favor or against this or that economic system, 
but studying both of them together helps to some extent 
in understanding economic mechanisms. 
I have attempted to present the two models, side by 
side, as symmetrically as possible. My main objective 
was to promote a critique of the way in which we teach 
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conventionally focuses on the market model which 
quickly captivates the hearts of the students, not as 
a result of empirical evidence or following proper 
discussion — these are usually absent. Students of 
economics are enchanted by the elegance of the market 
model, by its decisiveness, and by its ability to predict, 
whether correctly or erroneously. In this chapter, I have 
tried to emphasize how easy it is to impress students, by 
using similar tools and employing rhetorical ploys with 
a different economic system, a system that is not to my 
liking either.

4. Economics, Pragmatics 
and Seven Traps
A visit to interdisciplinary realms
The writing of this book is replete with doubts for 
me. I am discussing academic issues from a personal 
perspective, a very personal one. While attracted to this 
form of writing, I do not feel completely at ease with it. 
In all of my academic work, I have wrapped myself in 
formal models of economic theory, game theory and 
decision theory. Typical titles of my papers were: “A 
Bargaining Model with Incomplete Information” and 
“Comments on the Interpretation of Decision Problems 
with Imperfect Recall.” So how is it that I have stooped to 
using the expression “a visit to interdisciplinary realms”? 
If I am not careful, the interdisciplinary realms will spill 
into the realms of my childhood, with its intercultural 
nature explaining my interest in interdisciplinary subjects. 
And with a little imagination, I am liable even to revisit my 
mythological grocer (behold – he is already here again). 
The pretense of the current visit to interdisciplinary 
realms is to illustrate how economic thinking can contribute 
to the analysis of issues that are not economic. I will embark 
on this visit with a critical outlook that will help me to 
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recognize traps and perhaps even search for them. Some 
of the traps are unique to interdisciplinary research, while 
others can also be found in other contexts. I will occasionally 
stray from the main objective of the discussion and draw 
the reader’s attention to a trap, one, two, three… up to seven. 
Economics is surrounded by interdisciplinary realms. 
The combinations of economics with sociology, zoology, 
criminology, psychology, law, political science, history 
and brain science, adorn the names of academic journals 
and advanced courses. I know economists who work 
on such combinations and wholeheartedly believe 
that economics has a lot to learn from other academic 
fields. But, in general, it seems to me that the spread of 
economics to other areas derives from the view expressed 
by the economist Steven Levitt: “Economics is a science 
with excellent tools for gaining answers, but a serious 
shortage of interesting questions.”
In conversations in departmental lounges or at 
post-seminar dinners, economists admit that economics 
is an imperialist profession. The giggling of those present 
when someone uses the expression “the imperialism of 
economics” is replaced by growing embarrassment when 
others begin to speak with arrogance and disdain about 
the natives in the colonies – that is, toward anyone who 
has yet to discover the treasures of economic thinking. 
I am not a “patriot” of economics and I harbor no 
professional colonialist ambitions whatsoever. But I too 
have tried to work in interdisciplinary realms, first in 
economics and law and later in economics and language. 
I was drawn to such areas because they offer the prospect of 
ground-breaking innovation, originality and diversity. On 
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days when I felt reservations about engaging in economics 
proper, I found an abandoned territory in the interdisciplinary 
realms – a refuge for economics without economics. 
Consider economics and law. The field includes areas 
such as corporate law, antitrust law and tax law which 
reflect research in economics into the structure of the 
firm, industrial organization and public economics. But a 
different meaning of economics and law is of greater interest 
to me, and is related to my view that economic theory aims 
to clarify the logic of interactions between the individuals in 
a society. There is no reason for economic theory to restrict 
itself to economic interactions only. The legal system is also 
designed to organize the interactions between individuals 
in a society. And indeed, the field of economics and law 
examines the legal system with the tools we use to analyze 
economic systems. In this sense, the field employs the 
method of economic thinking, not the economic content.
Economics and language sounds a stranger 
combination. Language theory does not address 
economic problems. Here, economists assume the right 
to deal with topics that are supposed to be the purview 
of linguists and philosophers of language, based on the 
view that economics focuses on understanding how 
all social institutions function. When we use the term 
social institution, we are referring to the prevailing 
mechanisms and conventions in society that organize 
the interaction between individuals. What is a more 
fundamental social mechanism for cooperation between 
human beings than language? This gives rise to the urge 
to explain language in the same way as classical economic 
theory explains familiar economic mechanisms. 
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Even after the previous two paragraphs, I doubt 
whether the reader has gained even the slightest idea of 
how economic thinking is relevant to other fields. Instead 
of continuing with abstract explanations, it would be 
more effective to present one interdisciplinary economic 
study from the field of economics and language. The 
study to be presented here is a project I conducted jointly 
with my colleague Jacob (Kobi) Glazer. The project 
deals with situations of argument and persuasion. I 
was attracted to this project because it brought to mind 
childhood dreams that I have not fulfilled: to become 
an attorney for the oppressed and to win public debates 
on fateful issues. One advantage in discussing this 
particular project is that I was involved in it, and thus I 
am entitled to be critical without worrying about being 
accused of persecuting someone on a personal basis. 
I have yet to say a word about economics and language 
and I am already talking about what attracted me to the 
field. It is not obvious why one would be attracted to 
interdisciplinary research. This seduces us to probe into 
the reasons that lead a person to this particular endeavor. 
So here, I have already stepped onto one landmine. 
Trap 1: Research in interdisciplinary realms elicits 
personal exposure whose place in academic writing 
is doubtful.
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Conversation and persuasion situations
We are entering an area that lies between economics and 
pragmatics. We have spoken about economics. Pragmatics 
is a branch of linguistics that deals with the rules guiding 
the implications of things said in a conversation (utterances). 
Pragmatics seeks to decipher the mechanisms that operate 
in our minds when we listen to a conversation like this one:
First conversation:
A:  (who is in Jerusalem, is about to travel to London 
and is speaking on the telephone with B, who is in 
London): I can’t wait to stroll around in the streets 
of London. Tell me, is the weather stormy there?
B:  It’s not raining hard. 
B’s statement – if detached from the context in which it 
was spoken – does not rule out the possibility that it is not 
raining at all in London. Nonetheless, in the context of the 
conversation, the clear meaning of B’s statement is that it is 
raining in London, but not hard. What are the principles that 
lead us to understand this statement so unambiguously?
Second conversation:
C:  (outside the conference room, speaking by phone 
to D, who is inside the conference room): Who is 
participating in the meeting?
D:  Most of the people I see are economists. 
D did not mention participants who are not economists. 
In fact, he did not say that he was looking at participants 
in the conference room at all (and not, for example, 
at passersby seen from the window of the room). 
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Nonetheless, we have no doubt that D meant to say that 
most of the participants at the meeting are economists, 
while some of the participants are not economists. How 
is it so clear to us that this is what D intended to say?
Pragmatics clarifies the rules that are engraved in our 
minds, which make these deductions so self-evident, 
without our even being aware that these rules exist. The 
high priest of pragmatics is the philosopher Paul Grice, 
whose main thesis is the cooperative principle: the rules 
that we employ to understand statements spoken during 
an everyday conversation derive from the assumption that 
the speaker and the listener have shared interests, and the 
conversation they conduct is intended to promote these 
interests. Grice deduces from the cooperative principle 
that the meaning of a statement in a conversation must be 
consistent with the assumption that the speaker intends to 
convey to the listener information that is correct, relevant, 
and sufficiently detailed, in the simplest possible way.
Grice’s approach reminds us of the approach used in 
economics to explain and understand social institutions. 
We imagine a super planner who has designed a social 
institution in order to promote a reasonable objective. We 
aspire to show that a familiar social institution optimally 
fulfills the objective of this social designer. Well, this 
aspiration may be a bit exaggerated. We will be satisfied 
if we show that the familiar social institution shares 
important characteristics with the social institution the 
social designer would have selected. 
Let’s return to the first conversation. B takes the trouble 
to say “It’s not raining hard,” and does not suffice with 
the shorter statement, “It’s not raining.” This indicates 
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that he wanted to convey something more. What could he 
have meant? That it is raining and it is not pouring. And 
why didn’t he say “It’s raining, but not hard?” Because B 
wanted to be relevant and knew that what was troubling A 
was that if it poured he would not be able to enjoy a stroll 
through the city. The two utterances “It’s not raining hard” 
and “It’s raining, but not hard” are not identical. But in 
the context of the conversation, the rules of pragmatics 
make them carry the same meaning. 
In the second conversation, because D is supposed 
to be relevant, we deduce that D is responding to C’s 
question and is referring to the group of people that C 
is interested in – that is, the group of participants in the 
meeting. Thus, D intends to say that most of the people 
in the conference room are economists. He could have 
stated more informatively (and just as simply): “All of the 
participants in the meeting are economists.” The fact that 
he did not say this leads us to deduce that that statement 
would not have been correct and that most – but not 
all – of the participants in the meeting are economists. 
Grice’s rules refer to conversation situations. In this 
chapter, we are interested in what we call a persuasion 
situation. A persuasion situation, like a conversation, 
involves an exchange of words. What characterizes a 
persuasion situation is that someone (we’ll call him the 
petitioner) seeks to persuade someone else (we’ll call him 
the listener) to adopt his opinion or perform an action. 
Examples of persuasion situations include: a worker tries 
to convince an employer to hire him, a politician seeks the 
public’s trust, or a telephone company attempts to convince 
a customer to switch over from the rival company. We are 
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interested in identifying the principles that determine what 
constitutes a convincing argument in a persuasion situation 
and how utterances aimed at persuading someone are 
interpreted. In other words, we are interested in developing 
a theory of pragmatics that applies to persuasion situations. 
Examining intuition
Our starting point (Kobi’s and mine) was routine 
observation of the world. Everyday, we participate in 
or witness persuasion situations in the family, in the 
workplace, in the market and in politics. We noticed 
that the meaning we attribute to a statement made in a 
persuasion situation is often different than the meaning 
we would assign to the same statement if made in an 
ordinary, non-persuasive, conversation. When the listener 
interprets a statement in a persuasion situation, he is aware 
of the fact that the persuader is trying hard to convince 
him. He thinks strategically (in the sense discussed in the 
chapter on game theory) and takes into consideration not 
only what the petitioner says, but also what the petitioner 
chooses to say and what not to say. 
But, unlike philosophers and linguists, we economists 
behave as if we do not rely solely on our impressions of 
the world and introspection. We aspire to reinforce our 
impressions via experiments that usually — surprise 
surprise! — support our intuitions, at least in the cases 
that are reported. Will this also be true here?
We asked students and lecturers in several universities 
around the world to relate to two stories. It cannot be said 
that these stories are taken from actual events though they 
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bring to mind realistic situations. In experiments, as in 
models, the world is refined to the point of absurdity. We 
refrain from confronting the respondents with situations 
that are too familiar or complex. Familiar situations are not 
suitable because the respondents are liable to be influenced 
by factors specific to their own lives, but irrelevant to our 
study. A complex situation is liable to be incomprehensible, 
especially to respondents who did us a favor by participating 
in the experiment and have a limited attention span (you 
can experiment with these situations on the book’s website: 
http://www.openbookpublishers.com/exsites/136).
First story: Imagine that you are one of two players in 
the following game. There are two packs of cards in the 
game. Each pack contains 100 cards, numbered from 
1 to 100. Two cards, one from each pack, are selected 
randomly and given to the other player. Only he sees 
the numbers on the two cards. His aim is to persuade 
you that the sum of the two cards in his hand is higher 
than 100. He can show you only one of the two cards. 
You have to guess whether or not the sum of the cards 
is higher than 100. The other player will receive a prize 
if he succeeds in persuading you that the sum of the 
numbers on the two cards is greater than 100. You will 
receive a prize if your guess turns out to be correct. 
The other player showed you a card with the number 
59. What is your guess: Is the sum of the cards in the 
other player’s hand higher than 100, or not? 
In this story, you are the listener and the other player is 
the petitioner. The story brings to mind realistic situations 
such as the following: a candidate for employment 
(the petitioner) tries to persuade an employer (the 
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listener) to hire him. The candidate has two references 
from previous employers. The content of the letters can 
range from an enthusiastic recommendation (like the 100 
card) to a scathing critique (like the 0 card). The employer 
does not have the time to read both of them and asks the 
candidate to give him just one of them (like the constraint 
in the story where the player can only show one card). 
The applicant claims that the references from his two 
former employers place him above the average candidate 
(comparable to the player claiming that the sum of the 
cards he holds is greater than 100). He presents a reference 
that is slightly better than the average (comparable to the 
card with the number 59). And finally, the question of 
whether or not the presentation of this reference supports 
the candidate’s chance of getting the job is comparable to 
the question of how to interpret the fact that the player 
chose to show the 59 card.
I can think of two conflicting considerations the 
listener might have in mind after the 59 card is presented 
as evidence designed to persuade him that the sum of the 
two cards is greater than 100. 
Naïve consideration: The listener sees the display of 
the 59 card as an innocent move and does not take 
into consideration the fact that the petitioner chose 
to display this card and not the other one. For the 
sum of the cards to be greater than 100, the number 
on the second card must be at least 42. The listener is 
aware that the second card was drawn from a pack 
containing 100 cards, numbered 1 to 100. He calculates 
the probability that the number on the second card is 
42 or higher (59%) and the probability that the second 
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card is lower than 42 (41%), and concludes that it is 
more probable that the sum of the numbers on the two 
cards is greater than 100.
Strategic consideration: The listener asks himself what 
led the petitioner to display the 59 card. He is aware of 
the fact that the petitioner is trying to persuade him that 
the sum of the numbers is higher than 100 and therefore 
did not show him just any card, but instead chose to 
show the card with the higher number of the two in 
his hand. Consequently, the listener deduces that the 
second card has a number less than 59. If so, the chance 
of the second card having a number between 42 and 
59 (which would bring the sum above 100), i.e., 18/59, 
is smaller than the chance of the second card having a 
number between 1 and 41 (too small to make the sum 
of the two cards greater than 100), i.e., 41/59. Therefore, 
it is more probable that the sum of the numbers on the 
cards in his hand does not exceed 100. 
So, do people interpret the display of the 59 card as 
evidence that supports the petitioner or as evidence 
against his argument? Our sample included more than 
1,500 respondents. Some 43% of them apparently exercised 
the naïve consideration and deduced that the sum of the 
cards was greater than 100. Most of the respondents, 57%, 
exercised the strategic consideration and deduced that 
the sum of the two cards did not exceed 100.
What would happen if the statement “one of the cards 
is the 59 card” is uttered during a conversation between 
two people and not in a persuasion situation? Imagine, 
for example, that two people are talking on the phone. 
One of them holds the two cards in his hand. The two 
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people have a shared interest in determining whether the 
sum of the cards is greater than 100. The person holding 
the cards says to the other one: “The number on one card 
is 59 and the number on…” and at that moment, before 
the speaker has a chance to mention the number on the 
second card, the conversation is cut off. The listener is 
left to guess whether or not the sum of the cards is higher 
than 100. Unlike in the persuasion situation, the great 
majority of those asked to interpret the statement (“The 
number on one card is 59”) guess that the sum of the 
cards is greater than 100. It seems that in a conversation, 
the listener believes that the speaker decided randomly 
which of the two cards to take first and not necessarily 
the higher card.
Second story: You are speaking with someone about 
the change in the level of education in major cities in the 
world. You are very eager to persuade him that the level 
of education has risen during the past decade in most 
cities in the world. You tell him that you have reports 
about the trends in the level of education in Brussels, 
Cairo, Manila and Mexico City. He says that he saw a 
reliable report indicating that the level of education in 
Bangkok declined during the past decade. All of your 
four reports support your contention, but you only 
have time to show him information on just one of these 
four cities. Presenting information on which of the four 
would strengthen your position most? 
The story describes a persuasion situation. You are the 
petitioner. Now that Bangkok has been presented as a 
counter-argument to your contention, you are expected 
to respond with an argument that is “proximate” to the 
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argument made about Bangkok. In this context, most 
people think about proximity in the geographic sense 
and the listener expects to hear from you about the level 
of education in a city near Bangkok – in our case that 
would be Manila. So if you present the report on Mexico 
City, the listener will deduce that the report on Manila 
does not support your contention. He will know that one 
case (Mexico City), supports your position, while two 
other cases (Bangkok and Manila) do not. If you present 
the details of the report on Manila, the listener will not 
draw any conclusion about the level of education in any 
of the other cities. He will then have data that supports 
your position in one case (Manila) and does not support 
your position in another case (Bangkok). Therefore, your 
situation will be better if you present the report on Manila. 
The findings support our intuition: in a survey 
conducted among about 600 students, 51% of the 
respondents said that Manila was the most persuasive 
argument, compared to 23% who selected Mexico City 
and 13% who chose Cairo and Brussels. And this is despite 
the fact that Manila is not the most prominent of the four 
cities. When we replaced Bangkok with Amsterdam, 71% 
of the respondents selected Brussels as the best argument, 
with the rest of the votes split evenly between the three 
other cities. 
A different interpretation would be attributed to 
this conversation if it were simply conducted between 
two inquisitive people rather than in the context of a 
persuasion situation. Let’s say that at the beginning of the 
discussion it becomes apparent that the level of education 
in Bangkok had declined (and incidentally we conducted 
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the experiment before I visited Bangkok, when I learned 
that the level of education had actually risen there in the 
last few years). Let’s assume that one of the interlocutors 
is knowledgeable about the level of education in the four 
cities (Brussels, Cairo, Manila and Mexico City) and he 
mentions that the level of education in Mexico City has 
risen. I doubt that this statement would be taken in any way 
other than literally. No one would deduce anything about 
the level of education in the other cities based on the fact 
that the speaker chose to cite Mexico City as an example. 
It seems that most of the respondents, in regard to both 
stories, took into consideration the fact that the petitioner 
chose what to say and what not to say, and that his choice 
was made with the goal of persuading the listener.
In the first story, the petitioner presents evidence – the 
card with the number 59. Ostensibly all he said was 
“I have a card with the number 59,” but most of the 
respondents say to themselves that the speaker is 
rational and was doing his best to persuade the listener. 
If the speaker held a more convincing card, he would 
have shown it. Consequently, the respondents deduce 
that the speaker was unable to show a card with a higher 
number and, therefore, the sentence “I have a card 
with the number 59” means that “The highest number 
appearing on the cards in my hand is 59.”
In the second story, after the listener tells the petitioner 
that the case of Bangkok does not support his position, 
the petitioner is expected to refer to Manila, the only city 
on the list that can be said to be geographically close to 
Bangkok. The most convincing argument is: “the level of 
education in Manila has risen.” That is, if the petitioner 
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had argued for example, “the level of education in Brussels 
has risen”, this statement would have been interpreted 
as if he had presented a weaker argument, “the level of 
education has risen in Brussels, but not in Manila.”
Criticism (1)
Of course, I am happy about the faith that you, the 
readers, have shown in me by unquestioningly accepting 
the survey results I reported. But what do you know 
about the method by which the survey was conducted? 
Who were the respondents and to what extent do the 
responses of several hundred students reflect the general 
population? Do I also report experiments that did not 
succeed or only those whose results support what I want 
to show? Don’t you have a sneaking feeling that I have an 
interest in bending the results a bit in order to appear – to 
myself as well as to you – as more persuasive? 
In fact, you the readers and I are involved in a 
persuasion situation right now. I want to convince you 
that the results of the survey support the thesis that I 
am presenting here. I must not lie, but I can choose to 
highlight only the findings that support my thesis and 
to hide the less favorable ones. This is the situation in all 
experimental and empirical work. The researcher wants 
to appear wise, correct and original – regardless of the 
quality of his research. 
If we are interested in verified facts, we should look 
at findings with a measure of skepticism. But most of us 
prefer not to delve into the experimental and empirical 
data or examine how researchers reached their conclusions. 
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The culture of relying on someone is especially prevalent 
in the interdisciplinary realms. We are not sufficiently 
critical when we cite research conducted in another field, 
because we are not knowledgeable enough to do so; often 
the citation is just intended to demonstrate the breadth of 
our horizons. We are also insufficiently critical in regard 
to citations from our own field, perhaps because we are 
interested in impressing researchers from other fields, 
and fear that by criticizing the works of other economists 
we may harm ourselves too. 
If economists would write models describing the 
research in economics and would include economists 
among the decision makers, they would certainly adopt 
the approach that the conclusions should not be taken 
at face value, and that the interests of the researchers 
should be taken into account. Economists would discuss 
the incentives they face when they collect, analyze and 
publish findings. They would also speak about the 
common interests of the members of the economics 
club to praise themselves in front of spectators from 
the other clubs. But the economists do not write models 
about economists. Only rarely have I heard an economist 
complain that a colleague who had announced a great 
discovery in his famous article, had been selective in his 
choice of the findings he presented, and had omitted data 
that was not quite consistent with his discovery. In other 
words, we have encountered another trap.
Trap 2: We are unduly impressed by studies published 
in the professional journals and pay too little 
attention to the personal interests of the researchers.
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The economists are coming
What principles determine the difference between a 
convincing and a non-convincing statement? Let’s return 
to my study with Kobi. The basic premise of our approach 
is that there is truth in the world. If the listener knew this 
truth, there would be no need for a persuasion process and 
the listener would adopt or reject the petitioner’s position in 
accordance with the truth and according to his preferences. 
However, the truth is not known to the listener. Only the 
petitioner knows the relevant facts and, independent of 
the truth, he is always interested in convincing the listener 
of something. The listener, on the other hand, would like 
to be persuaded by the petitioner’s arguments only under 
certain conditions. The situation becomes charged with 
tension similar to that present in many typical economic 
situations. The petitioner and the listener have common 
interests, as there are circumstances in which it is beneficial 
for the listener to accede to the petitioner. But there are 
also conflicts of interest, and there are circumstances in 
which it is best for the listener to reject the petitioner’s 
arguments. This is why Grice’s cooperative principle is not 
a reasonable basis for a theory explaining the rules used 
to interpret statements in a persuasion situation. We will 
therefore try to formulate an alternative principle that can 
explain the rules people use naturally when interpreting a 
petitioner’s arguments in a persuasion situation. 
In our approach, the purpose of the persuasion process 
is to enable the listener to extract from the petitioner as 
much of the information he needs as possible. We assume 
that a social designer implanted in human beings the rules 
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with which they interpret the arguments and evidence 
presented in a persuasion situation. The designer 
assumed that the petitioner would act in a rational way 
and that the listener would listen to the petitioner and 
act according to the rules of persuasion implanted in him 
by the designer. The designer chose rules of persuasion 
that maximize the chance that the listener will reach the 
correct conclusion from his own perspective.
The social designer determines which arguments will 
convince the listener and which will not. He must take into 
consideration certain limitations: time limitations – the 
listener has very little spare time; and cognitive 
limitations – there is a limit to the listener’s ability to 
absorb and digest data and draw conclusions. As we 
know, even the judicial system is cognizant of the severe 
time constraints in which the courts operate and the 
limits of judge’s ability to absorb and process information, 
even in a life and death situation. 
Who is this super-designer who defines our life for us 
and whose optimization will be the cornerstone to our 
analysis? In the best of the economic tradition, we are 
speaking of a “virtual” designer. If we insist on removing 
the mask from this mysterious figure, we will hide behind 
the term “evolutionary forces”. In some contexts (for 
example, when the listener is the boss), we might say that 
the designer is the listener himself; thanks to his strong 
position vis-à-vis the petitioner, he is the one who decides 
on the rules of the game. But, perhaps it is best to admit:
Trap 3: Actually, we are not really sure what we 
are doing…
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Our approach leads us to clothe the problem of the 
virtual designer in formal dress. We will then analyze 
the formal model, swept up in the magic of transforming 
a mysterious, vague issue into a clear mathematical 
problem. This is not the place for a detailed description of 
the formal model – that is the domain of the professional 
literature. Here, we will suffice with presenting a simple 
example, just a taste of the model. 
Actually, even if I were to write about this subject in the 
professional interdisciplinary literature, I would suffice with 
a concise presentation of the essence of the model. I would 
not go into great detail on linguistic issues because I am not 
expert enough to delve into their complexities. I would also 
not go into too much detail in describing the formal model, 
because it would deter readers who are not well-versed in 
economic theory. So, in other words, my own words have 
led me into another trap.
Trap 4: In the interdisciplinary realms, the 
presentations must be concise. There is no room for 
details. We tend to speak about the general picture 
and often remain there.
Building a model
A petitioner is interested in persuading a listener about 
a certain matter. He can make use of the opinions of five 
experts: A, B, C, D, and E. Each expert has an unequivocal 
opinion on the matter. He either supports the petitioner’s 
position, or he opposes it. We will call the description 
of the opinions of the five experts – the state of affairs. 
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An example of a state of affairs: A, B and D support the 
petitioner’s position, while C and E oppose it. There are 
2 × 2 × 2 × 2 × 2 = 32 possible states of affairs. If the listener 
were aware of the opinion of the five experts, he would 
be persuaded only if the majority of experts support the 
petitioner’s position. 
However, only the petitioner knows the opinion of the 
experts. In the persuasion process, the petitioner seeks to 
convince the listener that the state of affairs is such that it is 
worthwhile for him to accept the opinion of the petitioner. 
An important premise (and later we will discuss it at 
greater length) is that the petitioner is allowed to raise an 
argument that represents the opinion of two experts only. 
A rule of persuasion defines what is considered a 
convincing argument and what is perceived as a 
non-convincing argument. The petitioner, who is aware 
of the state of affairs and the rule of persuasion, will 
check whether there is an argument that he is allowed 
to voice and which will persuade the listener. If there is 
such an argument, the petitioner will raise it.
The petitioner is not permitted (in the model) to do 
anything except present the opinions of the experts. 
Thus, for example, he cannot curse, bang on the table 
or open fire… he cannot falsely claim that a certain 
expert supports his position when the expert does not 
support him. This is particularly relevant in a situation 
in which, beyond mere words about the experts’ views, 
the petitioner must substantiate his statements with the 
reasoned declarations of the experts.
Finally, we come to that mysterious designer – the 
one responsible for choosing the rule of persuasion. 
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The rule of persuasion he chooses will apply in all 
states of affairs (since the listener, who uses the rule, 
does not distinguish between different states of affairs). 
In order to assess a rule of persuasion, the designer 
identifies the states of affairs in which the listener 
makes a decision that from the listener’s perspective 
is the wrong one. The designer counts as a mistake 
(i) every state of affairs in which the listener does not want 
to be persuaded, yet the petitioner is able to persuade 
him to accept his position; and (ii) every state of affairs 
in which the listener would want to be persuaded, yet the 
rule of persuasion does not allow the petitioner to present 
a combination of convincing arguments. The designer 
does not distinguish between mistakes in the various 
states of affairs and attributes equal weight to each 
mistake. The central assumption of the model is that the 
designer chooses the rule of persuasion that minimizes 
the number of states of affairs in which the listener makes 
a decision that is wrong from his own perspective. 
As stated, we allow the petitioner to present 
arguments that include the opinions of only two experts. 
The model would be uninteresting if we were to allow 
the petitioner to present the opinions of three experts. If 
that were the case, the social designer would determine 
that a convincing argument must cite three experts who 
support the petitioner. This rule of persuasion would 
always lead to the correct outcome from the listener’s 
perspective. The premise of the model, stipulating that 
the petitioner can only refer to two experts, reflects the 
listener’s limitations and prevents the social designer 
from imposing the full burden of proof on the petitioner.
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The social designer in the model must choose one rule 
of persuasion from a large number of possibilities. Here 
are three examples of simple rules of persuasion:
1. The listener is convinced by the arguments of the 
petitioner if the petitioner can cite any two experts 
who support his position. 
This rule of persuasion leads to an undesirable outcome 
from the perspective of the listener in 10 of the 32 states 
of affairs: 
•  In every state of affairs in which the listener 
would like to be persuaded – that is, when at least 
three of the five experts support the petitioner’s 
position, the petitioner can convince the listener.
•  The rule of persuasion prevents the petitioner 
from persuading the listener in the five states 
of affairs in which only a single expert supports 
the petitioner, as well as in the state of affairs 
in which all five experts oppose the petitioner’s 
position. And indeed, the listener would not want 
to be persuaded in these six states of affairs.
•  In the 10 states of affairs in which exactly two 
of the five experts support the petitioner, the 
petitioner can convince the listener to accept his 
position, despite the fact that the latter would 
prefer not to be persuaded. 
2. Let’s assume that the five experts are naturally 
arranged in the minds of the petitioner and the 
listener in the order A, B, C, D, E, as they appear, for 
example, in the directory of certified experts.
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According to this rule of persuasion, the petitioner is 
not only required to cite two experts who support his 
position, but the two experts must also be “neighbors” (A 
and B, B and C, C and D, or D and E). 
The rule of persuasion leads to a wrong result from 
the perspective of the listener in only five states of 
affairs:
•  The petitioner can persuade the listener in all 
states of affairs in which three or more experts 
support his position, except for the one state 
of affairs in which only the experts A, C and E 
support him. (In this state of affairs, he cannot 
argue that some pair of neighboring experts 
supports his position.)
•  The rule of persuasion prevents a mistake in the 
six states of affairs in which there is no pair of 
experts who support the petitioner. 
•  Of the 10 states of affairs in which only two 
experts support the petitioner, in four of them 
the experts are neighbors and the petitioner can 
convince the listener, despite the fact that he was 
not supposed to do this; in the other six states of 
affairs, the experts who support the petitioner are 
not neighbors and he has no way to convince the 
listener.
3. Let us assume that the five experts are arranged in 
the minds of the petitioner and the listener in two 
groups. A, B and C are in one group, and D and 
E in the second. This is the situation, for example, 
when the five experts are similar in every way, 
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except for the fact that three of them are men and 
two are women. The rule of persuasion requires the 
petitioner to provide evidence pertaining to two 
aspects of a same group (two men or two women). 
Citing the supporting opinions of B and C will 
convince the listener; on the other hand, citing the 
supporting opinions of A and D will not do so. 
The third rule of persuasion limits the number of 
mistakes to 4:
•  The petitioner can persuade the listener in all 
states of affairs in which at least three experts 
support him, because either two of the three are 
men or two of them are women.
•  There are four problematic states of affairs in 
which the petitioner can convince the listener to 
accept his position, despite the fact that in these 
states of affairs the listener would prefer not to 
be persuaded: these four states of affairs are 
when exactly two experts support the petitioner’s 
position and both of them are of the same sex 
(A and B, A and C, B and C, or D and E). 
•  In all of the other states of affairs, the number of 
experts supporting the petitioner is not greater 
than two; and if there are two experts who 
support the petitioner, they come from different 
groups. In these states of affairs, the petitioner 
has no way of persuading the listener and no 
mistake is generated. 
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What is the optimal rule of persuasion? It can be 
proven (we will not do this here) that every rule of 
persuasion involves at least four states of affairs in 
which the outcome of the persuasion situation will be 
wrong. Thus, third rule of persuasion, which is based 
on a division of the experts into two groups – one of 
three experts and the other of two experts – and which 
requires the petitioner to cite the views of two experts 
from the same group, is a rule of persuasion that 
minimizes the number of errors. 
According to this optimal rule of persuasion, the 
argument citing the opinions of B and C in support of 
the petitioner convinces the listener, while the argument 
citing the opinions of B and D in support of the petitioner 
does not. The two arguments seemingly convey equal 
information (two of the five experts support the 
petitioner), but nonetheless are not equally convincing. 
When the social designer adopts the third rule of 
persuasion, the argument that cites B and D in support 
of the petitioner’s position becomes more informative 
than it appears. The argument that B and D support the 
petitioner is interpreted as also admitting that there is no 
pair of supporting experts from the same group.
As noted, our approach is that the prevalent 
rules of persuasion in the real world derive from the 
maximization performed by the social designer. If 
there is any truth in our approach, we would expect 
to find the third rule of persuasion in persuasion 
situations in which there is a clear division of the 
experts into two groups, one of three and one of two. 
In the absence of such a single natural division, it will 
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not be clear to the petitioner and the listener whether 
or not the two experts the petitioner cites come from 
the same group.
The model and reality
Is there really a connection between the optimal rule of 
persuasion and what people consider to be convincing? 
When a group of experts can be divided naturally into 
two groups of two and three experts, do people really 
find that citing testimony from two experts from the 
same group is more persuasive than citing testimony 
from two experts from different groups? 
The third story does not deal with experts, but it is 
still easy to see the resemblance between the story and 
the model. 
Third story: An exam consists of five questions 
printed on two separate pages, three on one page and 
two on the other. The questions were administered 
to many examinees and it was found that: 
1.  The fact that a person knows one answer does not 
indicate whether he knows another answer; and
2.  About 50% of the examinees know the answer to 
every question.
 You want to determine whether an examinee’s ability is 
above the average in the population – that is, whether 
he is able to answer at least three questions. Due to 
time constraints, the examinee is asked to choose and 
answer only two questions. 
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Compare the following two events in terms of their 
ability to convince you that the examinee’s knowledge 
is above average:
Event A: The examinee chose two questions, one 
from each page, and answered them correctly. 
Event B: The examinee chose two questions from 
the page containing three questions and answered 
them correctly.
In the third story, each question reflects the examinee’s 
level. In other words, each question functions like an 
expert in the model. The examinee is the petitioner 
and the examiner is the listener. The examinee’s 
ability or inability to answer a question correctly is 
analogous to a situation in which an expert supports 
or opposes the petitioner’s position. The examinee 
tries to persuade the examiner via the answers to only 
two questions that he knows the answers to at least 
three of the questions. 
There is ostensibly no difference between the 
information received if the examinee answers two 
questions given on two different pages or if he 
answers two questions from a single page. Therefore, 
it would be possible to expect that the examiner would 
form the same opinion regardless of whether the 
examinee correctly answers two questions from two 
separate pages or two questions from the same page. 
However, according to our approach, an examinee 
who correctly answers two questions written on the 
same page should be considered more persuasive that 
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an examinee who correctly answers two questions 
written on separate pages.
We presented the story to students and lecturers 
around the world. We asked them to compare the 
persuasiveness of Event A and Event B. We also allowed 
them to say that they find the two events equally 
persuasive. We expected to find that Event B would be 
perceived as more persuasive than Event A. Of 1,300 
respondents, 28% found Event B to be more persuasive 
and 19% found Event A to be more persuasive. 
Since the sample was a large one and 28% is much 
higher than 19%, it could be said that we received 
support for the conjecture that a correct answer on two 
questions from the same page is more convincing. But 
it can also surely be said that the results of the survey 
do not support our assumption because more than half 
of the respondents found the two events to be equal in 
terms of their persuasive power.
Criticism (2)
Our discussion focuses on a very specific case and 
therefore sheds little light on the rules of pragmatics 
in persuasion situations. Furthermore, the discussion 
lacks the depth and understanding necessary to try to 
formulate and explain the natural rules that guide us in 
understanding utterances in persuasion situations. 
While recognizing the limitations of the model and the 
discussion, I found myself speaking about this study not 
only to economists and philosophers, but also to lawyers. 
Words such as: discussion, evidence, arguments and petition 
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tempted me to hint about the possible implications of this 
approach for legal theory. I have nothing at the moment 
to contribute to legal thought, but this has not prevented 
me from reciting for years (and again, here and now) the 
mantra that it might be interesting to view legal procedure 
and the laws of evidence through the lenses of economic 
theory. While jumping from economics to linguistics, and 
from linguistics to the legal world, I recognized another trap.
Trap 5: The interdisciplinary worlds are like the 
universe. They have a tendency to expand nonstop.
And, incidentally, there is another troublesome aspect 
of this interdisciplinary expansion. Under pressure from 
the audience and market forces, universities are dragged 
into approving interdisciplinary programs of study at too 
early a stage in the student’s academic career. In my view, 
an undergraduate student does not need to specialize. 
Instead, he should study a large number of areas from 
a list of basic fields such as: mathematics, philosophy, 
biology, history, physics, art, law and perhaps even 
economics. Challenging and provocative interdisciplinary 
studies should play a prominent role only in the course of 
studies for higher degrees, after the student has absorbed 
the forms of thinking from the basic fields.
Trap 6: The attractiveness of  interdisciplinary studies 
leads students to engage in them at too early a stage 
in their studies, and thus prevents them from building 




We have encountered six traps, jumped from economics 
to language and back, formulated bold assumptions (on 
a narrow base of knowledge) and played with a model. 
I will conclude the discussion with the last and most 
frightening trap of all.
Trap 7: Engaging in interdisciplinary  realms without 
deep knowledge of the basic fields raises suspicion 
of charlatanism.
Now, it remains for me to wonder, perhaps in this 
chapter I fell into Trap 7 myself.
5. (Sort of ) Economic Policy
Beginning
When I was a boy, I strolled every afternoon from my home 
through Shabbat Square toward the Workers’ Library at the 
top of Strauss Street. Half-way up the hill was a kiosk that 
displayed all the daily newspapers, attached by clothes 
pegs to the wide-open metal window shutters. As a curious 
child, I would stop and read the newspapers, peeking 
under the corners of the pages until I had my fill, and then 
continuing on my way. My favorite two newspapers were 
always on the lower-left side. Hamodia – “the Mouthpiece of 
Ultra-Orthodox Jewry” – would vilify the police for 
brutally beating demonstrators at Shabbat Square. 
Kol Ha’am declared: “Workers of the world, unite!” 
and reported unpatriotically about border incidents. 
I became fond of both of them – perhaps because of their 
particularly bold typeface. Perhaps it was because both 
were slim, or perhaps because they gave voice to departed 
heroes my mother would mention with veneration: her 
brother, who would sit in the study hall of the Slonimer 
Hasidic Yeshiva until midnight; and her brother-in-law, 
who was a clandestine communist in Warsaw before 
the war.
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We, who were born into the young State of Israel, grew 
up in the shadow of two cultures. One was Judaism, which 
we did not really know. But we were able to glean bits 
of it from our homes, from the street, from bar mitzvah 
preparations, and from what trickled into Israeli secular 
culture. The second was socialism, which we knew even 
less. We encountered its slogans on bulletin boards, in youth 
movement activity, and in what remained of the values of 
the Zionist socialist society after the establishment of the 
State of Israel. Both Judaism and socialism were regarded 
as absolute truths, great doctrines that provide answers to 
all questions, both intriguing and intimidating. We lived in 
a society that was trying to build a new type of “Israeliness,” 
young and just, an antithesis of the past. But ultimately, 
I absorbed the message of solidarity not from the May Day 
parades, but on the eve of the Yom Kippur service. 
At the Shalom Shachna Meisel synagogue, the children 
would jeer at me as someone who was not familiar with 
the prayer book. The librarian at the Workers’ Union 
Library insulted me by chuckling when I asked to borrow 
Marx’s Das Capital. I wandered between these two giant 
mountains, Judaism and Socialism, not climbing either 
one. I remained at the foot of these mountains, gazing up 
at them wonder. 
Meanwhile, most of the newspapers hanging from the 
iron shutters of the kiosk on Strauss Street disappeared, 
and were replaced by sensational and commercial 
tabloids. A culture of materialism crept into our lives, 
exuding aggression, indulgent, unsatisfying and populist, 
supported by scientific method in the guise of economic 
	 5. (Sort	of )	Economic	Policy	 217
theory. And I found myself part of the infrastructure that 
supports its existence. 
I came to economics only because it serves as a 
workshop for pouring words from real life into formal 
models. I did not imagine that my professional work 
would touch upon questions of economic policy. For 
many years I considered problems of social injustice to be 
of far lesser consequence than the existential questions: 
Jewish identity, what it means to be Israeli, and Israel 
as an occupying nation. Eventually, when I began to 
think also about real-life economics, I realized that I had 
opinions on these issues too. However, my opinions have 
absolutely no relation to economics in its academic sense.
The economic system as a game
My favorite game as a child was Rikuz, the Zionist version 
of Monopoly. In Rikuz, you could build red houses and 
blue hotels, purchase remote communities, and control 
all of the capital of the electric and water companies. 
You could tour the country and even visit Hebron and 
Bethlehem, which were far beyond the border at the time. 
It was great fun to play the game during summer vacation, 
on the cool green floor of my bedroom. 
There are many games that enable children to learn, 
exercise their imaginations and dream. How did we 
choose which game to play? We understood that chess is 
for deep thinkers, that Scrabble is for the fluent of tongue, 
and basketball is intended for the tall. Everyone liked 
a different game. We agreed on which game to play by 
218 Economic Fables
balancing our conflicting desires, and because we wanted 
to stay friends. 
I think of the choice of economic policy in the same way 
as I think of the childhood choice of which game to play.
There are many economic games that enable people 
to consume, produce, contribute to society, grow and 
prosper. Some economic games benefit the workers and 
some benefit the wealthy; some are beneficial to the elderly, 
and some to the young; some of the economic games are 
complicated and suitable only for the best minds, while 
some are simple and can be played by anyone. Most of 
us believe that the rules of the economic game should be 
fair, but there is no consensus on the concept of fairness. 
Is it fair to compensate people according to the fruit of 
their effort or according to the effort itself? Should the 
economic game give more to those who need more? 
Is it right for someone whose parents won a lot in the 
previous game to enjoy an advantage when it is his turn 
to participate in the next game?
In order to define the economic game, answers are 
needed to questions such as: Who are the players? How 
should we deal with redundant players? What moves are 
allowed? What should be done if a few players acquire a 
dominant position in the game? What can be owned and 
traded? Should we take into account the possibility that 
some players have limited ability to play the economic 
game? How flexible are the rules of the game? And what 
course of action should be taken when players opt out of 
the game completely? 
A society must decide which economic game it will 
play. Those who favor the natural economic game, which 
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is seemingly free and without rules, actually support 
an economic game with very rigid rules – the rules of 
the jungle. Economics, as an academic field, has little to 
say about the question of which game to play. I reject 
the term “the right economic game.” The political 
system – through public discussion and the balancing 
of its citizens’ conflicting desires – must decide how to 
formulate and enforce the rules of the economic game. 
The players
The definition of a game begins by specifying the players. 
This is true for board games and equally applies to 
economic games. Nearly all public economic decisions are 
made at the national level. Therefore, the definition of the 
group of players in the economic game is almost identical 
to the definition of who qualifies to be a citizen in the state. 
Citizenship laws define the jurisdiction of the rules of the 
economic game, and also define the individuals whose 
welfare is taken into consideration when setting the rules 
of the game. True, it is possible to imagine a state that not 
only looks after the interests of its own citizens, but acts 
in accordance with the dictates of universal justice. But 
the overwhelming majority of us, even if we care about all 
human beings, feel a stronger commitment to the covenant 
with our fellow countrymen and members of our nation. 
We feel that the rules of the game should serve, first and 
foremost, the members of our own society, protect us from 
those outside of the society’s borders and perhaps even 
enable us to grow stronger at the expense of other nations. 
Who is entitled to join the nation? Who will be excluded? 
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Who will be born into the covenant and who will not be 
born at all? These are difficult questions that have an 
enormous impact on the society in which we live and, of 
course, on its economy as well. 
“Who are the players?” we ask, and must address 
the rules of acceptance for new members to our club. In 
other words, we are dealing with immigration policy. 
The immigration laws in Israel are both inclusive 
and exclusive. On the one hand, they do not enable 
non-Jews to join the club, and on the other, they mandate 
the absorption of anyone who is defined under Israeli 
law as a Jew. Israel has shouted for years: “aliya!” (Jewish 
immigration) and conducts a policy of encouraging 
immigration by anyone who claims a genetic connection, 
even a dubious one, to the Jewish people. Thus, Israel 
has absorbed church-going Christians only because 
the family name of one of their grandparents sounded 
Jewish, and has brought in groups of people who 
practiced traditions that somehow resembled Jewish 
ones. Bringing them to Israel was not motivated by 
universal humanitarian motives or aimed at building a 
culturally unique society. If we felt we were carrying the 
entire world on our shoulders, we would open the gates 
to refugees seeking entrance at our borders and would 
not expel people who had the misfortune to be born in 
lands devoid of hope and who found a future among 
us. If we intended to build a society with a common 
cultural foundation, we would have fenced ourselves 
off from others according to cultural distinctions rather 
than ethnic ones. When all is said and done, the guiding 
principle of our immigration policy is apologetically 
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racial. The desire not to appear as racists led us to suffice 
with a requirement for a flimsy genetic connection to 
the Jewish people. In recent years, this policy has also 
brought some immigrants whose connection to the 
Jewish people is a weak one, whose commitment to 
Israeli society is limited, and whose contribution to the 
economy is minimal. 
“Who are the players?” we ask, and contend with 
the question of policy regarding the birthrate. Israel 
has always acted according to an ethos of encouraging 
childbirth. We have glorified families with many children 
(called “blessed with children” in Hebrew) even as we 
realized that most of them would have meager resources. 
The roots of the birthrate policy can be traced to the 
instinct of refilling the ranks that arose in the wake of 
the Holocaust. However, this policy engendered a tragic 
situation: we are inundated with births only among the 
population groups that are in dire need of assistance from 
others. And the others who are supposed to support the 
children of those groups are not eager to do so, and it is 
hard to blame them.
“Who are the players?” we ask, and need to decide on 
the status of the temporary players – that is, we need to 
formulate a policy regarding foreign workers. In recent 
decades, many countries, including Israel, hastily brought 
in large numbers of foreign workers out of national greed. 
We treated them as if they were raw material. Employing 
them improved the situation of the middle and upper 
classes, who enjoyed cheap and submissive labor, but it 
worsened the situation of those who could only serve as 
unskilled workers, particularly in the sectors in which 
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the foreign workers were employed. We did not want to 
regard the foreign workers as part of our society, but the 
avarice blinded us from seeing that sooner or later they, or 
their children, would indeed become part of our society.
There is a consensus in Israel that it is one of the most 
talented nations, if not the most talented in the world. 
However, the nation is not a well-defined entity. Not 
every collection of human beings, even if it lives close to 
the holy places, can lay claim to this title. 
The policy of providing incentives for childbirth, the 
policy on foreign workers, and the immigration policy 
are changing Israeli society to a greater extent than the 
construction of a subway in Tel Aviv, the addition of 
thousands of teachers to the education system, or the 
building of a land bridge between Yemen and Cyprus. 
Encouraging childbirth among the weaker segments of 
society and actively promoting immigration through 
negative selection – while at the same time expecting 
constant growth in per capita GDP and an improvement 
in pupils’ achievements in the schools – is an expression 
of national psychological repression. Per capita GDP, 
which economists regard as an index of a society’s wealth, 
is “the value of the national product” divided by the 
number of people in the society – and the denominator, 
not only the numerator, affects the quotient.
Many moral and ideological considerations influence 
the decision about who will play our national economic 
game. This decision has absolutely nothing to do with 
insights derived from economics. An economist’s words 
carry the same weight as anyone else’s on these issues. 
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The redundant players
The time: tenth grade, perhaps eleventh grade. The place: 
near the Allenby military base in Jerusalem. The event: a 
day with the Gadna Youth Corps, devoted to intensive 
pre-military training. The counselor appoints two group 
leaders, who alternately choose children for their groups. 
The groups are supposed to form two lines. Each child, in 
turn, has to run to the tree several hundred meters away 
and back, and when he gets back, the next child in the line 
sets off. The air is full of adolescent excitement, two years 
before their army call-up. It is strange how much people 
care about their group winning, even when they are 
divided into groups arbitrarily, and by the next day will 
not remember who was in which group. This competition 
really did not suit me. I was not physically fit, suffered 
from a lack of motivation and hated all physical activity. 
The group leaders had good reason to believe that even 
social pressure would not push me to succeed in finishing 
the run. In other words, the group that was “lucky” to 
have me on its team would never win. It goes without 
saying that they chose me last, after all of the girls. I was 
an unwanted player.
Each person comes to the conventional model 
of the economic market with a “basket.” There are 
consumption goods in the basket, as well as production 
inputs to manufacture other products, and an important 
commodity called time. Each person would like to 
receive as much as he can, while giving as little as he 
can. And the market determines the terms of exchange 
for all of the products. In the model, as in reality, people 
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are not equal; some have many assets and others have 
few. It seems that at least in one commodity, time, we 
are all equal: each morning, we all wake up and have at 
our disposal a treasure of 24 hours. But even in this there 
is no equality. People differ in their ability to turn time 
into other desirable products. A good education system 
tries to rectify the inequality in the productive capacity 
of people. However, it is not at all clear that progress and 
education compensate for the innate differences between 
human beings. As a result of technological progress, 
it is no longer necessary to exploit tens of thousands 
of slaves to build pyramids. It is unnecessary to send 
millions of soldiers to attack an enemy, and we can get 
by without batteries of women bent over small sewing 
machines. Very many people have become redundant. 
The economic desires and needs of human beings can be 
fulfilled without these superfluous people.
In children’s games, there are ways to get rid of 
superfluous players. The other children “forget” to invite 
to the game a boy who dreams of playing in the NBA 
but does not know where to shoot the ball. A player in 
the chess club who always loses and spoils the match is 
showered with ridicule until he keeps away. I quickly 
realized that it was best for me to keep away from sports.
In the economic game, the redundant players do not 
vanish. If they could migrate to another country where 
they would be less redundant, many of them would do so. 
But the option to migrate is very limited. The redundant 
are on the fringes of society, censured and blamed for 
their own unfortunate situation. Society calls upon them 
to break out of the cycle of unemployment through 
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programs for professional retraining that they have no 
chance of completing. They stand in endless lines to 
receive welfare benefits that are barely enough to sustain 
them. Some of them take consolation in the illusion that 
one day, things will be better, and if not for them, at least 
for their children. All this only hides a simple truth: we 
have no need for the redundant, they have no economic 
value. Economics has nothing to say about the question of 
how to contend with their redundancy. 
Permissible actions
Every game has rules that define what is permissible 
and what is prohibited, who can do what and when. 
The rules of the game are intended to give each of 
the players an equal standing. Sometimes there is no 
alternative, and the rules create inequality among the 
participants. For example, someone has to play with 
the white pieces in chess and receives the advantage 
that white has over black. But even when the rules of 
the game do not discriminate the players, they have an 
impact in determining who will be the strong players in 
the game. If the rules of basketball allowed players to 
shove their opponents, the outstanding players would 
be like football heroes. If the rules of the game of chess 
prohibited the players from looking at the board and 
they needed to play by memory alone, a chess master 
with poor memory would become weak. If scrabble 
players were allowed to use a computer, the outstanding 
players would be Internet mavens rather than those 
with a rich vocabulary. 
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The rules of the economic game are heaped together in 
countless voluminous books of laws, regulations, rulings 
and administrative instructions. They are worded in a 
way that purports to place all players on an equal footing. 
But only ostensibly. 
Take, for example, the players of the economic game 
called entrepreneurs. An entrepreneur chooses a business 
in which to invest his capital and energy. The decision 
whether to allow entrepreneurs to open manpower 
businesses is likely to affect the outcome of the economic 
game, and to be significant not only for the entrepreneur, 
but also for the workers and employers. 
Let’s consider the case of a female engineer who is 
interested in working if she can find someone to help 
her with the housework. Across the street lives a woman 
who can serve as a cleaning lady but cannot work as 
an engineer. It would be beneficial for everyone if the 
woman across the street devotes time to helping with the 
engineer’s housework and, in exchange, receives some of 
the engineer’s earnings. Two questions arise. First, how 
will the two women find each other? And second, what 
portion of the engineer’s earnings should she give to the 
cleaning lady?
“Matchmaking” mechanisms create these matches: 
bulletin boards, employment bureaus, social connections 
or private intermediaries. The engineer will not publish an 
advertisement in the newspaper if cleaning ladies do not 
look at the Help Wanted ads, and the cleaning lady will 
not visit the employment bureau if potential employers 
do not turn to these bureaus to look for workers. If private 
individuals can open manpower agencies, an equilibrium 
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might be created in which all of those involved, from both 
sides of the street, turn to a single manpower agency that 
operates in the area. In this equilibrium, the agent is in a 
position to charge a significant agent’s fee as a condition 
for putting the engineer and the cleaning lady in touch 
with each other. The result is that the engineer’s income 
will be divided not only between the engineer and the 
cleaning lady, but also with the agent. 
What is wrong with this? First, a manpower agency 
is simply unnecessary. Ostensibly, it is a service that 
matches workers and employers. But the engineer 
and the cleaning lady can easily be matched via other 
means: bulletin boards, community centers, employment 
bureaus and the Internet. The problem of suitability is 
not a complicated one in the case of cleaning ladies, and 
the nature of the relationship depends mainly on their 
meeting in person. The entrepreneurs make a profit not 
because of their contributions to others, but because they 
position themselves on the bridge between employers 
and employees. Second, for various reasons manpower 
agencies in this market give preference to the employers’ 
interests over those of the workers. The result is not only 
that they eat into the wages of the cleaning lady. They 
also influence the outcome of the negotiation between 
the engineer and the cleaning lady and prevent the 
cleaning lady from benefiting from her economic power 
even when there is a shortage of cleaning ladies in the 
market. Most remarkable are the importers of foreign 
workers, who bring them to Israel and often collect fees 
that are equivalent to a year’s wages – a fee greatly out 
of proportion with the expenses involved in arranging 
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their transfer from their home countries to their place of 
employment. When there is a severe shortage of foreign 
workers, the manpower agencies separate the demand 
and supply sides, and ensure that the shortage in workers 
is translated into an increase in their profits rather than a 
raise in the workers’ wages.
Other entrepreneurs mediate between workers and 
employers, presenting themselves as service contractors. 
They sell a product called home cleaning without citing 
the identity of the worker who will do the work. Instead 
of employing the worker directly, the engineer contacts 
the contractor who provides her with the submissive 
worker. The contractor relieves the engineer of the 
headache of employing the worker, as well as of any 
guilt feelings about the fact that the wage is below the 
minimum wage. During the past decades, one can find 
these service contractors almost everywhere. Public and 
private entities have grown tired of employing cleaning 
personnel, gardeners and security guards directly (“Who 
has the patience to deal with them?”), and they employ 
these workers via a service contractor whose main job is 
to make sure that the worker’s salary and status remain 
low – for the benefit of their clients and their own profits.
The rules of the economic game must determine which 
moves are permissible for these talented entrepreneurs 
who have the knack of identifying business opportunities. 
Just as the government prohibits touting movie tickets, it 
could prevent entrepreneurs from acting as middlemen 
between workers and employers. At the same time, just 
as the government is committed to issuing currency notes, 
it is obliged to operate a public employment service that 
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connects workers and employers in a simple and efficient 
way, without nibbling away a piece of the pie.
No, I do not think that the government should provide 
matchmaking services in all economic areas. In the luxury 
housing market, for example, the estate agents share 
information with the buyers and sellers, thus facilitating 
activity in the market. There is less risk of estate agents 
prejudicing the outcome of the bargaining because the 
buyers and sellers in the luxury housing market have 
more or less equal capabilities. Sometimes the market 
players are on the side of the seller and sometimes on 
the side of the buyer. Government intervention in this 
market is redundant because it would not prevent or 
correct injustice, or improve the efficiency of dealing in 
this market.
The employment conditions of workers at the lower 
end of the scale have received some public attention in 
recent years, and a number of regulations have been 
introduced that slightly enhance the standing of these 
workers in the economic game. It was not professional 
economists who generated this change. Even after 
legislative reforms, these workers remained powerless 
and transparent in the workplaces where they scrub, 
garden and guard. In the future too, the weak may find 
more consolation in poems than in the discussion papers 
of economists. 
The problem of wealth
Every few years, the world of children revolves around 
cards with pictures of cartoon heroes, sports champions 
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or weapons of war. In schoolyards, children gather with 
the cards they purchased at the nearby kiosk. The children 
repeatedly play a particularly simple game that ends 
with the loser surrendering one card to the winner. The 
children also trade the cards according to a price system 
determined in the children’s market and expressing the 
rarity of the cards. All is peaceful until one morning a 
child comes to school whose parents treated him to a large 
number of cards. The child’s pockets bulging with cards 
arouse great envy, not only among the children who have 
no cards at all, but also among the “middle class,” who 
have just a few. Occasionally, he graciously gives a card 
or two to a child he wants to be nice to or as protection 
money to the class bully. This is sufficient to win him an 
exalted status in the society of children. But one day, the 
“exalted one” goes outside during the recess and forgets 
his cards in his satchel. When he returns to the classroom, 
he screams. The cards have disappeared. 
Game designers assume that players want to win. 
But winning is not always players’ only objective. There 
are chess players who do not want to take advantage of 
a blunder by their opponent and allow the opponent to 
take back a foolish move, even when this means giving 
up a sure victory. There are sprinters who are mainly 
interested in their time, and would rather come last in a 
race against champions than win against poor opposition. 
But some players also have less positive objectives: those 
who not only want to win, but to win again and again, 
and to do so in a big way, in order to feel the intoxication 
of superiority over their rivals, that gives them status and 
power. 
	 5. (Sort	of )	Economic	Policy	 231
The accepted model in economics assumes that 
people are interested in enjoying as much as possible: 
bread, books, health services and living space. Money 
is intended to be a means of exchange for obtaining 
goods and has no intrinsic worth. In the economic game, 
however, people have desires beyond the aspiration to 
increase their consumption basket. Some of these desires 
are beneficial to others. There are merchants who do not 
feel comfortable exploiting a mistake by another party 
to a transaction. Some employers feel they should pay a 
decent wage to their workers, above the market price. But 
there are problematic desires too. One such example is 
the desire of very wealthy people to become very, very 
wealthy. This only involves a small number of people, but 
these few can determine the fate of many other people. 
If they become even more affluent, this will only have a 
marginal impact on their consumption. Even Bill Gates 
does not eat more than five eggs a day and cannot travel 
simultaneously in two private jets. Extremely affluent 
people long for greater wealth, but not in order to get 
more consumer goods. Success itself is what enchants 
them. Some of them enjoy being able to share their wealth 
with others; some of them crave the power of control over 
those who are subject to their authority and benevolence.
Many countries suffer from the problem of wealth – 
that is, the concentration of great wealth (and therefore, 
great power) in the hands of a few. What is wrong with 
this? We do not want a class of aristocrats to control our 
lives, regardless of how small and enlightened this group 
might be. Concentration of wealth is anti-democratic 
because the idea of democracy does not only mean 
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conducting elections every four years, but also aspiring 
to distribute political power equally between all citizens. 
Whoever is not worried about oligarchy, whoever does not 
want to take responsibility and make an impact, whoever 
prefers that others determine his way of life – must hope 
that the wealthy elite turns out to be a community of 
angels who do not abuse their power.
The damages caused by the concentration of wealth 
can be seen in the daily evidence of tycoons wielding 
influence over public figures and the media, the takeover 
of public assets through the exploitation of wealth, and the 
use of wealth for political purposes. Even philanthropy, 
the charitable aspect of wealth, is not necessarily as 
welcome as it seems. When a society assigns authority to 
philanthropists, it also leaves them to set the priorities. 
For example, as a result of generous donations received, 
the universities develop in directions that are far from 
being the result of academic considerations and national 
priorities. Some of the salient changes in academia and 
in cultural institutions have expressed the priorities of 
tycoons interested in commemorating themselves and 
their relatives on the walls of buildings. And these refined 
individuals prefer quasi-academic areas rather than the 
faculties of arts and science. 
The problem of poverty is urgent and cries out for 
attention. The problem of wealth is less obvious, but 
threatens to transform democracy into a mere formality. 
From one perspective, it is easier to address the problem 
of poverty because it involves giving, while dealing with 
the problem of wealth requires taking. People get angry 
when they do not receive something they feel is due to 
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them, but they are very, very angry when something 
they already possess is taken from them. Let’s look at the 
inheritance tax, for example. It is the most just tax I know. 
It is so just that there would be justification for it even 
if the government did not collect taxes at all. Inheritance 
tax dilutes the concentration of capital in the hands of 
the few. The tax is only slightly detrimental to the system 
of incentives that encourages people to conduct useful 
economic activity. Nonetheless, and despite the fact that 
inheritance tax is imposed in nearly all of the countries we 
envy, there is enormous opposition to instituting this tax 
in Israel. The tax is perceived by most people, including 
those who are not affluent, as crueler than income tax. 
This is because income tax takes something that is not yet 
owned, while inheritance tax takes a bite out of something 
that has already found a home among a person’s assets. 
Economic models generally ignore the aspiration of 
individuals to gain power and control over other people. 
The problem of wealth is not a topic of discussion in the 
customary economic discourse.
Assets
The rules of the game specify what each player holds at the 
beginning of the game. In chess, each player starts the game 
with 16 pieces ready to capture and eliminate the other 
player’s pieces. At the beginning of the game of Monopoly, 
most of the assets are in the bank. The players receive 
banknotes throughout the game. They can accumulate the 
banknotes or convert them to properties, houses, hotels or 
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railroads at prices set in advance by the designer of the game. 
Players cannot take a coin from their pocket and add it to the 
game. The houses are not tradable between the players, and 
you cannot take a loan from the bank.
In the economic game too, someone (the state, who 
else…) must decide which assets the players can play 
with. We are familiar with the idea of a commune, in 
which all of the property belongs to the collective; 
the collective not only decides the fate of the material 
assets, but also decides what work each individual will 
do, what he will eat and what he will wear. On the 
other hand, in the completely free market, a person can 
sell himself into slavery, his body for prostitution and 
his body parts for transplants. Between a commune, 
where there is no place for private ownership, and 
an economic system in which every object belongs to 
someone and everything is tradable, there is a broad 
range of possibilities. In order for ownership to have 
validity, the community must recognize it and it must 
be backed by an enforcement authority. The designer 
of the economic game is the one who determines which 
assets can be owned, which assets are tradable, which 
assets will be under the state’s control and which will 
be privately owned. 
I think that most of us believe that it is appropriate 
for a person to own what he has produced with his own 
two hands and that a person has a right to trade what he 
has produced in exchange for something else. Most of us 
also believe that a person’s ownership of his body should 
be protected and should not be an object of commerce; 
that parks and beaches should not be in private hands. 
Beyond these principles, the issues are controversial. 
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I understand the revulsion felt in light of the revelations 
of corruption and waste in the public service, revulsion that 
feeds the enthusiasm for the privatization process, which 
is essentially a transfer of control over assets from public to 
private hands. But the sale of a bank to a businessman does 
not ensure its efficient operation and certainly does not 
improve its business ethics. Before a government company 
is privatized, the appointment of a crony as CEO is liable to 
result in a criminal indictment. After the privatization, the 
appointment of a party activist favored by the controlling 
owner is considered to be his right. 
True, it is problematic to assign too many tasks 
and authorities to the state. The government is too 
large an entity, with an abundance of missions and a 
narrow-topped pyramid structure. Leaders, like tycoons, 
sometimes use their power – and not necessarily for the 
good. I also believe that it would be best for us if the 
government focuses on governing rather than managing. 
The government should concentrate on defining and 
enforcing the rules of the economic game and not engage 
in the ongoing management of matters that others can 
execute without fear of harming the public interest. But 
removing control of the nation’s assets from government 
hands does not require converting them into private, fully 
tradable assets. In order to address the problem of wealth, 
the concept of ownership of assets of special public 
interest could be defined in a way that restricts the use 
that can be made of them. For example, we could require 
that the ownership of such assets be distributed between 
a large number of individuals, or that a government 
company that passes into private hands be managed with 
extra consideration for the welfare of the employees. 
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Assets can be outside of government control and still 
not under private ownership. Authority could be divided 
between the government and a public non-governmental 
entity that manages the nation’s assets. The directors of 
the Public Economy Authority could be elected by the 
founder shareholders – that is, all of the citizens of the 
state – rather than being appointed by the government. 
It is not absurd that citizens would not only elect their 
leaders but also the directors of this Authority. (In 
the U.S., the attorneys general are also elected by the 
public.) The director must be a person of integrity, with 
managerial attributes. He should be committed only to 
the public that elected him and will perhaps reelect him, 
and must consider not only the balance sheets of the 
Public Economy Authority, but also the Authority’s level 
of service and how it treats its employees.
Of the assets that individuals can accumulate, land 
is the best candidate for expropriation. The Bible was 
familiar with this notion too. The economic significance 
of the idea of the jubilee year is that land is to be held 
by individuals for a limited period and is eventually 
redistributed among all. Land is also a unique asset in the 
high-tech era, a sought-after treasure that is dwindling 
quickly and which cannot be smuggled abroad or 
imported without wars. Leaving land in public hands 
and only selling leasing rights would drastically reduce 
the problem of wealth without harming market activity. 
Even if the rules of the economic game do not permit the 
accumulation of land, people will continue to be exposed 
to enough incentives to work and exert themselves. 
The question of ownership is discussed in economics, 
but the main economic discourse focuses on the efficiency 
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of various ownership arrangements. In any case, it 
seems to me that the views of economists regarding the 
boundary between the public and private ultimately 
derive from emotional positions rather than scholarly 
conclusions. Some are wary of government and would 
like to hand the world over to the private sector, while 
others are outraged by tycoons and wish to strengthen 
the power of the state. I see nothing wrong with this. 
I do not see why economic models have a place in these 
matters and emotions do not.
The player’s limitations
When we think in game theory about a game, we assume 
that the players have a perfect ability to play it. In 
tic-tac-toe, for example, it is reasonable to assume that 
each player prefers a victory to a tie, and prefers a tie to a 
defeat. Thus, we have a game with an absolute conflict of 
interests. Some will argue that if both players are rational, 
game theory proves that the outcome of the game is known 
in advance – a tie. This is because each player in the game 
has a strategy that ensures he will not lose, regardless of 
what his opponent does. Consequently, if the game does 
not end in a tie, at least one of the two players must have 
made a wrong move at least once, a move that led to a 
situation in which the other player could win.
But human beings are not perfect players. They 
make errors and do not always take advantage of 
opportunities. Despite the fact that tic-tac-toe is a 
well-known and simple game, not everyone is familiar 
with the strategies guaranteeing that a player will 
not lose in the game. This fact enables the game to 
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survive. No one would be interested in participating 
in a game whose outcome is known in advance. The 
limited rationality of the players makes the game 
more interesting than it appears when analyzed 
via game theory. This also applies to other games. 
A game’s outcome is likely to be unpredictable, even 
when we have a mathematical theorem stating that 
if the players act rationally, the outcome of the game 
is known in advance. The outcome of a game in the 
real world depends on the abilities of the players to 
play the game, i.e., their memory or logical ability, 
associative ability or manipulativeness.
Most of the players in the economic game have only 
limited familiarity with the economic game and make 
plenty of mistakes. Almost all of us have difficulty 
accepting rational decisions on substantial matters such 
as pension planning and health insurance. And, of course, 
most of us are unable to trade in derivatives on the markets 
in Chicago and Shanghai (if we even know what they 
are). Most economic players find it difficult to identify 
economic opportunities and respond to them. This is a 
problem for supporters of traditional economic thought, 
which assumes the existence of an unlimited number of 
entrepreneurs ready to jump at every opportunity that 
comes their way. A complex economic environment gives 
an advantage to speculative and manipulative players. 
The designers of the economic games tend to ignore the 
emotional and cognitive qualities required to excel at 
the game. I think the designers of board games are more 
sensitive to the personal qualities the game rewards and 
encourages.
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The flexibility in the rules of the game
We all hated to lose in our childhood games. We were hurt, 
angry and kicked. Sometimes one of us would suddenly 
announce – that is, after realizing that the accepted version 
of the game was not working to his advantage – that we 
were actually playing a different version of the game. 
Usually it was the strong kid who made this declaration. 
We had no choice but to yield to him, to be angry and hold 
our tongues. 
The players who are high up in the economic game, 
as enlightened as they pretend to be, aim to preserve 
their status and wealth. When market forces finally are 
about to benefit those who are lower down, someone 
announces that we are actually playing according to 
a different version of the game, one that ensures that 
everyone remains in their assigned places. 
Here is an example: according to the rules of the 
economic game of the free market, occasional excesses of 
supply and demand affect prices, including the price of 
labor. The import of foreign workers in a particular industry 
affects the supply of labor and lowers the wages of those 
working (or who could have been working) in that industry. 
The movement of foreign workers is not determined only 
by market forces. We live in a village that is less global than 
it seems. Capital flows have become freer, but few people, 
even among those who champion the free market, would 
argue for the unregulated migration of labor. The designer 
of the economic game still sets entry quotas for foreign 
workers, even in states that practice economic liberalism. 
In order to comply with the principles of the free market, 
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the designer must define a policy for importing workers in 
a particular industry that will depend on how critical the 
labor shortage is in that industry, and will ignore the status 
of those employed in it. 
Indeed, for years there was a shortage of registered 
nurses, computer programmers and even economics 
professors in Israel, on the one hand, as well as of farm 
workers, caregivers and construction workers on the 
other. In conventional economic parlance, the added 
value to the economy of a worker in the first group of 
professions was higher than the added value of a worker 
in the second group. In all of these professions, there are 
very many foreign workers highly willing to come and 
work here for wages that are lower than those of Israeli 
workers. But we did not see plane loads of registered 
nurses and programmers at the airport, not to speak of 
economics professors. But we did see planes full of Thai 
workers, Filipino caregivers and Romanian construction 
workers. For years the state has permitted the entry of 
foreign workers in industries where local workers are 
not unionized and lack political power, and has refrained 
from doing this in industries with a well-organized work 
force, despite the fact that in those fields the contribution 
of foreign workers to the economy could have been 
greater. 
So, when attorneys, accountants, economics professors 
or programmers are lucky and the demand for these 
professionals exceeds the supply, then it is all well and 
good for their wages to rise, as the free expression of 
market forces. But when it appears that luck is shining on 
those who are only capable of working as caretakers, and 
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the surge in demand threatens to benefit them, pressures 
are exerted to make the rules of the game more flexible and 
allow the import of foreign workers, thus preventing the 
market forces from performing their role. I am not aware 
of any moral or economic justification for this absurdity. 
In order to understand how this occurs, there is no need 
to study economics. You just need to recall how the strong 
children changed the rules of the game when they were 
not to their liking.
Spoiling the game
Sometimes in children’s games, a great drama is enacted, 
when some players abruptly quit in protest. This happens 
after some of the children are struck by a feeling that 
something is unfair to them. In the economic game we 
play, this type of abrupt exit from the game is also not a 
far-fetched scenario. Let’s imagine that we have reached 
the (not so distant) moment when there is nothing left to 
privatize. The postal bank, hospitals, universities, prisons 
and television channels – all have been privatized. An 
oligarch who made his money on a soccer team and 
power plants in Sleazistan has completed the acquisition 
of the police. All of the nation’s lands have been sold. 
Nature Day, which was once a festival of renewal, became 
the holiday of privatization, celebrating the victory of the 
forest over the wasteland, efficiency over bureaucracy, 
the private over the public. 
But then some minor shareholders, who invested 
their money in the largest company in the state, discover 
that the company’s chairman of the board has appointed 
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his son, a famous ne’er-do-well, to manage a subsidiary 
company. These shareholders file a class-action suit 
against the company’s defective management, claiming 
that the firm’s obligation is to maximize its profits and not 
to pamper the well-born. This does not entail a criminal 
offense, so they cannot ask the police to get involved. The 
embittered shareholders are unable to prove that the 
appointment stemmed from extraneous interests, and the 
lawsuit is rejected. 
Next, the shortage of land in the metropolitan area 
engenders a rumor that several tycoons from overseas 
have gained control of most of the valuable lands in the 
area, and are refusing to sell them, anticipating a rise 
in prices during the coming decade. At the same time, 
there is an unexpected water shortage, despite the fact 
that it has not been a particularly dry year. Someone on 
a popular television program claims that the privatized 
water companies have collaborated to cut back the supply 
of water in order to drive up its price. However, no one is 
watching the program because on the competing channel 
the reality show A Director is Born is being broadcast. 
Rumors are circulating that the value of pension funds’ 
investments in Mongolian currency slumped after 
Mongolia’s application to join the European Union was 
rejected, contrary to expectations. This leads to a new 
banking crisis.
The situation reaches a boiling point when a dirty 
bomb is discovered in the subway. The privatized market 
finds it difficult to cope with the catastrophe. Investors 
reach the conclusion that the idea of investing in this 
country is not only uneconomic, it is crazy. 
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At this stage, people begin to have a sneaking 
suspicion that perhaps we have gone too far. There is a 
growing realization among the public that privatization 
has transferred control of the society from the hands 
of elected politicians, who are subject to some sort of 
oversight, to other people who are no less infantile, who 
do whatever they want. Now, only one thing remains for 
the people of this country to do: to change the rules. Or, in 
other words – nationalize. 
At best, there are only a lot of tears shed when the 
rules are changed in the economic game. It is really not 
very pleasant. Unlike privatization, nationalization hurts; 
and only when it occurs do we recall that the smartest 
way to prevent the cruelty of expropriation is to make it 
less easy to accumulate wealth. The economists I know 
do not discuss nationalization, at least not until very 
recently. For those who wish to be ahead of their time, 
I would advise putting aside their research plans and 
starting to discuss the question that will become more 
relevant – what to nationalize and how to go about it.
Almost the end
It is possible to discuss social and economic issues in an 
abstract way and to treat Israel like Finland and Thailand, 
as just another society whose members want to survive, 
plus a little bit more. But a fundamental problem makes 
Israel unique. The existence of the national home for the 
Jewish people in the Land of Israel has about as much 
economic logic as building a convalescent home on a 
traffic island. I use the word economic in the sense in 
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which in recent years we have examined the need for 
public infant welfare clinics, the construction of the 
separation wall and the transition to alternative energies. 
Yes, it is possible to build a sanitarium on a traffic island. 
You just need to also build acoustic walls to block the 
noise, stop the traffic on the highway whenever a guest 
arrives, or (if this is not sufficient) completely close 
the highway. A convalescent home on a traffic island 
would disappear if our economic world were managed 
by the forces of the free market, which would move 
the convalescent home from the traffic island to the 
mountain forests.
Let the market forces operate over time without 
constraints and you will find that the Zionist project is 
foolhardy. Look at the members of this so-called talented 
nation, from the development towns to the nouveaux 
riches high-rises of Tel Aviv, and send them forth, from 
Manhattan to Silicon Valley, and you will receive a 
much more economically efficient outcome. And here’s 
a thought that is not mere demagoguery. Israel’s annual 
defense expenditure per average Jewish family in Israel 
would be enough to pay a year’s rent on a fine home – four 
bedrooms, two baths and a garden – in Wisconsin. If you 
add the cost of investment in the West Bank settlements, 
you could also have a swimming pool.
Perhaps things would be different if we lived in a 
virtual Middle East in which Israel had peace with its 
neighbors and led the region to progress and prosperity. 
I am doubtful about the possibility of such an ideal space. 
According to both the Zionist left and the messianic right, 
the Jewish state is inherently separate and aloof.
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Anyone who wants a Jewish state in the Land of Israel 
must accept the necessity of imposing limitations on the free 
economy. In order for Israel to exist, its citizens – particularly 
its most talented and mobile ones – must have a reason to 
live there even at a significantly lower standard of living 
than they could enjoy elsewhere. Some have a religious 
reason for this: the holiness of life in the Land of Israel. For 
the majority, this reason can be the language, or the unique 
culture, or ensuring the framework of strong solidarity that 
includes a commitment to the principles of the welfare state: 
ensuring a basic basket of services – in the fields of health, 
housing, education, security and law.
Adherence to the principles of the welfare state does 
not contradict the value of personal responsibility. I am not 
referring to the prime minister’s personal responsibility 
to resign after embarking on an unnecessary war (though 
taking such personal responsibility would not hurt either), 
but rather the personal responsibility of the individual 
for himself and his family. Thus, for example, the Home 
Front Command must make sure that bomb shelters 
meet the required standards, but the maintenance of the 
shelters should be performed by the citizens who are 
slated to use them in time of trouble. The welfare bureau 
should care for broken families and for those who are 
alone in the world. But the elderly bedridden man from 
the north who has family in central Israel should be cared 
for during a rocket attack by his children, grandchildren 
and great-grandchildren, and not by officials from the 
municipality’s welfare department. Ensuring a basic level 
of health for all citizens is one of the foundations of the 
welfare state, but the decision whether to devote financial 
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resources today for costly, life-extending drugs tomorrow 
should be made by each individual for himself through 
insurance plans whose premiums are linked to income. 
Even if Israel continues to sanctify the Law of Return, the 
responsibility for absorbing new immigrants to Israel 
should be assumed by the immigrants themselves. 
The concept of the welfare state reflects a set of values 
expressed in Israel’s declaration of independence: “The 
State of Israel… will be based on freedom, justice and 
peace as envisaged by the prophets of Israel.” And the 
prophets of Israel were not market economists. But 
I fear the worldview that demands exaggerated public 
responsibility for the individual. I am afraid that the 
group in society which is supposed to take care of 
others will not be able to carry the burden expected 
of it and will find refuge in right-wing economics. 
Perhaps we complain too much about society shirking 
its responsibility for the individual and too little about 
the individual’s exaggerated expectations for society to 
protect him. Solidarity does not require patronage, and 
society’s concern for the weak is not a license for evading 
personal responsibility. Exemption from personal 
responsibility is not efficient, is unfair and constitutes an 
imposition on others.
End
On one side of my room when I was a child stood a large 
dresser, with an alarm clock and my mother’s sewing box 
perched on top of it. Inside the dresser was the forbidden 
drawer containing the secret letters and pictures that 
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my mother and father kept from their parents’ homes. 
Next to the dresser was a large bookcase containing an 
encyclopedia for the young, a world atlas, Edmondo De 
Amicis’s The Heart, and several other books that I read over 
and over again. Along the walls, opposite each other, were 
two iron beds with squeaky springs. On the other side of 
the room, opposite the dresser, stood a desk that faced a 
three-leaf window and two large, green trees that protected 
me from the southern sun and caressed me on summer 
days. Even now, when I think of an exciting moment that 
occurred not long ago while sitting at a desk – thinking, 
writing or speaking on the phone – I imagine myself sitting 
at that desk from my childhood and looking out through 
the window at the two trees.
Between this bedroom furniture, my soccer field 
stretched across the floor of the room. The field was 
a matrix of green tiles, twelve tiles long and nine tiles 
wide. When I discovered in the encyclopedia that the 
dimensions of a regulation soccer field are 120 meters 
long and 90 meters wide, my soccer field became perfect. 
The goal posts were red-topped, lacquered wooden pins, 
remnants of a children’s bowling set I received as a gift 
from neighbors on the day my sister celebrated her bat 
mitzvah. Two large Lego pieces represented the two 
teams. A blue Lego piece was the Israeli national team 
and a red, green or yellow one represented the foreign 
team. The ball was a small Lego piece. I would hold 
the two large Lego pieces in my hands, dribble, pass, 
kick, block, miss and score on behalf of all twenty-two 
players. The Israeli national team included all of the 
stars of the period, with one exception: I played in place 
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of one of the forwards. And I was also Nehemiah Ben 
Avraham, the legendary Israeli sports announcer who 
broadcast all major matches, and now also those from 
the stadium on the floor. I could not remember the real 
names of the players on foreign teams, so the lineup of 
the rival teams was always: Ig (goalkeeper), Big and Gig 
(defenders), Dig, Vig and Zig (midfielders), and Hig, Tig, 
Kig, Lig and Mig (forwards). When a goal was scored, 
the roar of the crowd escaped my lips in a whisper, 
because the game was top secret and no-one could 
watch it. When someone was about to enter the room, I 
would hide the Lego pieces between the clumps of fluff 
under the dresser and stand with the feigned innocence 
of someone who has something to conceal. During most 
of the game, the rival team was ahead and held a 3:0 
lead in the final minutes. But then, an unknown forward 
(that is, I) would score four goals to win a great victory 
for the team in blue. 
I would immerse myself in this game almost every day, 
even when I was already in high school. In fact, perhaps 
I am still playing the same game. The room became lecture 
halls and academic journals. The Lego pieces became the 
players in the formal models. I realized that the green 
floor was an imaginary world that enabled me to do 
what I could not do in the real game in the neighborhood. 
Standing by the podium, I realize that the models I deal 
with in economics are fables. The games on the cold floor 
did not help me play soccer and the economic models 
have not helped me formulate views on social issues. 
Everything, for better or worse, comes from those green 
tiles and remains there.
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family and career. In doing so, he challenges many of the central tenets 
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economists as it is enlightening for newcomers to the field.
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